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Economic Growth Nexus in Saudi Arabia: 1968 -2010 
 
By 
 
Mohammed Moosa Ageli 
 
Abstract: 
Economic growth and development remains an important policy issue for most 
of the states in the world, which is a particular issue for late developing countries, as they 
have very much relied on „state‟ for economic growth and development. As a result, the 
experience in the 20th century demonstrates a secular increase in the growth of 
government expenditures all over the world. Hence, the role of 
government expenditures in contributing to long run economic growth continues to be 
an important topic and the subject of much debate. 
Saudi Arabia economy is one of late developing countries.  While its economy is 
characterised by an open and private economy, the government remains to have a large 
role in the economy through its expenditures financed largely by revenues generated 
from oil.  While the Saudi economy has grown and developed, the government has also 
responded to the increased demand for social services such as education and healthcare 
in addition to other infrastructure investments for development purpose. Therefore, the 
process of economic growth and development has resulted in growth of government 
expenditures. 
This research, thus, aims at modelling of government expenditures and 
economic growth nexus in the case o Saudi Arabia for the period of 1968-2010 by testing 
a number of models developed in the literature: Wagner‟s Law, Keynesian Relations and 
Peacock and Wiseman‟s Displacement Effect.  The analysis modelled within the time 
series econometric techniques including co-integration test, Granger causality test and 
the error correction model (ECM). 
The findings obtained from the analyses find that the Wagnerian proposition can 
explain the growth of government in Saudi Arabia, which holds for both the oil and non-
oil income cases. The result indicates the existence of strong feedback causality for all the 
versions of Wagner‟s law in the long run. The findings also note that the three versions 
of Keynesian Relations found to be held for both general income and non-oil income in 
the case of Saudi Arabia. In addition, the findings also support for the Displacement 
Effect mainly due to international political developments and trends in oil prices, as such 
events resulted deviation from the linear growth in the government expenditures over 
the average growth and it is observed that government expenditure growth continued its 
gradual growth from the new level. 
This study, thus, concludes that growing economic activity of the state has 
marked the Saudi Arabian economy over the period in question.  While this partly can be 
explained due to economic reasons such as the need for economic development and 
responding to the demands of a growing population, but also the rentier economy nature 
of the Saudi political economy necessitates increasing government expenditures for 
political stability. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
 Economic growth and development objectives remain to be the main pillar of all 
the governments in the world in general and in particular the developing countries, which 
require large and sustainable capital accumulation and human resources.  However, in the 
initial stages of economic development, as in the case of late developing countries, capital 
accumulation has generally been either non-existent or limited.  Therefore, in addition to 
responding to the neo-classical notion of „market failure‟, the states in developing 
countries undertook the role of providing capital for economic and human development 
as a result. Thus, the experience in the 20th century demonstrates a secular increase in 
the growth of government expenditures all over the world. This has attracted the 
attention of policy makers but also the academics. Consequently, the role of 
government expenditures in contributing to long run economic growth continues to be 
an important topic and the subject of much debate. 
 Government expenditures are resources spent to maintain the functioning of  the 
state and of  the government as well as promoting the wellbeing of  the society and the 
economy as a whole. The inevitable reality of  „living together‟ resulted in the rise of  
„public‟ and hence „public economy‟ with the civilizational development throughout the 
history.  It should, however, be noted that the expanding of  government activities over 
time makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish which portion of  government 
expenditure goes to the maintaining of  the government itself  and which portion is 
allocated for the benefit of  the society and the economy more generally.  Regardless of  
such a debate, the experience demonstrates in most of  the countries in the world that the 
size of  the government and more specifically the size of  government expenditure is 
shown to follow an upward trend in the modern history of  nation states, which unlike the 
empires of  the past found legitimacy in delivering services to the general public for their 
social welfare alongside the classical functions of  the state.  
 The „growth of  the public sector‟ or „government size‟ or „increased government 
expenditures‟ has received considerable attention for several decades. In particular, the 
relationship between public expenditure and national income such as GDP has been 
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tested empirically for various countries using both time-series and cross-sectional data sets 
within the context of  „Wagner's Law‟.  Thus, in the last few decades, considerable 
attention has focused on the growth of  the size of  the government sector, both in 
absolute terms and as a proportion of  real gross domestic product or GDP.  In practice, 
however, economists have been more concerned with the relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP. 
 The Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia was established after the WWI as a nation state, and 
since the establishment of  the state, the public sector or the state has traditionally been 
the generator and allocator of  resources in Saudi Arabia and therefore it is the major 
employer and actively encouraged the development process. This has resulted in 
significant expansion of  the public sector, where the public expenditure is spent on 
development plan projects, the administration of  the country, in meeting the welfare 
needs of  the society and the salaries or pensions of  public sector employees. The Saudi 
Arabian social formation, hence, is very much defined as a rentier state in the sense that 
the state remains as the main generator of  wealth and the distributor of  this wealth, which 
is heavily generated from the oil revenues. 
 Saudi Arabia being oil reach country generated huge wealth from the exploitation 
of  oil since 1950s.  The oil shocks in 1970s and early 1980s in particular together with 
continuously rising production of  oil, brought the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia vast 
amounts of  oil money.  “The Saudi economy is heavily dependent on oil with oil revenues 
making up around 96% of  total export earnings and around 59% of  the country's GDP” 
(Ministry of  Economics and Planning, 2010). 
 The growing role of  the private sector in particular since 1980s, however, is 
reducing the relationship between public expenditure and the growth of  non-oil sectors. 
This partly can be explained with instability of  public expenditures, especially during a 
decline in oil prices and hence recession in 1980s. Whilst it is easy to reduce capital 
expenditures without any political or social risk, Saudi Arabia sought to avoid reducing 
salaries or rationalising the level of  public service due to the high political and social risks. 
 Because of  the drop and fluctuating in oil prices there is uncertainty about the 
ability of  the government to maintain its level of  expenditure and economic policies. In 
fact most of  the government growth witnessed in Saudi Arabia was a result of  the 
government‟s expenditure from oil revenues. “In the 1970‟s and early 1980‟s oil revenues 
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accounted for about 95% of  government expenditures, but lately its share in government 
expenditure declined to about 75%, also, increased from less than 8 billion SARSAR  in 
1970 to about 180 billion SARSAR  in 1996” (Albatel, 2000). While the importance of  oil 
revenues in financing of  public expenditures has continued, the role of  government in 
the economy in terms of  share in GDP was 21.89% in 1968, which later increased to 
56.92% in 1976.  This trend continued, and in 1979 it was 49.46%. However, in 1980 it 
declined to its lowest level 43.31% since 1975 due to the global recession as a result of 
oil prices. Immediately, in 1981 the increasing trend in the share of government 
expenditures to GDP set in and reached to 51.70% in 1983. The declining trends in the 
ratio were observed from 1984 to 1989, falling to 43.37% in 1989 only with a pick in 
1987 with 67.62%.  Since then a decreasing trend observed in the ratio of government 
expenditures to GDP until the present times.  Immediately after the war, the ratio fell 
down to about 47% and then followed a decreasing trend to 22.43% in 2010 (Ministry of 
Economy and Planning, 2010). 
 Sparingly, this study focuses on government expenditure and economic growth in 
Saudi Arabia during the period of  1968-2010. Since economic literature has already 
covered some case studies in this regard, this study aims to conduct an empirical analysis 
under the light of  the existing body of  knowledge by modelling government expenditure 
and economic growth in Saudi Arabia.  
1.2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 The main aim of this research is to explore, examine and analyse the relationship 
between economic growth and government expenditure in Saudi Arabia for the period of 
1968-2010. This study, hence, aims to investigate the impact of government expenditure 
growth on the performance of economy in the form of GDP growth in Saudi Arabia 
through modelling this observed relationship by employing econometric methods.  
In fulfilling these aims, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) to render a critical survey of the relevant literature; 
(ii) to test whether Wagner‟s Law with six functional forms or variants is held in the 
case of Saudi Arabia; 
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(iii) to test if the Keynesian Relations, and the Peacock and Wiseman Hypothesis as 
potential models of government expenditure growth and economic growth can 
explain the experience of Saudi Arabia; 
(iv) to investigate the main factors, which are important in changing the relative amount 
of government expenditure in the long term; and lastly 
(v) to employ econometric time series modelling in the empirical analyses of the 
mentioned models. 
The crucial question in this study is to find if there is a long-run relationship 
between economic growth and real government expenditure. The hypothesis to test in 
this study, hence, is: 
Hypothesis I: There is a long-run causal relationship running from economic growth 
to real government expenditures in the case of Saudi Arabia as explained by Wagner‟s 
Law and Keynesian Relation; 
Hypothesis II: There is a deviation from the trend in the development and growth of 
government expenditures due to some social and political events as explained by 
Displacement Effect; 
Hypothesis III: There is a direct and long-run correlation between the government 
expenditure growth and economic growth in Saudi Arabia as conceived by the Keynesian 
Relationship with causality running from government expenditures to economic growth. 
1.3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
There are a number of  reasons as to why investigating the government 
expenditure growth in the case of  Saudi Arabia is essential. First, there is a need 
to develop and analyse the relationship between government expenditure and economic 
growth in particular considering that the government expenditures have shown a secular 
and linear increase over the years with heavy public sector involvement in the economy. 
Therefore, re-evaluating this relationship with methods of  empirical testing is 
particularly important to predict the new phase of  the Saudi Arabian economic growth 
and determine the impact of  government expenditure on the economic growth in the 
future.   
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Secondly, since such an analysis has not been attempted since 1983, exploring the 
impact of  government expenditures on economic growth in Saudi Arabia is essential, as 
since then the Saudi economy has gone through dramatic changes towards a modern 
economy with increased role of  private sector.  However, it is still difficult to discuss 
about the independent or state-free private sector, as state still remains an important 
distributors of  the resources in the economy.  The recent disbursement and allocation of  
public funds for general social welfare and increased salaries is an indication of  the 
continuation of  a strong state in the Saudi Arabian economy. 
It is, thus, important to discuss the economics and politics of  public expenditure 
in a rentier state such as Saudi Arabia.  While the economic rationale may not suggest an 
efficient use of  public funds, the political economy nature of  the country, being rentier, 
maintains and sustains the presence of  government and its expenditures in the economy 
and society.  
1.4. RESEARCH RATIONALE 
The rationale for undertaking this study can be explained through a number of 
reasoning. First, it is a reality that the government expenditure has been increasing 
substantially over the years in Saudi Arabia and alludes to the expenses which the 
government incurs for its own maintenance and for the society as a whole.  In 
supporting this statement, the data indicates that the government sector in Saudi Arabia 
is a major component of GDP, accounting for more than 45% of the country's GDP in 
2010. Such a growing and hegemonic economic role of the government creates academic 
curiosity to study the subject matter. 
It should also be mentioned that most government expenditure is financed 
through revenues from oil exports, accounting for almost 88% of total government 
revenues. Moreover, government expenditure has been increasing substantially over the 
past few years. It is seen as the engine of economic growth and considered the leading 
sector in the economy. Nevertheless, the growing government expenditure in recent 
years, along with the declining oil revenues in 1980s and 1990s has largely contributed to 
an accumulating national debt. However, in recent years, government managed to 
increase its surplus from the oil revenues due to the recent increases in oil prices 
(Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2010). 
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One of the main issues in the rationale for this study is the opportunity to 
recognize the fluctuations in oil revenues along with the large public debt. This has raised 
the question of the productivity of government expenditures relative to private spending, 
leading policy makers to call for an expansion of private sector at the expense of the 
public sector.  One of the first methods to examine the efficiency of public expenditures 
is to measure its impact on economic growth as aimed at by this study. 
However, the fluctuations in the oil prices in particular in the past created fiscal 
tension on the government. The increase in oil prices from 1970 to the early '80s and 
from 2005 to 2010 placed a huge burden on government expenditure to meet the 
upcoming projects and economic development in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, as a 
developing country, the Saudi government dramatically reduced the massive government 
expenditures in the 1980s and since that it is making great efforts for maintaining the 
growth rate of GDP.  However, political economy nature of the country necessitates that 
the government must distribute its wealth to the larger part of the society for its political 
legitimacy, which implies the growing government expenditures. This has been the case 
in the recent months, and the distributive policies in the recent months created a very 
large burden on the treasury of the Kingdom. 
 
1.5. MODELLING AND RESEARCH METHOD 
There are three different theories explaining the government expenditure growth, 
which are utilised in this research: 
(i) Wagner‟s Law  
(ii) Keynesian Relations and  
(iii) The Displacement Effect Hypothesis 
The relationship between government expenditure and economic growth in 
Saudi Arabia during 1968 to 2010 is, thus, explored and examined by using these there 
theoretical frameworks. Table 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 summarised the six different functional 
forms of Wagner‟s Law, Keynesian Relations and Displacement Effect, which are used 
to model the relationship between government expenditures and real GDP and real non-
oil GDP, respectively. 
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Table 1.1: Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with real GDP / Non-Oil GDP 
No Function Version Year 
Absolute Versions 
1 
L(GE) = α + L (Oil GDP) 
Peacock-Wiseman 1967 L(GE) = α + L (Non-Oil GDP) 
2 
L(GEC) = α + L (Oil GDP) 
Pryor 1968 L(GEC) = α + L (Non-Oil GDP) 
3 
L(GE)  = α + L(Oil GDP / P) 
Goffman 1968 L(GE)  = α + L(Non-Oil GDP / P) 
4 
L(GE/P) = α + L (Oil GDP / P) 
Gupta & Michas 1967 & 1975 L(GE/P) = α + L (Non-Oil GDP / P) 
Relative Versions 
5 
L(GE/Oil GDP) = α + L (Oil GDP / P) 
Musgrave 1969 L(GE/Oil GDP) = α + L (Non-Oil GDP / P) 
6 
L(GE/Oil GDP) = α + L (Oil GDP) 
Mann 1980 L(GE/Oil GDP) = α + L (Non-Oil GDP) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Three Versions of Keynesian Relations with Real GDP/ Non-Oil GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 
L(GDP) = α + β  L(GE)  
Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
L(Non-Oil GDP) = α + β  L(GE)  
2 
L(GDP/P) = α + β L(GE)  
Goffman 1968 
L(Non-Oil GDP / P) = α + β  L(GE)  
3 
L(GDP/P) = α + β L(GE/ P)  
Gupta & Michas 1967 & 1975 
L(Non-Oil GDP / P) = α + β  L(GE / P)  
 
 
Table 1.3: The original Version of Peacock-Wiseman with Real GDP / Non-Oil GDP 
 
Function Version Year 
L(GE) = α + β  L(GDP)  
Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
L(GE) = α + β  L(Non-Oil GDP)  
 In testing all the identified theoretical frameworks and their various forms, time 
series modelling in econometrics is used through the following analyses: 
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(i) Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
(ii) Unit Root Test 
(iii) Co-integration; 
(iv) Granger Causality Test 
(v) Error Correction Models (ECM) 
It should be mentioned that the main difficulty faced in this study is the fact that 
the models under consideration mainly developed for countries where there is a different 
political economy dynamic as compared to Saudi Arabia. For example, Saudi Arabia is a 
rich country with large wealth created by oil exportation, while these models are based 
on the experience of European countries which were and are considered mainly as 
manufacturing and industrial countries. 
In sum, as a method, econometric time series analysis with secondary data 
utilised to explore and examine the relationship between government expenditures and 
economic growth. 
 As to the variable definition and data sources, the data used in this study on Saudi 
Arabia consist of the following variables: 
(i) Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
(ii) Real Non-Oil Gross Domestic Product (Non-Oil GDP); 
(iii) Total Real Government Expenditure (GE); 
(iv) Total Real Government Expenditure on Final Consumption (GEC), it covers 
expenditures on goods and services; 
(v) Population (P) 
 The variables (GDP), (Non-Oil GDP), (GE), and (GEC), are all in real terms. In 
addition, the data examined is in per capita terms, and total real government expenditure 
used as ratios to GDP, which is required by some versions of Wagner's Law. 
 In empirically modelling this study, the following sources of secondary data were 
consulted: 
(i) International Financial Statistics produced by the World Bank (IFS); 
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(ii) SAMA: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency; 
(iii) The Ministry of Planning; 
(iv) International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
1.6. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
This research contains ten chapters. Chapter One introduces the study, aims and 
objectives, the research problem and questions and also it presents a brief research 
methodology.   
Chapter Two discusses financing economic development through state 
expenditures in late developing countries. In the first section it discusses the late 
developmentalism to explain the place of private capital and rationale for public 
expenditures.  In the following section it discusses the use of government expenditure 
for economic growth. 
Chapter Three provides a summary of the government growth theories and 
models. It presents economic rationale for a government, the theoretical explanations for 
the size and growth of governments and the related literatures starting with classical 
studies including Wagner‟s Law and some discussion about its validity.  In addition, the 
Displacement Hypothesis and Keynesian Relation are explained. Furthermore, it explains 
the microeconomic models in explaining the growth of government including Baumol‟s 
Differential Productivity Growth and Bacon and Eltis Model. Moreover, the Public 
Choice Approach to the growth of government including bureaucracy, interest groups, 
median voter and redistributor‟s government model, voting bias and fiscal illusion is 
discussed as part of theoretical explanations provided for the explanation of growth of 
government. The chapter lastly presents the reinter state and government expansion. 
Chapter Four aims to present issues related to the aspects of public 
sector measurement whereby the definition and measurement of the public sector or 
government expenditure is provided.  In doing so, different conceptual definitions in 
explaining increase in government expenditures are provided. This is followed by an 
explanation of the remarkable complexity of the indicators used to measure of the size of 
the public sector. 
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Chapter Five presents the economic growth of Saudi Arabia and also the trends 
and developments in government expenditures.  In doing so, various measure are utilised 
to present the case. The details of economic progress and growth in Saudi Arabia are 
presented with the relevant stages of development. 
Chapter Six describes the modelling of  government expenditure and economic 
development nexus for Saudi Arabia, along with the methodology that this study uses. 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Unit Root Test, a Co-integration, and Granger Causality 
Test and Error Correction Model are presented in this chapter to test for the validity of  
relevant models in the case of  Saudi Arabia. 
Chapter Seven presents the empirical analysis for Wagner‟s Law through the six 
versions of  Wagner‟s Law with real GDP and real non-oil GDP. The empirical analysis 
was conducted according to the methods discussed in Chapter Six after each version of  
the Wagner‟s Law is presented in their functional forms. 
Chapter Eight presents the empirical analysis for Keynesian Relations. After 
presenting a number of  empirical results from the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth, 
three versions of  Keynesian Relations is presented. This is followed by the presentation 
of  the data, and empirical analysis conducted through the use of  methods mentioned in 
Chapter Six.  
Chapter Nine presents the empirical modelling and analysis for Displacement 
Effect. It first presents the empirical results of the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth 
through Peacock and Wiseman‟s Hypothesis. It also investigates the data and empirical 
results and analysis by using the defined empirical methods. In addition, presents the 
results of analysis presented. 
Chapter Ten concludes the study by summarising the empirical findings, 
comparing the results for real GDP and real non-oil GDP. The final section of the 
chapter discusses some of the implications that might apply to the Saudi Arabian 
economy, to identify the proper economic policy that would be appropriate for Saudi 
Arabia in managing their economic growth and government expenditure. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH STATE 
EXPENDITURES IN LATE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
  
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Development is the primary tool to address human suffering and requires cultural change 
which deals with all sectors of society in dealing with the causes of poverty and in the provision 
of social and health care. In the late twentieth century, development was an important global 
concept, closely examined in multiple dimensions and levels, and seen as interconnected with 
many other economic concepts such as planning, production and progress. However, concepts 
of development vary according to the final objectives pursued such as increasing the national 
income over a set period.This includes trying to identify the changes caused by economic 
variables such as income, production, consumption, and capital formation. Means of 
augmentation grow and result in automatic growth, defined as that which occurs without 
government intervention or representatives in programmes and economic plans.  
The most important aims of economic growth and development are to reduce 
unemployment and improve citizens‟ well-being and hopes for a decent life in terms of standards 
of health and education as well as social progress that allows them to contribute to the economy 
and general progress of their nation‟s increasing prosperity. Thus, economic growth and 
development is a comprehensive strategy aiming to change the economy and society as well as 
the lives of individuals living in that particular society. However, an important part of such a 
strategy is the financing economic growth and development; which has remained an important 
question in developing countries since their independence (Buffie, 1984). As late development 
countries, shortage of capital was initially an important bottleneck for economic development; 
and hence the search for financial sources for economic growth and development constituted an 
important dilemma for developing countries. 
It should be noted that the studies investigating the relationship between economic 
growth and finance can be classified into three: The first involves a positive relationship between 
finance and economic growth. The second recognizes financing as an extremely significant 
element in the development process. The third trend finds a negative relationship between 
finance and economic growth (Van Wijnbergen, 1983; Buffie, 1984). 
This chapter focuses on late developmentalism as a concept and policy source to explain 
the weaving of private capital and rationale for public expenditures, which is extended by 
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discussing the uses of government expenditures for economic growth. This chapter also provides 
critical approaches to the issues in question. The conclusion draws this chapter to an end. 
 
2.2. LATE DEVELOPMENTALISM 
 
2.2.1. Concept 
 
Developmentalism approaches aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
change in societies by defining development through socio-economic and human well-being 
related variables beyond economic growth. It is not only an economic concept, hence, but also 
takes into consideration principles of various theoretical approaches and ideologies of 
development as a key strategy towards gaining economic prosperity. This is complemented by 
analysing development concepts through the international economy but also through political 
institutions with the objective of putting economic development in a political context, as politics 
and policy making determines the nature of economic development. 
The theory of development assumes that the phases of development must be compatible 
with the system of each country and move in a balanced manner from one stage to another. The 
map of international economies shows the huge changes that have taken place in the 
international system in both geo-political and geo-economic conditions as a result of pressing 
need for change through different dimensions.  
Concepts of development vary depending on the final objectives pursued by doubling 
national income over a certain period, including trying to explain the changes caused by the same 
economic variables such as income, production, consumption, and capital formation. However, 
since 1970s, the understanding of economic development changed to define it beyond economic 
growth as it is recognised that economic development is a multidisciplinary and also a larger 
concept compared to economic growth. Building infrastructure in the context of 
underdevelopment requires measurement of productive forces and understanding the relations 
and conditions of production, but at the same time change in the socio-economic and human 
conditions are essential.The features of developmentalism include: 
(i) Late development of the forces of production, in particular, the essential element of 
„rights‟ which finds expression in the unequal relationship between people and the natural 
environment in which people live. 
(ii) Late emergence of an integrated and supportive cultural infrastructure. This leads to the 
considerable differences in rates of literacy among developing countries as compared to 
developed countries. 
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The differences between the countries do not provide an accurate picture of the 
development process, and their measurement is similarly.  However, economic problems facing 
any society are confined to reconciling the needs of a community and resources available to it.  
Rostow (1960) states that underdeveloped countries would go through the same process 
and stages of economic development until they reach the level of a mature society with rising 
consumption but also level of social development. This implies that capitalism is the highest 
stage of development that societies aim to reach as in industrialised democratic countries. 
While developmentalism remains an important policy of developing countries, how to 
finance economic development is an important issue. Considering that these are late 
developmentalist states, lack of private capital in these countries resulted in finding other means 
of financing economic development, which are the issues discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.2.2. Lack of Private Capital 
 
The development of a private sector is a key requirement for the progress of a society. 
However, less developed nations failed to give this the necessary attention and so contributed to 
their economic underdevelopment. This section will consider the concept of the private sector 
and development, and also discusses the obstacles faced by the states.  
The private sector is considered as the main aspects of the national economy which 
normally provides the resources for economic growth, and such resources are utilised by the 
governments to achieve economic development. This is a strategy based on the development and 
industrialisation of the westerns world, and therefore as a linear modernisation, the late 
developmentalist countries are also expected to go through the same stages as identified by 
Rostow (1960). Thus, private capital is considered as the main locomotive of economic growth 
and development. For late developmentalist countries, the lack of private sector and hence 
private capital was an issue, and therefore heavy estates as a result opted as a solution in these 
countries, which necessitated heavy involvement of state in economic expansion in late 
developing countries.  In most of the developing countries, until the privatisation policies since 
1990s, state played major role in the economy. While the state involvement perceived as a 
solution in the initial period after independence of these countries, by 1980s the state became an 
obstacle for the economic development in these countries, and hence the Washington Consensus 
in early 1980s to provide structural change through economic reform and liberalisation aiming to 
strength the private sector. 
In the case of the Saudi economy, as a late developmentalist country, state has been the 
main economic actor generating and distributing wealth of the country. The oil wealth in the 
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country resulted in state‟s heavy involvement in the economy, as the Saudi society did not have 
any infrastructure and a viable economy when it gained independence. However, due to the need 
for economic diversification, the private sector has begun to grow in recent years. As an 
indication, non-oil sector grew by 9% from 2005 to 2009 to become the main engine of 
expansion for the Saudi economy parallel with government expenditure (Ministry of Economic 
and Planning, 2009). 
The development of private sector has become important in particular with Saudi 
Arabia‟s accession to the WTO in recent years, which conditions the expansion of the private 
sector. As a result of the expansion of the private sector, the amount of foreign direct 
investment in the Kingdom has doubled to reach 5.6 billion dollars (IMF, 2008). 
The Kingdom‟s membership in the WTO did not have any sudden adverse impact on 
agency agreements and the commercial sector, and this was a supporting factor in the economic 
reform program adapted by Saudi Arabia. The private sector is the most important sector to 
develop the economy in Saudi Arabia despite the deferred interest and the existence of some 
restrictions.  
The private sector‟s role in increasing productivity and investment and the provision of 
employment would have been possible due to economic diversification and the WTO accession. 
Over the past decade in Saudi Arabia, the government adopted several policies that would 
strengthen the role of private sector in the economy. While development still requires continued 
change to achieve higher rates of economic growth, expansion in private-sector investment is of 
crucial importance for the development process. The Kingdom has strong economic and 
physical infrastructures as well as a large domestic market, relevant institutions and modern 
concepts of development management structures. 
It should be noted that Saudi Arabian state has enormous resources for economic 
growth and development and therefore heavily involved in the economy of the country.  
However, such an expansion has resulted in inefficiency and ineffectiveness and also over waste 
in the economy. Thus, there is an urgent need for the economic diversification and private sector 
development in the country. 
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2.2.3. Rationale for Public Expenditure 
 
The lack of private sector and the private capital in the independence period of new 
states resulted in governments assuming the role of private sector to raise the necessary funding 
for economic growth and development.  Thus, the second half of the 20th century is marked with 
heavy involvement of state in the economy. 
One of the most important economic phenomena, attracting the attention of economists, 
is the phenomenon that any increase in public expenditure results in increases to national 
income. Thus, the phenomenon of greater public expenditure increasing national income is 
generally recognised phenomenon in all countries, no matter the economic system or level of 
economic advancement. 
The first to scrutinise the nexus between government‟s involvement in the economy and 
economic growth is the German economist, Wagner (1883:8), who stated that “There is a 
proportion between public expenditure and national income which may not be permanently 
overstepped.” In other words, after he studied the related overheads and increases, he found that 
there is a direct correlation between increases in economic activities of the state and economic 
development. Moreover, it has been noted that the phenomenon of increasing public 
expenditure might be due to other reasons, real and virtual, with the following being the most 
important (Bailey, 2002:44) 
(i) Economic reasons resulting from the increased role of the state in economic activity 
to achieve overall balance of the national economy, which requires increased financial 
resources, which means an increase in the volume of public expenditure. 
(ii) Political reasons have been linked to the political role of the state and political 
changes, which all necessarily lead to increased public expenditure. 
(iii) Social reasons have been associated with an increased state role in social activity and 
equitable distribution of income. 
(iv) Military reasons and security needs necessitates increases in public expenditure. 
(v) Administrative reasons involving large businesses run by the state require the 
presence of government employees to work in the state‟s administrative structure, as 
well as development, modernization and training, leading to increases in public 
expenditure, and greater government work as well as the accompanying increased 
expenditure. 
The state, thus, actively involved in economic and social construction and structuring of 
the society as a later developmentalist society as a general pattern in the post-colonial and 
independence period. 
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2.3. UTILISATION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FOR ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
 
There are many different opinions about the impact of government expenditure on 
economic growth. Some have argued that government expenditure in all the various subdivisions 
has a major impact, while another view is that there is a limited impact on some of them (Gupta 
and Verhoeven, 2001). 
Government expenditure, whose effects are often evident in promoting economic 
growth, is an important tool to affect the economy. Government investments are initially 
considered to contribute to the accumulation of capital, as well as contributing to meeting the 
needs of a market economy but also aimed at generating the necessary funding for social 
development of the society.  
In terms of government expenditure having impact on the economy, functionally 
government expenditures can be classified in the following manner, consumer expenditure, 
investment expenditure; transfer expenditure. 
As regards to the consumer expenditure is to be taken first. Consumption is the main 
component of gross national product (GNP). It features on both sides of the equation of income 
and expenditure when measuring the GNP. From this standpoint, the consumption per capita 
(expenditure) is considered an income to another individual. Consumption depends heavily on 
several factors, most notably income, and income is divided into consumption and savings. 
Regarding the proportion of saving and consumption from society to society, some communities 
tend to be more consumption-oriented and some communities are better known for their high 
percentage of savings. We cannot ignore the fact that consumption is important in economic 
growth, as rising consumption, especially for durable goods encourages production, which in 
turn encourages increased employment and creates new businesses (Barro, 1991).  
  Savings further encourage investment. During economic boom years, both jobs increase 
the size of expenditure for different types of consumption and investment increase. As a 
consequence the value of the gross domestic product (GDP) grows. There are periods of 
prosperity followed by periods of stagnation. In economic cycles periods of economic recession 
are the slowing of the rate of growth of both consumer expenditure and investment expenditure. 
Furthermore, there is an accompanying lack of development of alternative opportunities, leading 
to increased unemployment; financial crises may lead to the loss of banks, loss of capital markets 
and loss of the market‟s ability to perform its role successfully. This may lead to lower profits 
and faltering stock prices, besides lower levels of real gross domestic production than normal. 
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  It is important to distinguish between savings and investment according to the factors 
affecting both of them. This is crucial and important for economic analysts, some of whom 
believe that investment has the more important role in economic growth and is the most prone 
to volatility due to changes in expectations of investors and the multiplicity of factors that could 
affect these expectations. Expenditure of wealth varies with the individual according to such 
factors as age, marital status, expected changes in prices, future income, and customs and 
traditions prevailing in the society. 
  Economists view income as more important than other factors. Functional studies have 
shown that the size of consumer expenditure is directly proportional to the size of the ideal 
income when other factors remain the same. There are also the differences among individuals in 
terms of their commitment and their involvement in social practices and traditions such as 
imitation and simulation. It has also been observed that increases in the rate of government 
expenditure usually reflect increases in salaries and bonuses for staff and increases in public 
services such as building and operating costs of new schools and hospitals. Thus, increased 
income has many effects including an increase in the rate of personal income, increase in state 
income and budget and this increase is usually inflationary because it does not reflect a real 
increase in gross domestic product (GDP). 
  As for increasing the overall budget deficit, governments borrow from abroad or from 
the private sector to cover their deficits. In both cases, the state must bear the burden of 
repayment of these loans. Increases in government expenditure have a bad effect on the 
economy, although governments often resort to this solution in times of economic recession to 
reduce the rate of unemployment and encourage private-sector investment. 
  The behaviour of consumer expenditure tends to be based on habit. Once individuals 
become accustomed to a certain standard of living, they will try to maintain this level despite any 
drop in income. Economists are of the opinion that such behaviour is irrational. 
  This vision confirms the nature and simulation of consumer expenditure of family 
income. Certain segments of a population will often spend more on consumption in this way if 
they are of middle-range income or lower (Barro, 1991). This trend towards expenditure more in 
the middle-range income bracket results in part from pressure on the family to conform to the 
society in which they live. It is the result of the larger family noticing in their life what is normal 
for them, and other families will tend to continue to spend on certain goods, maintaining a 
family habit. 
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  On the other hand, together with the time series analysis, this has been used to clarify 
cyclical movements in the average propensity to consume, whereby subjects seek to maintain a 
level of consumer expenditure despite the fluctuations in income.  
   The level of consumption is not only current income as pointed out by Keynes (1936), 
but also the greatest level of income reached in the past. Some researchers believe that consumer 
expenditure has a strong negative impact on government expenditure and thus on governments‟ 
moves to influence economic growth (Barro, 1991). 
  Secondly, investment expenditure is the total expenditure by corporations, whether 
governmental or private for the acquisition of assets, equipment and tools for the goal of 
increasing production. Therefore, it can be said that an increase in investments is a healthy and 
positive phenomenon. The reason for this is that increased investment leads to an increase in the 
GDP, which in turn leads to an increase in the proportion of employed persons and therefore an 
increase in income for individuals.  
  It is not difficult to recognise that increased investment is "a key element in the growth 
of the national economy in any country, and that it can be considered as one of its important 
beneficial factors" (Aschauer, 2000:391; Barro, 1991:407). 
It is also important to examine extremes in positives and negatives of economic growth, 
the advantages and disadvantages. Researchers like Aschauer (2000) demonstrated that public 
funds might have a positive impact on growth if the growth equation has been controlled for 
effectiveness and public financing. In addition, Galor and Moav (2004) suggested that the main 
cause of economic growth varies at different stages of a country‟s development. 
In public finance the most famous early theory is Wagner‟s law (1883) of expanding state 
activity. This “law” reflects the importance of government activity and expenditure as an 
inevitable feature of a progressive state (Bird, 1971). According to Al-Hakami (2002:1), 
"Wagner‟s law states that government expenditure tends to rise as gross domestic product 
increases because of": 
(i) Expansion of "protective and administrative government functions";  
(ii) Expansion of "government activities pertaining to education and culture", and 
(iii) The increasing "tendency toward monopoly because of technological progress and 
increasing returns to scale which need to be offset by government action." 
 
Government expenditure has a direct impact on the operations of capital formation, 
production and income, consumption and savings, as well as the distribution pattern of 
investments. This as well as proved by experiments that the rate of economic growth in the 
developing but also depends to a large extent on the ability of the state government expenditure 
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on different sectors, which depend on the ability of these sectors to increase domestic 
production and thus the national production and diversification of the production, 
which allows the development of the state's ability on capital accumulation and the payment 
of the growth rate to a remarkable level. 
According to, Odedekun (1999) there is a positive relationship to spend on 
infrastructure and other public expenditure on investment growth in the long term.  
  Lastly, governments undertake large transfer expenditure with the objective of 
redistribution of national income in different forms such as education, health, public investment, 
social security and social benefits. In addition, transfer expenditures can also include all expenses 
paid by the government in the form of subsidies to individuals in different forms. These take 
three forms: 
(i) Social Benefits: for those who pay for a certain category of members of the community to 
improve their social and their access to a certain standard of living. This category includes 
widows, the disabled and the unemployed.  
(ii) Economic Subsidies provided by the State to sectors and enterprises with a view to 
reducing prices and/or increasing production of some commodities: 
(a) to provide interest-free loans to some sectors; 
(b) to provide direct or indirect cash subsidies; 
(c) to provide benefits in kind such as providing the land needed for a project free of 
charge or for a nominal fee. 
(iii) Subsidies and Foreign Aid includes subsidies in the form of grants provided from one 
country to another in cash or in kind. Also included are interest-free loans provided by the 
state to another for political or humanitarian purposes. 
All these three categories of government expenditures have different level of impact on 
the economy; and therefore governments use these expenditures categories as part of its fiscal 
policy. 
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2.4. IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
SHORT AND LONG-RUN 
The government expenditures through each of its categories have different impact on 
economic growth.  Prest (1985:7-8) commented that “expenditures may differ in their outcome in 
the long run since some expenditures are expected to yield income in the longer run, like education 
and public works, and others will not yield any additional income in the long run, like defence”. 
 
As regards to the short-term economic growth, economic growth has been biased by an 
increase in Aggregate Demand (AD) in the short-run and has been measured by the change in 
real GDP. The main reasons for an increase in AD are as follows: 
(i) Reduction of interest rates, which reduces the cost of borrowing, and thus, encourages 
spending and investment. 
(ii) Increased real wages, increasing disposable income, and encouraging consumer spending. 
(iii) Increased government spending on development projects. 
 
Crouch (1972) presents that the increase in AD only results in real GDP growth in the 
short term. He notes that Long Run Aggregate Supply (LRAS) is inelastic; therefore higher 
Aggregate Demand (AD) only causes inflation. 
The long-term economic growth is biased by an increase in LRAS and AD. The main 
reasons for an increase in the LRAS are as follows:  
(i) New raw material; 
(ii) Increases in investment; 
(iii) Increases in government spending on development projects; 
(iv) Increases in labour productivity. 
 
It is common knowledge that fiscal policies cannot bring about changes in long-run 
growth of output in a neoclassical growth model. The introduction of endogenous growth 
models that incorporate the government sector have led to the opposite conclusion; that fiscal 
policies can affect the long-run growth rate of an economy (e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1995:539). 
Over the "course of a business cycle, a rise in the budget deficit (that is, the ratio of 
budget deficits to output) increases the growth rate of output and employment. By increasing 
effective demand, the rise in the budget deficit increases potential business profits, thereby 
stimulating investment expenditure by firms. If planned investment is greater than firms' 
available savings, firms borrow from banks. However, the injection of bank credit also leads to 
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the accumulation of financial charges that eventually slow down the expansion". The positive 
effect of the budget deficit can be augmented by expansionary monetary policies that maintain 
low interest rates, which would have the dual effect of providing greater monetary stimulus from 
the deficit and keeping financial charges on business debt low" (Moudud, 1999:2-3). These 
results accord well with the proposition that monetary policy should be designed to stimulate 
growth and employment (Papadimitriou and Wray, 1994) rather than targeting inflation. 
Moreover, even if productive capacity is fully utilised in the long run, government 
expenditure may still have a positive role to play. "Specifically, increased government 
expenditure, even deficit expenditure, may not lead to lower growth; indeed, under certain 
plausible policy regimes the long-run growth rate may even rise". This can occur if government 
expenditure increases either the long-run rate of profit or the social saving rate (the combined 
government, business, and household saving rate). "One means of raising the social saving rate is 
to increase business retained earnings, which might be accomplished through policies such as 
investment tax credits, lower corporate tax rates, and accelerated deductions for capital 
depreciation" (Fazzari, 1993). Combined with appropriate taxes on capital gains and „luxury‟ 
consumption, these policies could produce enough of an increase in the total social saving rate to 
allow a fixed or modestly rising budget deficit. The consequence of this would be an increase in 
the long-run growth rate.  
Government expenditure can be divided into two types:  
1. Consumption expenditure (expenditures on goods and services) and  
2. Public investment expenditure (expenditures on infrastructure, education, public 
health, research and development, and other expenditures that are conducive to 
raising business productivity).  
A number of empirical studies have found that a rise in public investment significantly reduces 
business costs and improves business profitability, thereby raising the long-run growth rate. An 
increase in the growth rate is also obtained by raising the share of investment expenditure 
relative to consumption expenditure while keeping the budget deficit constant. 
 
2.5. CRITICAL APPROACH TO GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
 
In the case of financing for development issues, despite the frequent criticism of various 
funding policies for development in developing countries, shortcomings must be addressed and 
criticism of government spending is important in advancing development and helping the 
government to be the proper steward of public funding. 
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Government expenditure is widely seen as having an important role in supporting 
economic growth. This section aims to identify the factors determining government expenditure 
efficiency and inefficiency. As  discussed above, most studies did not initially find a robust 
relationship between government expenditure and growth.  
It should be noted that governments have also introduced performance measurement at 
the organizational and individual levels to ensure that programmes and activities are 
implemented efficiently and effectively with set objectives. 
It is therefore important to question whether economic policies reflect the actions and 
measures taken to achieve those objectives in light of the availability of human and financial 
resources.  
The problem of economic development facing the developing countries was itself 
imposed itself through evolution from traditional concepts to the concept of sustainable 
development. However, if sustainable development is itself considered an obstacle that occupies 
the majority of the attention of the researcher's government (those that have reached an 
advanced stage of well-being in the methods of providing for future generations) then the 
situation is different to the developing countries which are still trying, with extreme difficulty, to 
meet the minimum necessities of life. It therefore remains important to identify the most 
efficient and effective method to address the problem and to achieve the goals according to the 
nature of the economic situation caused by each of the issues posed in the past and still posed 
today. 
Lucas (1988:20-42) argues that "public investment in education increases the level of 
human capital, and that this can be seen as a main source of long-run economic growth ".  
Moreover, Barro (1990:111-125) mentions the importance of government expenditure in public 
infrastructure for economic growth and Romer (1990:70-102) stresses the relevance of research 
and development expenditure. "Therefore, the composition of public spending is also a relevant 
issue, and if the aim is to promote growth then the focus should be put on the more productive 
items in the budget, even if the balance between the various functional items of the budget varies 
according to the particular circumstances and priorities of each country". 
In one of the seminal contributions to endogenous growth theory, Barro (1990:103-125) 
placed "fiscal policy in the central position".  In providing microeconomic rationale, Romer 
(1990:70-77) stressed the importance of  "externalities to argue that the government has an 
important role to play in the growth process". 
Additionally, Kneller et al. (1999:170-191) explained these counterintuitive  results as "a 
failure to account for distortionary taxes. They argued that a complementary explanation is a  
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failure to account for inefficiency. This claim was supported by a simple endogenous growth 
model that explicitly considers the role of inefficiency. Particularly for developing countries, it is 
very likely that inefficiency plays an even more important role than distortionary taxation due to 
the income  structure in these countries and the systematic occurrence of substantial 
inefficiencies". 
In both developed and developing countries, privatization and, in some cases, 
commercialization have grown in popularity and acceptability. They have also become important 
instruments that governments can use to promote economic development, improve the 
production and distribution of goods and services, streamline government structures, and 
reinvigorate industries controlled or managed by the state. 
Over recent decades, privatization policies have been implemented all over the world 
(Bortolotti and Siniscalco, 2004) and the economic literature "devoted to privatization has been 
constantly increasing. The theoretical literature dealing with the relationship between 
privatization and efficiency has also grown over the last twenty years, but the theoretical results 
are ambivalent about the impact of ownership changes on efficiency". Although this literature 
has been regularly reviewed in empirical studies devoted to privatization policies, to the best of 
our knowledge there has been no survey of economic literature focusing exclusively on 
theoretical studies. Such studies could be useful in assessing the pure effect of ownership 
changes and would show a gradual shift from a normative to a positive analysis as the focus of 
attention moves from the theory of incentives with incomplete information to political economy 
issues. "The latter are obviously at the core of privatization decisions but have only recently been 
analysed by the theoretical literature." 
Likewise, the most serious allocation inefficiencies reflect the failure of the state to 
provide a mix of goods and services consistent with any reasonable social welfare function. 
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2.6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the financing of development and its importance in developing countries 
and its effect on the development process is discussed. It should be concluded that development 
is inevitable for the human well-being, an essential requirement in all countries in the world. But 
its importance is growing in developing countries as countries seek to improve the living 
standards of their residents through improved economic resource utilisation. Prest (1985) argued 
that a prerequisite to the development process has been to locate, support and facilitate all 
economic sectors in the country. 
The economy must find and create the necessary conditions for growth, which depends 
on many different ingredients, including foreign direct investment. States need to choose how 
best to use those resources in order to achieve efficient use of factors of production in 
production processes and thus raise the rate of economic development. 
In any case, economic development is a goal of all governments throughout the world. 
Over the past 25 years, it has become increasingly important to be an aggressive player in the 
economically restructuring global economy of the 21st century. Rapid changes have shocked the 
world. Globalization has left a gap in revenue streams. The transition from a manufacturing 
economy to a service economy has created an unstable economic climate desperately trying to 
create jobs and generate revenue, that this transition has taken place principally in post-industrial 
societies.  
Finally, with respect to proposals and recommendations relating to policy, the following 
points can be considered an outline of the way in which the wheels of the economy may begin to 
roll. They are: 
(i) Increased investment for public and private sectors, as the economy can experiment 
with public and private investment complementarily. In this case, measures should 
be undertaken to promote private investment to reduce risks and provide assurances 
for the public sector, and to increase revenue by expanding the market. 
(ii) Adopting a gradual approach to selective trade integration processes of 
unprecedented measures in order to penetrate the global economy. 
(iii) Controlling volatility by coordinating functions of the actual macroeconomic 
framework and by the consolidation of monetary stability to sustain growth in 
investment. 
(iv) Governments in developing countries should emphasize investment in research and 
development activities in human capital. The criterion should be efficiency of public 
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investment measured by the degree of economic progress made because of the 
increased revenue factors in knowledge-based economies. 
(v) Economic policies should be directed towards providing the necessary guarantees 
for the stability and encouragement of investment. 
 
In addition, criticism of development processes in developing countries, however 
powerful, should not slow down the development process. It must be constructive, directed to 
government expenditure supporting development projects, and should not diminish the role of 
the private sector, which is the current key to the leadership of many government projects 
through privatisation. 
Economic development is a process through which state in interactions with national 
private sectors achieve better economic growth and qualitatively higher levels of community life, 
which remains an important policy issue still. Thus, in the late developmentalist states, such as 
Saudi Arabia, there is still role for state to play in terms of creating the much-needed initial 
capital in the economy for economic development. However, efficiency of such involvement in 
the economy remains an important issue. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
GOVERNMENT GROWTH:   
SURVEYING THEORIES AND MODELS 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 The growth of government and its impact on economic performance has been an 
important subject area within economics and political economy studies. Over the decades, a 
number of approaches, theories and models have been developed to explain the determinants of 
government growth but also measure the impact of government growth on economic growth 
and development. Since Wagner‟s Law of „expanding state activity‟, a number of macro and 
micro-economic models have been developed to understand the relationship in question. 
 In particular, in late developmentalist state, the economic role of the state and the role of 
the state in the economy have been crucial due to the lack of private capital for economic 
growth. Therefore, compared to industrial countries where the role of the state moved to welfare 
oriented concerns, in the developmentalist states the state remains an important part of the 
economy despite the concerns over efficiency of the state‟s economic involvement in the 
economy. For this, since 1979 Washington consensus, economies in the late developing 
countries are liberalising and, hence, privatising the state economic enterprises to reduce the role 
of the state in the economy. 
The purpose of this chapter, hence, is to review the literature concerning economic 
rationale for government but also aims to present the theoretical explanations and model to 
explain the growth of government. A particular attention is given to the empirical studies aiming 
to locate the relationship between government expenditures and economic growth. A number of 
studies have been selected and provide observations on such growth. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section one, presents government growth 
and related literatures by starting with classical studies and relevant theories. Following section, 
presents Wagner‟s Law, the Displacement Hypothesis, and later theoretical explanations such as 
Keynesian relationship. Section three, considerers the microeconomic models such as, Baumol‟s 
differential of productivity growth, Bacon, and the Eltis Model. Moreover, the Public Choice 
approach to the growth of government studies is reviewed including „bureaucracy and growth of 
government‟, „interest groups and growth of government‟, „median voter and redistributors‟ 
government model‟, and „voting bias and fiscal illusion‟. The following section reviews the 
literature related to „rentier state and government expansion‟ to contextualise the case for Saudi 
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Arabia which is a „rentier state‟ generating the wealth through oil and distributing to the larger 
population. Section four presents the combined model; while section five provides the empirical 
studies on the subject matter.  
 
3.2. THE PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT (STATE) OVER TIME 
Government has grown in all countries over the decades with the development of nation 
states. However, growth in public expenditure has not been symmetrical across nations.  
Depending on the economic growth level of nations, government‟s role in economy and society 
has shown differences. A quick observation therefore shows a ray of government involvement in 
the economy: a very heavy state involvement in the economy to very liberal economies.  While 
economic necessities are used to justify this, there are political reasons determining the role of 
the state in the economy as well. 
In an attempt to explain the state‟s role in the economy, Musgrave (1996: 250-257) 
considers the relations between fiscal theory and the theory of government as it emerged from 
the 18th century to date and he concludes that this relationship is observed through four 
different patterns". First, there is a classical view of the service state, needed to adjust for 
externality-based market failure, and to approximate a market solution. Second, there is a welfare 
state, designed to correct the market-determined state of distribution, based on what society 
views a fair or optimal pattern. Next is the communal model, where individuals recognize 
communal as well as private concerns. Finally, the flawed state, where action of governmental 
agents shifts attention from market to policy failure. While this indicates the changing political 
economy over the development of economies in nation states, it also indicates changing 
economic nature and role of the state in different phases of economic and political development 
in nation states. 
An important aspect of growth of government is, however, related to the economic 
development needs of developmentalist societies.  In a very euro-centric manner, the post-war 
development of industrial states were taken as example in developing policies for the 
underdevelopment countries through linear development model indicating that state played an 
important role in the development process in Europe, which can be replicated in the developing 
nations. It is therefore suggested that state in general accelerated economic development by 
providing safety for increasing investment and optimal direction for growth and development by 
also providing the necessary initial capital.   
While classical economists aimed to limit the role of the state in the economy, the failure 
of market through the beginning of the 20th century has brought the state back into the 
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economic life beyond taxation. The Great Depression in 1929 and the collapse of the economy 
in those years paved the way for the state‟s further involvement in the economy. The Keynesian 
solution to the problem increased the role of the state in economy with the objective of 
expanding the aggregate demand in the economy through fiscal policies to overcome the 
stagnation in the economy. Keynes, therefore, suggested that the government should intervene 
in the national economy to influence the overall course of spending to provide full employment, 
otherwise there is recession and conditions deteriorate. This trend has led to a widening of the 
scope of government action and activity throughout the government to guide all areas of 
economic activity and provide for social justice in providing essential services to citizens for their 
well-being and prosperity in various dimensions of their existence (Keynes, 1936). 
To overcome the political and economic legacy of the grown government in the face of 
inefficiency of the government involvement in the economy, in 1979 international agencies urged 
the developing states to restructure their economies and liberalise their economic and financial 
system as proposed as a policy under Washington Consensus. Since then about all the states in 
the world involved in economic restructuring by privatising their economies, which includes 
Saudi Arabia as well. While it is expected that this should result in reduced size of government, 
the nature of government involvement however in regulating the economic and financial sectors 
as well as social sector has been the new areas of the increased role of the state. 
  Lastly, since the financial crisis in 2008, a number of governments in the world in 
particular in industrialised G-8 countries involved in bailing-out and transferring the ownership 
of the failing financial institutions to the public sector. While this should not be considered as a 
policy change, the real life consequences of such policies indicate the increased role of 
government in the economy. 
 
3.3. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR GOVERNMENT 
The economic rationale for government can be understood in terms of the degree to 
which government intervention improves efficiency. Importantly, however, initial stages in 
economic growth and development process necessitated the public-sector investment as high 
priority. In the later stages of economic growth and development, the government then 
continues to supply investment but in such a stage public financing is considered as 
complementary to growth in private investment.  
The debate on the role of the state in the economy can be traced back to Smith (1776) in 
The Wealth of Nations and Mill (1848) in Principles of Political Economy. Both Smith and Mill intended 
Government Growth: Theories and Models 
 
29 
 
to explain the principles by which revenue and expenditure policies could be determined as part 
of their wider investigation of the relationship between the government and the economy. 
In Smith‟s (1776) argument the role of the government is confined to three main duties. 
These are protecting the country from foreign aggressors; maintaining law and order, and 
providing and producing goods that could not otherwise be produced by the private sector, 
which was built on the basic theorems of welfare economics. 
 While the classical notion of limited role of the state could be possible until the 
emergence of nation states, since mid-19th century the role of the state in the economy has 
increased through various forms beyond expenditure and taxation. In particular with the 
realisation of market failure and economic crisis in the beginning of the 20th century provided the 
policy rationale for the increased role of the state in the economy with the objective of 
correction the observed failure. On the other hand, the rise of neo-classical school of thought in 
responding to the changing nature of the economy provided the theoretical and intellectual 
rationale for the increased role of the state in the economy, which is discussed in detail in the 
following sections. 
 
3.3.1 Market Failure 
Market failure refers to the deviation of market operation from the first best solution and 
hence is marked with inefficient allocation of goods and services by a free market . "That is, 
there exists another conceivable outcome where a market participant may be made better-off 
without making someone else worse-off. Market failures can be viewed as scenarios where 
individuals' pursuit of pure self-interest leads to results that are not efficient – that can be 
improved upon from the societal point-of-view" (Stiglitz, 2000:4-5). 
Smith‟s theory of laissez-faire, with the underlying premises that markets allocate 
resources efficiently, leading to social welfare maximization by markets got wider acceptance 
among developed countries‟ policy-makers and academicians in the centuries since he published 
The Wealth of Nations. The roles of the government in many of the Western European countries 
have been shaped by this philosophy. However, the realities of the market conditions and 
failures in the economy and market resulted in the recognition that Simithian perfect market 
conditions are not valid; as the realities indicates the impossibility of the first best choice due to 
the certain prevailing conditions in the economy marked as market failures. Market failures are 
used by the neo-classical school to provide rationale for the state intervention, which are 
discussed in the following sections: 
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3.3.1.1. Public Goods 
Public goods have been defined by Samuelson (1954: 387) as those "which all enjoy in 
common in a sense that each individual‟s consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction 
from any other individual‟s consumption of that good. Therefore, by definition, public goods 
either will not be supplied by the market or if supplied, are supplied in insufficient quantity. They 
have two definitive properties". First, it costs nothing for an additional individual to enjoy their 
benefits. Second, it is difficult to exclude individuals from the enjoyment of public goods.  Thus, 
it is not possible to price public goods in the market. 
Samuelson (1954) argued that markets would fail to provide public goods because they 
are non-excludable. However, that means it is not possible to prevent the use of the service by 
those who do not pay for it, and it is nontrivial in consumption to the extent that one person‟s 
consumption of the commodity does not affect any other person‟s consumption of it. However, 
other users can cause congestion when using the goods and other facilities may be required. It 
adds up to the government establishing effective amount of such goods provided according to 
population size. The fact that private markets will not supply public goods provides a rationale 
for various government activities, which includes free education, health and other welfare 
services. In addition, some of the public goods perceived as merit goods, consumption of which 
are encouraged due to social benefit it creates.  Since the consumption of such goods also cannot 
be left for the market, state is considered to provide such goods as well for the larger social 
welfare. 
 
3.3.1.2 Externalities 
The private sector sells many commodities that affect people other than the purchasers. 
Thus, in addition to private costs and benefits, there are social costs and benefits, which are 
called „externalities‟. Externalities, hence, can lead to inefficient decisions even if perfect 
competition exists as the social costs and benefits are not considered in production and pricing 
decision. 
Instances where one individual‟s actions impose a cost on another have been referred to 
as negative externalities. An example is that without government intervention of some kind, the 
level of pollution would be too high (Stiglitz, 2000). In addition, not all externalities are negative. 
There are some important instances of positive externalities, where one individual‟s actions 
confer a benefit upon others.  
It has been, thus, argued that the economic action of a rational person may result in a 
positive or a negative effect on a person or firm who does not part take in the economic activity 
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and does not pay for the activity to occur. The positive effect is known as positive externality 
and the negative one as negative externality.  
If we let markets decide resource allocation in the presence of externalities, the amount 
of output produced by an individual firm appears to be higher than the socially desired amount 
in the case of negative externalities but lower in the case of positive externalities. This creates a 
conflict with the principle of a Pareto-efficient resources allocation. The correcting mechanism is 
either to reward or to penalize those who produce positive or negative externalities respectively. 
This could be done by an institution which we call government. 
Challenging this argument, Coase (1960) argued that, without government involvement, 
optimal resource allocation is quite possible by assigning property rights. In supporting this, 
Inman (1978: 687) presents his argument, as in the case of two agents linked to each other 
through an external activity in a world of complete information and costless bargaining, the two 
agents will strike mutually advantageous bargains for the level of the external activity. However, 
considering the non-existence of perfect market, such an arrangement would not be possible, 
and therefore government intervention is expected to correct such a failure. 
 
3.3.1.3 Imperfect Market 
 
The classical economic theory argues that Pareto-optimal resource allocation may be 
achieved when price determined according to marginal cost at zero economic profit (Stiglitz, 
2000). Zero economic profit eventually means that the average cost of production is equal to the 
price. However, being the condition of the perfect market this may not hold when there is 
oligopoly and monopoly markets or increasing returns to scale. In addition, market failure also 
appears when there are few sellers or one seller in the market, or in the case when the price of a 
good is greater than its marginal cost in which case the optimal level of production is less than 
the socially desired one (Bailey, 2002). 
In order to overcome such imperfect market conditions, government can apply many 
systems to correct this market failure. While in the case of an increasing returns scale, 
government intervention in the production of goods and services was justified for long periods 
because of this reason. That was why government has engaged in even the developed countries 
in telecommunication, postal services, electricity, and communication for long periods (Cowen 
and Cramption, 2002).  
In other words, government in modern economy interferes to correct the market 
through regulating the market to overcome monopoly and oligopoly impacts and make sure that 
natural monopolist markets produces and charges price according to the socially acceptable level. 
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3.3.1.4 Imperfect Information 
 
In order for an individual to obtain the maximum benefit from the consumption of a 
good, he or she must possess as much information as possible about it. This makes it possible 
for the individual to make an informed decision about whether to consume the goods in 
question. However, in the second best solution of the market system such information is not 
abundantly and freely available as suggested by the perfect market conditions. Hence, the 
consumer possesses imperfect information about the goods in the market and will not be able to 
make an informed decision about them (Stiglitz, 2000). 
Market institutions may arise to help overcome information asymmetry such as 
contingent contracts, seller reputation, and professional associations. Governments do also take 
measure to moderate the consequences of asymmetric information and moral hazard by the 
provision of additional information or actions through regulation and legislation (Inman, 1978: 
660). 
 
3.3.2 Government Failure 
The preceding section provides rationale for the government in economic sphere of a 
society by referring to the neo-classical economic theory. However, through the years, in 
addition to market failure, government failure is also observed. In other words, while 
government intervention was expected to overcome the market inefficiencies, government itself 
was considered inefficient; and therefore with the Washington Consensus all the countries in the 
world advised to reduce the role of the state in the economy by reforming and liberalising their 
economies including through privatisation. 
Government failures are "the public sector‟s version of market failure and happen when 
a government intervention causes a more inefficient allocation of goods and resources than 
would happen without that intervention" (Weimer and Vining, 2004:7-9). This was the case in 
most of the economies by the 1980s, and therefore in order to reduce the efficiencies in the 
economy, reducing the size of the state is considered as a panacea for the problems. 
It should be noted that in particular government was considered a leading solution in 
developing countries by fostering and achieving development through central planning systems. 
However, the experience of the government centred economic growth did not produce much 
better solution for the developing countries.  In a critical position, Brown and Jackson (1990: 58) 
noted that “The government failure literature discards the notion of the benevolent omniscient 
economic planner serving the public interest and replaces it with a muddling, imperfect, 
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endogenous state that serves the interests of powerful lobby groups and the private interests of 
politicians and bureaucrats.” 
It should be concluded that the assigned economic role for the public sector has changed 
over the years depending on the political ideologies of the times in addition to the economic 
necessities. For example, having some of the developing countries without any infrastructure and 
sustained economic growth assuming privatisation since 1980s is an imposed political choice 
rather than economic necessity. Thus, politics is an important determining factor of economic 
policy choices.  
 
3.4. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT 
 The size of government expenditure in general and in promoting economic growth in 
particular has long been of interest to economists and policy-makers in both industrialised and 
developing countries. In terms of government expenditure contributing to economic growth, as 
Keynesian relation (1933) states its acts like an exogenous factor that can be used like a policy 
instrument to determine growth. 
Since this study is concerned with locating the impact of government expenditures on 
economic growth in Saudi Arabia, this section aims to review the theoretical explanations and 
models to identify such a relationship. These can be considered as the determining factors of 
increasing government expenditure; this study however only examines the impact of government 
expenditures on economic growth in the empirical sections.   
This section, hence, first presents macro models developed to explain growing 
government expenditures; secondly, the micro models of government growth are presented, 
which is followed by the Public Choice approach to the growth of government. 
The macro and micro models that we will consider in this section differ from 
macroeconomic forecasting models in their analysis of public expenditure, as far as the latter take 
government expenditure as exogenously determined. In this section, three different theories are 
presented: (i) Wagner's Law of „Expending State Activity‟; (ii) The Displacement Effect 
Hypothesis; and (iii) Keynesian Economic Growth and Government Expenditures. In addition, 
two different micro models are presented: (i) Baumol‟s Differential Productivity Growth; (ii) 
Bacon and Eltis‟ Model. 
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3.4.1 Macroeconomic Models of Government Growth 
In this initial section, main macroeconomic models developed to examine and explain 
the growth of government expenditures are presented. The survey in this section focuses on 
Wagner‟s Law, Peacock and Wiseman Hypothesis, and the Keynesian Relation. Having 
government expenditures as endogenous factor is the common departuring points of these 
models. 
 
3.4.1.1. Wagner’s Law of ‘Expanding State Activity’ 
One of the earliest attempts to explain the growth of government in the sense of 
increasing public expenditure was made by Adolph Wagner, a 19th century German economist. 
His theory, which has come to be known as Wagner‟s Law, is one of the most referred to and 
tested one in government growth literature. 
Wagner‟s (1893) theory of The Law of Expanding State Activity pointed to the growing 
importance of government activity and expenditure. In explaining his theory, Wagner (1883: 16) 
stated that:  “The law of increasing expansion of public, and particularly state, activities becomes 
for the fiscal economy. The law of the increasing expansion of fiscal requirements, both the 
state's requirements grow and, often even more so, those of local authorities, when 
administration is decentralized and local government well organized." Recently there has been a 
marked increase in Germany in the fiscal requirements of municipalities, especially urban ones. 
“The law is the result of empirical observation in progressive countries at least in 
Western European civilization; its explanation, and the causes, is the spheres of private and 
public economy, especially compulsory public economy. Financial stringency may hamper the 
expansion of state activities causing their extent to be conditioned by revenue, rather than the 
other way round which is usual. But, in the long run the desire for the development of 
progressive people will overcome these difficulties” (Wagner, 1883: 8). Thus, Wagner‟s Law 
“pointed to the growing importance of government activity and expenditure as an inevitable 
feature of a progressive state” (Bird, 1971: 1), which can be formally expressed as a law: 
“Historically there exists a clear tendency for an expansion of public activity together with the 
progress of the economy” (Biehl, 1998:  107). 
Wagner (1883), thus, investigated a functional relationship between the growth of an 
economy and the growth of governmental activities and observed and empirically proved that 
governmental sector grows faster than that of the economy. In other words, Wagener considered 
that the elasticity of government expenditures in relation to the growth of economy is higher 
than the unity.   
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 Wagner also presented the motive of the government growth taking into account the 
historical development of the Western governments during that century. The state activities, 
according to Wagner (1890: 16), are the provision of necessary conditions for market 
functioning, maintenance of law as well as order and of participating in material production. 
According to Getzler (2000: 13), “Wagner was writing at a specific time and place, when 
many scholars in Germany became filled with nationalism and the desire for a strong state to 
heal the political and economic disorders affecting German society.” Under such influences, it is 
believed that Wagner argued that the social progress of the time resulted in increasing state 
activity, which in turn meant more government expenditure. Hutter (1982: 134) suggested that 
“Wagner views the state, represented by the government activity, as an organic part of the social 
and economic system, and he expected that the state would tend to grow proportionally with the 
growth of the economy as a whole.” 
Wagner offered three reasons why this development would come about with respect to 
the changing and expanding functions of the state. In understanding the reasoning, it is 
important to point out that these ideas were formulated in Germany in the later 19th century 
which was experiencing industrialisation and hence economic growth. Not surprisingly therefore, 
Wagner‟s Law was framed to refer only to states in which income was rising because of 
industrialisation. The conditions under which one might expect the „Law‟ to operate would 
therefore seem to be (i) rising per capita incomes; (ii) technological and institutional change of a 
particular sort implying that in particular the state had an increasing role in production where 
technical conditions favoured monopoly; and (iii) at least implicit democratisation of the polity 
(Ghamdi , 1983) implying that Wagner saw increasing state activity in fields like education where 
the social benefits of the service were not susceptible to economic evaluation. 
In a more formal manner, according to Wagner (1893), growth of the public sector is due 
to the above mentioned there reasons which can also be expressed in the following manner: 
(i) The demand for public goods grows with the increase of population in cities, leading to 
higher demand for infrastructure, leading to the growth of industrialisation and therefore 
achieving a more integrated development which requires control and management of the 
state and then leading to expansion of the public sector. 
(ii) The more income in the economy, the greater the demand for goods of high flexibility, such 
as education and the elastics of cultural goods and services that lead to a rise in government 
spending. 
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(iii) The financing of projects with long-term development goals accompanied by technical 
changes lead to pressure on the state to a greater involvement in the economy, which will 
have financial implications on the budget. 
Over the decades, a large number of studies conducted to test the Wagner‟s Law in 
different cases. As a result of this process, depending on the understanding of the concerned 
scholar, different versions of Wagner‟s Law have been developed, namely: Peacock and Wiseman 
(1961), Gupta (1967), Goffman (1968) and Goffman and Mahar (1971), Pryor (1968), Musgrave 
(1969), and Mann (1980) versions of Wagner‟s Law.  It should be noted that all these different 
versions are due to the fact that in the original version, it is not clear whether Wagner was 
referring to an increase in (i) absolute level of public expenditure; (ii) the ratio of total 
government expenditure to GNP; or (c) the proportion of the public sector to the total 
economy. Consequently, there are at least six models of Wagner's law which have also been 
empirically tested.  These are all explained in detail in the modelling chapter. 
It should be noted that among the empirical studies, some studies have shown that 
Wagner‟s law of expanding state activity holds with higher levels of economic development 
(Dutt and Ghosh, 1995).  
Henrekson (1993), for example, found a positive relationship between economic growth 
and government expenditure in Sweden, and his result confirmed that the real GDP explained 
the growth of government expenditure in the economy. In addition, Murthy (1993) found 
supporting evidence in favour of Wagner‟s law using data from 1950 to 1980 in Mexico. Further 
empirical studies on Wagner‟s Law is presented in a later section, 
 
3.4.1.2. The Displacement Hypothesis 
While Wagner sought to explain the trend in public expenditure, the most useful 
pioneering work in Britain, that Peacock and Wiseman (1961), offered a working hypothesis to 
explain the fluctuations in government expenditure over time. Peacock and Wiseman, in their 
work published during the early 1960s, aimed to locate the pattern of public expenditure trends 
(Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; xxiii). According to what later is known as Displacement 
Hypothesis, government expenditure tends to evolve in a step-like pattern, coinciding with social 
upheavals, notably wars. The disincentive effects of high marginal rates of tax, popular notions 
of tolerable tax burdens and the degree of political control exercised by the citizens over their 
government, encouraged by a rising output per person, are some of the major foci of study. 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961:24-27) also investigated and found that "both citizens and 
government hold divergent views about the desirable size of public expenditures and the 
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possible level of government taxation. This divergence can be altered by social disturbances that 
destroy established conceptions and produce a displacement effect. People will accept, in a 
period of crisis, tax levels and methods of raising revenue that in quieter times would have been 
thought intolerable, and this acceptance remains when the disturbance itself has disappeared." 
Revenue and expenditure statistics of governments also show a displacement effect after 
periods of social disturbance. Expenditures may fall when the disturbance is over, but they are 
less likely to return to the old level. “The state may begin doing some of the things it might 
formerly have wanted to, but for which it had hitherto felt politically unable to raise the 
necessary revenues” (Peacock and Wiseman 1961: 26).  Peacock and Wiseman (1961) contended 
that under normal conditions of peace and economic stability, changes in public expenditure are 
quite limited. 
In a simple language, Displacement Hypothesis states that "the effect of public 
expenditure on the time pattern will tend to be constant over time, rather than increasing, unless 
major crisis periods occur which require an increase in government intervention" (Peacock and 
Wiseman, 1961:24-26). The associated expansion of the public sector will not just be temporary 
after such an event, since the new levels of government expenditure and taxation will be 
accepted by the electors and public sector size will remain stable at a higher level until the next 
shock. According to the Peacock and Wiseman model(Brown and Jackson, 1990:123-127), 
therefore, the time-pattern of government expenditure normally increases stepwise, rather than 
linearly. They investigated the concept that public expenditure increases stepwise during war 
times due to higher military expenditures and that after a significant period military expenditures 
return to their previous values. On the other hand, the government expenditure as a whole was 
not restored to its earlier levels. Total government expenditures decrease after the war, but it 
stabilises at a higher level compared with the pre-war period. It can also be noted that the 
Peacock-Wiseman hypothesis proposed that public rationalisation during the time of expenditure 
growth occurred more freely than related to the size of the ultimate government expenditures.  
The entire process is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Illustrating Displacement Effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brown and Jackson (1990:126) 
 
According to, Brown and Jackson (1990),  figure 3.1 shows three possible patterns of the 
influence of war expenditures on government expenditures. Figure 3.1 (a) shows that case in 
which civilian public expenditures in the post-war period return to their original growth path; 
whereas Figure 3.1(b) represents the case in which the trend in total public expenditure 
experienced during the war period continues into the post-war period along with an upward shift 
in the level of civilian public expenditures. In the final example, Figure 3.1(c), there is an increase 
in post-war civilian public expenditures. This, however, is only a temporary phenomenon until 
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the old trend line is reached. The long-term trends shown in cases 3.1(a) and 3.1(c) are thus 
similar and show that there has been a permanent displacement of private by civilian public 
expenditures (Brown and Jackson 1990:124-127). 
It should be noted that due to such features of the Displacement Hypothesis, Brown and 
Jackson (1990: 123) noted that “Peacock and Wiseman‟s study is probably one of the best-
known analyses of the time pattern of public expenditure”.  
In terms of empirical contextualisation, Borcherding (1965) did not find any evidence for 
a displacement effect. A new analysis focusing on the time-series behaviour of government 
expenditure has developed and was tested on data from Sweden and the UK, which located 
upward displacement after World War II, and good evidence against the hypothesis was found 
(Henrekson, 1993).  Such studies are detailed and presented in a later section, 
Displacement Effect is articulated as a theory of structural break by Diamond (1977) due 
to the nature and operating mechanism of the observed government expenditures.  In addition, 
some other contributors considered the initial jump in the government expenditures after a 
social upheaval as ratchet impact.  The following section explores these two features of the 
Displacement Effect. 
 
3.4.1.2.1. The Displacement Effect:  Structural Break 
Wars and other social and political upheavals are capable of displacing this notion of 
tolerable tax rates and hence facilitating the shift in the level of government expenditures. After 
such events, government expenditure may fall again, but not to their previous levels. Therefore, 
public expenditure grows in a discontinuous and stepwise fashion, the steps occurring at times 
of major social upheavals (Demirbas, 1999).   
In other words, Peacock and Wiseman (1961:24-27) investigated that "both citizens and 
government hold divergent views about the desirable size of public expenditures and the 
possible level of government taxation. This divergence can be adjusted by social disturbances 
that destroy established conceptions and produce a displacement effect. People will accept, in a 
period of crisis, tax levels and methods of raising revenue that in quieter times would have been 
intolerable, and this acceptance remains when the disturbance itself has disappeared."  Thus, the 
hypothesis indicates that there is the structural change in government expenditures in terms of 
the trend. 
In explaining the „displacement effect hypothesis‟, Henrekson (1990: 246) states that 
“Peacock and Wiseman (1961), adopt a clearly inductive approach to explaining the growth of 
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government expenditure. When Peacock and Wiseman observed that expenditures over time 
appeared to outline a series of plateaus separated by peaks, and that these peaks coincided with 
periods of war and preparation for war they were led to expound the „displacement effect‟ 
hypothesis”. Such an explanation refers to the structural break nature of the hypothesis. 
Diamond (1977), therefore, presented the displacement effect as a theory of structural break. He 
used the Chow test, comparing two periods separated by a social upheaval, and he found that, if 
this shows significant structural change and there has been displacement. 
 
3.4.1.2.2. The Displacement Effect:  Ratchet Effect 
The „ratchet effect‟ refers to the restrained ability of processes to be reversed once a 
specific thing has happened.  The term is used within the „displacement effect hypothesis‟ to 
describe the seemingly irreversible expansion of government in times of crisis.  In other words, 
as explained due to the expansionary government expenditures during crises periods, 
governments then have difficulty in reducing government expenditures back to the original level 
after the initial temporary needs due to war, natural or economic crisis .  The government‟s 
exploitation of taxpayers‟ tolerance plays an important role in this process. Thus, the main 
argument of the ratchet effect is that if there is a crisis and government expenditures grows as a 
result, then the public expenditure might decline but not to the previous level as there would be 
resistance against such a move. 
According to Bird (1972), within the displacement effect, this resistance to get over 
displacement effect by public expenditure returning to the original level is named as „ratchet 
effect‟. However, it should be noted that Peacock and Wiseman (1979) argued that in the 
extreme, the ratchet effect interpretation of the displacement effect leads to the denial of its very 
existence. 
 
3.4.1.3. Keynesian Relation: Economic Growth and Government Expenditures 
Another model using Wagner‟s approach to explain economic growth and government 
expenditures is associated with Keynes as was mentioned previously. Keynesian theory 
articulates the idea on the role that the government expenditures or fiscal policy plays in cases 
when aggregate demand in the economy is declining.  
It is essential to note that Keynesian relation is related to the Wagner‟s Law, which 
considers that public expenditures are income elastic. Keynesian idea of aggregate demand and 
its role in the economy in stabilising the economy was central to his argument, as he considered 
that total income is a function of the level of operation in any country, and hence the greater the 
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scale of operation, the greater the total income. Therefore, he suggested expansionary economic 
policies through fiscal policy for the growth of the economy, which by definition treats public 
expenditure as an exogenous factor (Keynes, 1936) as oppose to other theories. 
Keynes (1933) found that public expenditures could contribute positively to economic 
growth and governments should use public expenditure as a tool of economic policy to manage 
national economies. Keynes‟ theoretical and policy suggestions helped to get the economies of 
the industrialised world out of stagnation in 1930s by heavily relying on government expenditure 
to boost aggregate demand.  This is expected to render economic growth through expanding the 
economic activity.  Therefore, it establishes a direct causality between government expenditures 
and economic growth.  
It should be noted that Keynesian policies very much remained as an important policy 
option until 1970s, when the growing government began to be perceived as part of the 
government failure as well. 
 
3.4.2. Microeconomic Models of Government Growth 
After presenting the theoretical macroeconomic models related to the growth of 
government expenditures, this section considers microeconomic theoretical explanations for the 
growth of government, mainly, in the western industrialised democracies. 
 
3.4.2.1. Baumol's Differential Productivity Growth 
Baumol (1967) argues for „differential productivity growth between private and public 
sector. According to this explanations, there are two sectors in the economy one of it is 
productive, and the other one is unproductive, namely private and public sectors respectively. 
Second, the wages in the two sectors of the economy rise and fall together. Finally, the money 
wages increase as rapidly as output per hour in productivity increases. Furthermore, Baumol 
(1967) argues that a differential function of productivity based on these assumptions – after 
developing and analysing the cost per unit of the unproductive sector – rises without limit. In 
addition, there is a tendency for the outputs of the unproductive sector, whose demands are not 
highly inelastic, to decline and vanish. According to Baumol (1967), in the unbalanced 
productivity model – if the ratio of output of the two sectors held constant – this suggests that 
more of the labour force must transfer to the non-progressive or unproductive sectors (Brown 
and Jackson, 1990). 
The progressive sector was characterised by cumulative increases in productivity per 
man-hour that arise from economies of scale and technological change. In the non-progressive 
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sector, labour productivity advances at a slower rate than that experienced in the progressive 
sector. Baumol‟s results depend upon there being a productivity differential between the two 
sectors. This does not imply, as some have incorrectly thought, that there are always zero 
productivity increases in the non-progressive sector. One reason for the existence of a 
productivity differential is the key role that has been played by labour inputs in the non-
progressive sector‟s goods.  Baumol‟s model, thus, provides a possible explanation of public 
expenditure growth, which is mainly explained by inefficiencies. 
Baumol (1967) also investigated the differing inflation rates between the public and 
private sector. He argued that the inflation rate for the government would be higher than that 
experienced by the private sector. 
In supporting „Baumol‟s Disease‟, Le Grand (1991) argued that an analysis of growth in 
public sector reveals that almost half of the increase in the public sector can be attributed to 
what has come to be called „Baumol‟s Disease‟.  
 
3.4.2.2. Bacon and Eltis’ Model 
Bacon and Eltis (1978) argued that Britain‟s long-term problems are reflected in high 
public spending, who states that the public sector increased quickly in size through the 1960s and 
early 1970s, which had to be financed by production of marketed output. Although taxes were 
levied to support the public sector, the wage earners, arguments run, had either not valued the 
increased social wage or had not assumed any change in the social wage, and had tacitly refused 
to support the public sector (Ansari, 1994). 
According to Bacon and Eltis, labour‟s concern with take-home pay led them to resist 
tax increases with claims for wage increases. In Bacon and Eltis (1978), trade unions passing on 
taxes to profits following a period of rapid wage increases achieved their desired position in that 
model. Retained profits are the main source of investment funds in the UK, so that ultimately 
the cost of the increased public sector reduces investment and there are consequent economic 
problems on all fronts. On the other hand, Bacon and Eltis argue that there is a fundamental 
fault in the UK economy caused by the fact that few people produce marketed goods and 
services. Marketed outputs are those, which are sold, and non-marketed products are those that 
are not. They have argued that the main problem with the UK economy is that an increasingly 
large proportion of the nation‟s total resources have moved into the non-marketed sector. 
Furthermore, they have produced figures to show that employment in the non-marketed sector 
and mainly in the public sector increased by over 40 per cent between 1961 and 1975 (Bacon and 
Eltis, 1978).   
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Thus Bacon and Eltis (1978) rather than locating the reasons of increasing government 
expenditures, they focused on the consequences of expanding public sector, which was 
considered as an important reason for the economic difficulties in the UK by Bacon and Eltis. 
 
3.4.3. Public Choice Approaches to the Growth of Government 
In addition to the mainstream micro or macro determinants of government expenditures 
and the related methods, a number of theoretical explanations are also developed by the public 
choice approach, which is explored in detail. Further discussion on the empirical studies on the 
topic is provided in the following section. 
It should be noted that the modern public choice is a study of political mechanisms and 
institutions in terms of government and individual behaviour through tools and methods of 
economic analysis. In other words, as Mueller (1989: 1) stated “public choice can be defined as 
the economic study of non-market decision making, or simply the application of economics of 
political science”. It means that public choice takes as its province the application of economists‟ 
methods of a positive analysis of problems that have conventionally been regarded as those of 
political science, concerning events generally in the public sector.  
The subject matter of public choice is mainly political issues and the causal impact 
between economics and politics. This directly refers to public sector and therefore public sector 
is the natural field of study for public choice analysis, which, thus, has developed approaches in 
understanding the growing size of government. The following sections present the public choice 
approach to growth of government. 
 
3.4.3.1. Bureaucracy and the Growth of Government 
Public choice school with its critical approach to the public sector mainly through the 
writings of Niskanen developed the understanding that one of the reasons of increasing 
government size is the strong position of bureaucracy. The argument is that the government 
managed to cover the bureaucracy by the use of higher bureaucrats who were intent on the 
continued existence of the system for their personal benefit.  
Bureaucratic responsibilities and assignments exist to attain numerous goals. However, 
bureaucracies are noted for their size and complexity and bureaucrats work to become part of 
the system with many rules of bureaucratic behaviour frequently tied to the letter of the law. The 
presence of a large administrative authority assumes a goal of coordinating the sections in 
decision-making. 
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The bureaucracy models of Niskanen (1971) and Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979b, 
1982:27-43), explain why the government might be larger than its optimal size or even as 
expected by legislature, as legislation would prefer if it knew the unit costs of the outputs it 
thought it was buying, and why the level of outputs might be larger than the median voter‟s most 
preferred level. According to Niskanen (1971), the bureaucrat‟s primary purpose is to achieve 
power and status, which positively correlates with the size of the budget allocated to his or her 
department. Therefore, the government worker starts with the assumption that the bureaucrat‟s 
objective is to maximize his or her budget, as explained in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2: Niskanen’s Model of Bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Niskanen‟s model (1971) 
 
As can be seen from the Figure 3.2, if we suppose the bureaucrat knows that the sponsor 
of his or her bureau‟s budget allocation will accept any project whose total benefits exceed total 
costs, the bureaucrat proposes QB, the output level that maximizes the size of the bureau, 
subject to the constraint that total cost (TC) is not above total benefit (TB). Thus, the solution 
produced by the bureaucracy is beyond the efficient output level and hence the bureaucracy in 
order to expand their size by producing inefficient outcome they use government expenditure, 
which leads to the linear growth of government. 
In support of the idea of the sustaining their position, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980: 
97-1011) argued that "government workers or bureaucrats have higher voter participation rates 
than do private employees but that this is not conclusive support for the salary growth assertion.  
In other words, government employees have much at stake when voting, and that this explains 
why participation rates are higher for government workers than for people who depend on the 
private sector for their primary services." 
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It should be noted that this explanation of the role of bureaucracy in producing an 
inefficient outcome should not be limited to the central and local governments only, but this also 
observed in a growth industry or in the private sector. 
The theory of bureaucracy may not offer a comprehensive explanation of the growth of 
government expenditure and it would be difficult to test it empirically. Mueller (1989) argued 
that bureaucracy incorporates the ability to inflate both the price and quantity of their activity. 
But Jackson (1990: 8) pointed out “there are no obvious measures of bureaucratic strength.”  
However, the theory of bureaucracy presented by Niskanen (1971) puts forward the role of 
interest of the bureaucrats. The theory that bureaucracy increases the growth of government 
presumes that the bureaucracy can mislead the government about the costs of different levels of 
production. Niskanen (1971) has used this assumption to analyse the penalty of pretentiousness 
when bureaucrats exploit the size of their budgets. Not amazingly, the model implies larger 
budgets than have been required by the governmental demanders. His study has become the 
theoretical foundation for a significant section of the literature on the growth of government.  
Tullock (1974) for example, in a dynamic prediction about bureaucracy considers the 
extent to which bureaucrats convert their power into high wages and salaries. He notes that 
bureaucracy can contract if the number of bureaucrats is falling. This can lessen the positive 
influence of the goods themselves (Niskanen, 1971). 
Finally, considering the impact of the bureaucratic role on the expansion of the state led 
to the emergence and growth of the behavioural theory of institutions, and therefore it helps to 
shed a great deal of light onto the growth of government expenditures through internal dynamics 
of bureaucracy as an institution and bureaucrats as individuals. 
 
3.4.3.2. Interest Groups and the Growth of Government 
The view of the public interest and the role of interest groups are essential to what is 
described as the public interest approach to the political decision making including public 
expenditures. To describe government growth over time using this approach, one must certainly 
argue that interest groups‟ bargaining power has developed over time; governments have become 
less unified over time, or various mixtures of the two.  
As the main contender, Olson (1982) argued for the growth of interest groups, however, 
and Murrell (1984) presented support consistent with Olson‟s hypotheses relating to the causes 
of interest group arrangement.  It is thus considered that the various interest groups create 
pressure on government and bureaucracy leading to growth of the government.  In should be 
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mentioned in the passing that bureaucracy is also considered as an interest group within thus 
approach. 
According to Olson‟s seminal theory, the steady economic situation in developed 
Western countries since World War II has facilitated the growth in interest groups.  “Growing 
specialisation also created a host of new interest groups” (North and Wallis, 1982:  340). In other 
words, the growing interest groups is seen as a reaction to the larger transaction costs of 
organising in a market economy with increasing specialisation (North, 1985). The role of interest 
groups can be considered as helping to develop the economies, and therefore lack of interest 
groups in underdeveloped countries may help to clarify the situation of relatively poor countries. 
The role of interest groups in influencing the behaviour of voters, the passage of 
legislation, and operation of the bureaucracy has been widely discussed (Niskanen, 1971). 
Traditional views of interest groups regard it as natural that individuals with common goals tend 
to form groups to further their common interest with the objective of maximizing their welfare 
by lobbying the government. In other words, the theory of interest group formation is founded 
on individual self-interest, but alternative views of political motives may lead to quite different 
results (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). 
Mueller and Murrell (1986) report investigations of empirical evidence suggesting that 
interest groups have an effect on the size of government. They found a political method in 
which parties supply interest groups with favours in exchange for the interest group‟s evidence. 
Lybeck (1986: 88-96) found that the relative size of government in Sweden varied over time with 
the relative fraction of employees who were members of interest groups. A study by McCormick 
and Tollison (1981: 9-45) found that the extent of economic regulation within a state varied 
directly with the number of trade associations registered in the state. In a number of cross 
section econometric and sample specification studies, the number of interest groups shows as 
consistently positive result, leading Mueller and Murrell (1986: 140) to suggest that those interest 
groups are able to influence public policies in such a manner as to lead to increased government 
size. 
Hunter and Nelson (1989) have investigated evidence from Louisiana showing that 
organised farmers and wealthy homeowners were able to lower their tax burdens. Rice (1986) 
found evidence showing that labour unions and other interest groups were able to persuade 
governments to initiate programs to counterbalance economic hardships; and also that such a 
group‟s programs helped provide an explanation for the growth of government sectors in 
European countries between 1950 and 1980. In a similar line, North and Wallis (1982), for 
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example, found a correlation between the growth of government and the growth of white-collar 
and managerial employment in the private sector.   
The demands that interest groups put upon government are not for a redistributive 
hand-out, but are to improve the transaction costs these groups stand within in an increasingly 
specialised society.  However, their impact on resource allocation and the pressure on the 
government to act in their favour are considered as one of the reasons of growing government. 
 
3.4.3.3. Median Voter and Redistributors Role of Government  
One of the main arguments developed in public choice theory is „median voter theorem‟, 
which is also employed to explain the growing size of government. The obvious point for a 
public choice account of public expenditure is the median voter model, which is “the voter 
whose preferences lie in the middle of the set of all voters‟ preferences. Half of voters want more 
of the good, and half want less than the median voter” (Rosen, 2005:117) 
Median voter theorem implies that voters have single peaked preferences, or policy bliss 
points, and can be described by a distribution function arraying them in a simple two 
dimensional policy space. The objective is to look into the political process closely to see how 
individuals express their views on economic matters, and how that is translated into political 
action, how it works with different voting rules, and whether the resolution reflects the wishes of 
the public, or if the government simply imposes its will. The median voter theorem hence 
implies that the preferences of the median voter determine the policy outcomes of the 
governments.  Since median voters act to maximise their own benefits, they prefer higher public 
expenditures, which results in increased government size through redistributive policies. 
However, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) argued that, since median income is below mean income 
in virtually all societies, this would suggest that public expenditure on goods and services would 
be less than the efficient level. 
In support of the median voter theorem, Schneider (1994: 178) for instance, argues that 
the median voter votes for the party whose political program is strongly in tune with their own 
preferences. Denzau and Mackay (1976) also pointed out that benefit shares and tax share will 
affect the quantity of local public goods the median voter will demand.  
Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) point out that median-voter model perform better 
when local institutions are consistent with their adoption. In the case of redistributive public 
expenditure, the flavour of this effect is reversed. This can be seen within the model developed 
by Meltzer and Richard (1978, 1983) in which there is a simple technology for income 
redistribution that consists of a proportional income tax and a tax rate tied to the median voter. 
In this setting, all individuals with productivity greater than or equal to the mean will vote for a 
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tax rate of zero. Redistribution will occur only if the median voter‟s productivity income is below 
the mean. The lower the productivity of the median voter the greater the redistribution will be. 
In short, median voter preferences can have deterministic effect on the government 
spending policies, and does result in increased government expenditures through redistributive 
but also direct policies. 
 
3.4.3.4. Fiscal Illusion 
It is argued within public choice theory that fiscal illusion encourages certain 
characteristics of a government‟s revenue collection system that hide the cost of public goods 
leading to growing government. In other words, citizens do not realise the real costs of public 
goods they demand and therefore they continue to increase their demand due to the fiscal 
illusion in the sense of the tax they pay for the increased public expenditures.  
Fiscal illusion states that if people do not appreciate the burden that is accruing from 
government expenditure and tax relief, they may stick to the growth of the expenditure.  
Congleton (2001) established that the fiscal illusion hypothesis presumes that the government 
can deceive people about the true growth of government. Wagner (1976) draws attention to the 
role of the tax system in fiscal illusions. In particular he considers rising revenue and postulates, 
“The accuracy of a person‟s perception of the cost of government will vary inversely with the 
complexity of the revenue structure” (Wagner, 1976: 52). Thus, the government size is 
considered to be increasing due to the fiscal illusion people under in demanding more public 
goods. 
 
3.5. THE COMBINED MODEL OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH 
The preceding section presented a number of model and theory developed over the 
decades to explain the growing size of government or the increasing government expenditures.  
Each of these models and theories, however, provides an explanation to the issue in question 
and represents an approach, and therefore each one of these should be considered as partial 
analysis.  
In their attempt, however, to provide a comprehensive model, Brown and Jackson (1990) 
present a combined model, which aims to explore and describe the factors that influence the 
level of public expenditure in an integrated manner. The model can be explained through the 
help of Figure 3.3 in four quadrants (Brown and Jackson, 1990: 143). 
„Quadrant I‟ explains the the demand curve of the average voter and the average cost 
curve for publicly supplied goods. In this part, we find the horizontal axes in the presentation of 
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the tax price, the demand curve for the median voter and the average cost curve for publicly 
supplied goods. 
„Quadrant II‟ depicts the production of goods and services supplied.  In other words, the 
production function refers to the number of values and actors required in the production 
process, such as technology, size of population, and the quality of services. 
„Quadrant III‟ contains significant elements, namely, labour and capital. It makes use of 
the input unit cost line OW0 to cost the service. if, for example, a single inputs such as labour 
was used in the production of Gk then the slope of OW0 could be thought of as the wage rate, 
which when multiplied by the total volume of labour inputs used would result in a value for total 
cost or total expenditure (Figure 3.3).   So we find that the impact of work is the amount of 
labour used in the production process and has a direct impact on the total expenditures or costs 
(Brown and Jackson, 1990: 145). 
„Quadrant IV‟ shows how to follow up behaviour change in the total expenditure over 
time through changes in the functions in the previous parts to consider what can be called 
change over time or „time pattern‟ (Brown and Jackson, 1990: 144). This shows the dynamic 
nature of the problem but also the on-going change in the public expenditures through the 
changes take place in other variables. 
Through the four quadrants in the model and the mechanism, we find that the net effect 
is to show the relationship between overall spending, change over time and its impact on services 
and products offered. 
 
Figure 3.3: The Combined Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Brown and Jackson (1990) 
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3.6. RENTIER STATE AND GOVERNMENT EXPANSION: A POLITICAL 
ECONOMY APPROACH 
The preceding sections present various macro, micro and public choice models in an 
attempt to develop an understanding into the growth of government or the increasing public 
expenditures which complemented with the combined model. However, there is an important 
aspect for government growth, which is the political economy nature of it.  In other words, 
political economy approach can help to develop an understating beyond the functional 
explanations offered by other approaches. 
In the political economy approach in addition to public choice approaches, the social 
formation of a society together with its political culture is considered to have important impact 
on the economic performance and also on the nature of fiscal policy.  In other words, the 
political economy of a country also determines the size of the government in that society.  In a 
liberal political economy setting, the economic role of the state will be minimal while in a 
socialist or welfare state setting the state will have more social role than economic role in terms 
of redistribution but also regulation of the economy. The developmentalist political economy 
brings about additional roles for a government in terms of undertaking the development of the 
society due to the lack of private capital and lack of civil society. Furthermore, some societies are 
considered as rentier state as part of their political economy in which the state remains the 
generator of wealth and distributes these to the larger population and hence the rentier state 
controls the entire economy and polity. 
The rentier state is a state that feeds on proceeds from abroad, either from the sale of 
raw materials or through the provision of services. The rentier state is a country that “receives on 
a regular basis substantial amounts of external economic rent” (Mahdavy, 1970: 428). The rent 
economy is then divided between the various stakeholders in the society. In general most of the 
developing countries, and in particular most of the Middle Eastern states are „rentier states‟ 
(Shambayati, 1994: 307),  
In rentier states, loyalty to the system is the most reasonable course of action for all the 
economic stakehodlers as well as individual citizens. In the process, government expenditures is 
used to create support but also sustain support. In this process, the state of privileges and 
distributed enterprises go to pro elite, the middle classes and intellectuals, who would spoil the 
shape and category of intellectual and cultural sector cash separately. The rentier state implies, 
hence, that democracy is in question in such settings. 
The rentier state analysis is based on the observation that the amount of money collected 
by the oil-rich governments is not from taxes, but rather comes from the proceeds of natural 
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resource extraction. According to the theory of the rentier state (Mahdavy, 1970), on condition 
that the state obtains ample amounts of such income; it may not have a strong impulse for 
democracy, change, and development.  
As part of the articulation of rentier state, for example, in the Gulf Countries, 
governments of oil-exporting countries to embark on large public expenditure programs without 
the imposition of taxes. They do not fall into deficit in balances of payments and have no 
financial difficulties or inflation, which the suffering states in most of the developing world, must 
contend with. This does not necessarily result in a socialist system, but it can turn into what may 
be considered a lucky state. The government becomes an important factor, but does not have 
such a critical role in the economy. Beblawi and Luciani (1987) took this kind of state as his 
point of departure and propose a new classification based on their productive functions. 
Beblawi and Luciani (1987: 51) detail "the features of a rentier state. First, the rentier 
economy of which the state is a subset must be one where rent situations predominate. Second, 
it must be external to the economy. Furthermore, the rent must appear from external sources. 
National rent, even if it were extensive enough to dominate, is not enough to typify the rentier 
economy because economic rent is an income factor that only results from production and 
investment at risk with respect to internal forces of production.  Furthermore, the open 
economy with elevated levels of distant operation is not rentier, even if it depends mainly on rent 
because the majority of the society is actively involved in the creation of wealth. Finally, the 
government must be the receiver of the external rent." This last point is related to the absorption 
of rent into the hands of the few, to use a phrase popular among modern political scientists 
(Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). 
Beblawi and Luciani (1987: 224), articulating the rentier state in the case of the Gulf 
region by applying their criteria consider that “the heritage long characterised by the purchase of 
tribal loyalty and devotion across the country, promotes the distribution of benefits and grants 
for the population” resulting ever increasing government expenditures. In supporting this, Ayubi 
(1991) also considers the rentierism as part of the traditional social formation of the Arab states 
in identifying the factors of production in the region. 
It should be noted that the rentirer state and political economy will be particularly 
important in understanding the growth of government in Saudi Arabia. However, this study is 
delaminated with the search for the nexus between government expenditure growth and 
economic growth and will only briefly refer to the political economy approach in reflecting on 
the results. 
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3.7. SURVEYING THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON GOVERNMENT GROWTH 
Over the decades, interest in understanding the determining factors as to why 
governments have grown in different political and economic setting. As presented above a 
number of theories and models have been developed since Wagner‟s Law, but also a large body 
of empirical studies conducted in the case of different countries to search for the validity of 
these models and theories. With the development of knowledge in econometric modelling, the 
nature of empirical studies has been sophisticated such as using time-series analysis. The 
following table provides a summary of the sampled papers from the existing body of empirical 
studies by referring to their methodology and the main results. Indeed, the empirical studies 
cannot be limited with the ones presented, as rather large number of such studies exists, but this 
list aims to provide a general understanding and pattern in government growth studies (Table 
3.1). 
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Table: 3.1. Surveying the Empirical Studies on Growth of Government 
Author Version Model Econometrics Test Country Result 
Kumar (2009) All Versions 
Log-linear /Cross & 
Time Series 
Co-integration test 
East Asian, 
countries 
1960- 2007 
Wagner‟s Law does hold East Asian countries, 
except for Hong Kong. 
Samudram , Nair & 
Vaithilingam (2009) 
Gupta‟s, Mann‟s & 
Musgrave‟s 
Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration & Bounds 
test 
Malaysia, 1970–
2004 
Supporting both Keynes view and Wagner‟s Law. 
Ziramba (2008) All Versions Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration & Granger 
non-causality test : Toda 
and Yamamoto 
South Africa, 1960-
2006 
The short-run causality find bidirectional causality, 
and 
Wagner‟s law finds no support in South Africa. 
Asutay & Al Fazari 
(2007) 
Wagner's 
Macroeconomic Model 
Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration, Causality & 
Error Correction test 
Oman, 1971-2002 
The results do not provide evidence for the 
government expenditures and economic growth. 
Sideris (2006) 
All versions except 
Pryor‟s 
Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration, Causality 
test 
Greece, 1833 – 
1938 
The results support Wagner‟s hypothesis. 
Al-Qudair (2005) 
P&W‟s Following 
Kolluri 
Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration , Granger 
causality & Error Correction 
test 
Saudi Arabia,  1970-
1999 
Support Wagner‟s Law, that real government 
expenditure has determined largely by real gross 
domestic product. 
Dritsakis and 
Adamopoulos (2004) 
P&W, Musgrave‟s, 
Goffman‟s 
Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Greece, 1960-2001 
Growth in government size has positive effects on 
economic growth. 
Wahab (2004) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration OECD, 1950-2000 Mixed results 
Halicioglu (2003) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Turkey, 1960-2000 
Growth in government size has negative effects on 
economic growth. 
Al Batel (2002) All Wagner's Versions Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration , Causality & 
Error Correction test 
Saudi Arabia 
1964-1998 
The results suggest existence of Wagner‟s law. 
Al-Faris (2002) Gupta‟s, Musgrave‟s Linear-Time Series Co-integration GCC, 1970-1997 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Burney (2002) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Kuwait, 1969-1994 
Growth in government size has negative effects   
on economic growth. 
Chang (2002) 
All versions except 
Pryor‟s 
Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration 
6 countries, 1951-
1996 
Mixed results 
Legrenzi, G. and 
Milas (2002) 
All versions Linear-Time Series Co-integration Italy, 1959-1996 No support for Wagner's Law 
Islam (2001) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration USA,1929-1996 
 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
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Kolluri, Bharat R., et al. 
(2000) 
P&W‟s Log-linear /  Time Series Co-integration 
G7 countries, 1960-
1993 
 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Asseery, et al. (1999) Goffman‟s, Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Iraq, 1950-1980 Mixed results 
Alleyne (1999) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration 
4 Caribbean 
countries, 1950-
1991 
Growth in government size has negative effects   
on economic growth. 
Biswal, et al. (1999) 
P&W‟s, Goffman‟s, 
Gupta‟s 
Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Canada, 1950-1995 Mixed results 
Thornton (1999) P&W‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration 
6 develop countries, 
1850-1913 
 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Abizadeh & Yousefi 
(1998) 
P&W‟s Time Series OLS 
South Korea, 1960-
1990 
 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Azam (1998) 
P&W‟s following  
Diamond's Model 
Log-linear / Time Series 
Using Perron's procedure , 
Co-integration, Causality & 
Error Correction test 
Malaysia, 1961- 
1990 
Cannot trace a structural break in total government 
expenditure, GNP and ratio of government 
expenditure in GNP to verify the Peacock –
Wiseman Hypothesis. 
Azam (1998) 
All versions except 
Pryor‟s & P&W‟s 
Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration, Causality & 
Error Correction test 
Malaysia, 1961 - 
1990 
No  Causality to support Wagner's law , and  
Musgrave‟s, 
Mann‟s are not co-integrated. 
Karagianni, et al. 
(1998) 
All versions Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration EU,1949-1998 Mixed results 
Kireyev (1998) All Versions Log-linear / Time Series Granger Causality test 
Saudi Arabia,  1969- 
1997 
The growth in the non-oil private GDP was 
significant and positively correlated with 
government expenditure. 
Sinha (1998) All versions Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration & Granger 
Causality test 
Malaysia, 1950-1992 
Causality tests indicate the absence of short-run 
relationship whereas the presence of co-integration 
indicates long-run relationship. 
 
Abdel-Rahman and 
Barry (1997) 
Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration 
Saudi Arabia, 1970-
1991 
Mixed results 
Ansari, et al. (1997) Gupta‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration 
3 African countries, 
1957-1990 
No evidence supporting the existence of long-run 
relationship between government expenditure and 
national income. 
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Chletsos and Kollias 
(1997) 
Gupta‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Greece, 1958-1993 
Only the growth of military expenditure may be 
explained in terms of Wagner's Law. 
Afxentiou and 
Serletis (1996) 
All Versions Time Series Co-integration 
Six countries, 1961-
1991 
There is no evidence supporting Wagner's 
hypothesis that there was a long-run relationship 
between both, total government expenditure and 
GDP, also between the categories of government 
expenditures. 
Ahsan, et al. (1996) P&W‟s, Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Canada, 1952-1988 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Bohl (1996) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration G7 countries, 17 Mixed results 
Payne and Ewing 
(1996) 
Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration 
22 countries, 1948-
1994 
Mixed results 
Ferris and West 
(1996) 
Musgrave‟s Linear OLS USA, 1959-1989 No support for Wagner's Law 
Ashworth (1995) P&W‟s Log-linear 
Linear error-correction 
model 
UK 
He found evidence for structural changes in the 
post-war in UK. 
Nomura (1995) 
P&W‟s following  
Diamond's Model 
Log-linear Chow test Japan, 1960-1991 
He found evidence for displacement effect with oil 
crises. 
Nomura (1995) Gupta‟s Log-linear / Time Series OLS Japan,  1960-1991 
There is a positive association between the growth 
in government expenditures and Gross Domestic 
Product growth. 
Ashworth (1994) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Mexico, 1950-1988 
Growth in government size has negative effects   
on economic growth. 
Hayo (1994) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Mexico, 1950-1980 
Growth in government size has negative effects   
on economic growth. 
Hsieh and Lai (1994) All versions Log-linear / Time Series Causality test 
G-7 countries, 
1885-1987 
There is evidence of causality, but government 
expenditure had a marginal effect on growth. 
 
Murthy (1994) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration 
Mexico, 1950-1980 
1950-1988 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Oxley (1994) Goffman‟s, Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Britain, 1870-1913 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Courakis, et al. (1993) P&W‟s Log-linear /  Time Series OLS 
Greece and Portugal, 
1958-1985 
There is no evidence supporting Wagner's 
hypothesis that there was a long-run relationship 
between total government expenditure and GDP 
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Henrekson (1993) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Sweden, 1861-1990 
Growth in government size has negative effects   
on economic growth. 
Murthy (1993) Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series Co-integration Mexico, 1950-1980 
There is a positive long-run relationship between 
the variables under investigation. 
Bairam (1992) P&W‟s Log-linear / Time Series OLS 
OECD countries, 
1950-1985 
Mixed results 
Huang and Tang 
(1992) 
Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series 
Co-integration & Causality 
test 
Taiwan, 1951-1987 
There is a feedback between GNP and 
Government expenditure, as well as government 
revenue and GNP, but there is only one-way 
causality running from government revenue to 
government expenditure. 
Ram (1992) P&W‟s Time Series OLS OECD, 1950-1985 
 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP. 
Gyles (1991) Gupta‟s 
domain Transfer 
function model 
OLS UK, 1946-1985 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Nagarajan and 
Spears (1990) 
Musgrave‟s Log-linear / Time Series OLS Mexico, 1950-1980 
 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Kolluri, B. R., et al. 
(1989) 
Man‟s Log-linear / Time Series OLS 
6 countries, 1960-
1985 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Abizadeh, S. and 
Yousefi (1988) 
All versions Log-linear / Time Series OLS USA,1950-1984 
Growth in government size has positive effects on 
economic growth. 
Ram (1987) Musgrave‟s, P&W Log-linear / Time Series OLS 
115 countries, 1950-
1980 
Mixed results 
Vatter and Walker 
(1986) 
P&W‟s 
Proportional measures-
Time Series 
OLS USA, 1929-1979 
There is a positive relation between government 
expenditures and GDP 
Abizadeh, S. and 
Gray (1985) 
Musgrave‟s Linear OLS 
53 developing 
countries, 1963-
1979 
There is a decline in the government expenditure 
ratio with increased economic development. 
Singh and Sahni 
(1984) 
Gupta‟s Linear-Time Series OLS India, 1950-1981 
Growth in government size has negative effects on 
economic growth. 
Mann (1980) Man‟s Log-linear / Time Series OLS Mexico, 1913-1958 Mixed results 
Ganti and Kolluri 
(1979) 
Gupta's Log-linear / Time Series OLS USA,1929-1971 
GDP as opposed to using total GDP per capita, 
and the income elasticity of demand was 
approximately two. 
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Peacock & Wiseman 
(1979) 
P&W‟s 
“while government expenditure has clearly grown over the period as a whole for all countries for which adequate statistics are available, 
the time pattern of growth is less regular than, and quite different from, the corresponding pattern of growth in the size of community 
output” (Peacock and Wiseman 1961, p. 25). 
Diamond (1977) P&W‟s Log-linear Chow test 
He found evidence for displacement effect as a 
structural break. 
Goffman and Mahar 
(1971) 
Goffman‟s Proportional measures OLS 6 nations, 1940-1965 
Growth in 
government size has 
negative effects   on 
economic growth. 
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3.8. CONCLUSION 
This chapter aims to survey the relevant theories and models used in explaining growth 
of government.  In doing so, and in providing a foundation for the rest of the chapters, the 
economic rationale for the government is discussed within various schools of thought.  
In the models and theories section, Wagner‟s Law, Peacock & Wiseman‟s the 
Displacement Effect and the Keynesian Approach presented as part of the macroeconomy 
related models. These are three important theoretical observations on the growth of public 
expenditure. The most popular one is Wagner‟s Law (1883) which states that the increased 
economic activity leads to increases in government activities, which in turn result in the increase 
of public expenditure. This involves the view that public expenditure can be seen as a result, or 
as an internal factor of the growth of the economy.  Wagner‟s (1883) law of expanding state 
activity has since been empirically experienced by a number of states. 
In another attempt, Peacock and Wiseman formulated the displacement effect by 
analysing the time pattern of public expenditure. They found that public expenditure increases 
during war or periods of social crisis. Moreover, when the war ends, or crisis is resolved, public 
expenditure falls, but not to the level at the start of the emergency, with the conclusion that 
growth in public expenditure occurs in stages associated with stress. 
The advent of the Keynesian approach had a profound and pervasive influence on 
economists and governments for many generations. Keynes (1933) found that the government 
should use public expenditure as a tool of economic policy to manage a national economy and 
counteract unemployment. His view found ready acceptance in a world that had not yet 
recovered from the Great Depression. The Keynesian suggestion was to inject money into the 
economic system. In other words, through careful consideration of the macroeconomic theories 
of government growth comparable to Wagner‟s law, there appears to be a positive causal 
relationship flowing from government expenditure to economic growth.  
There are also the microeconomic models. These have included Baumol‟s differential of 
production growth, Bacon, and the Eltis model. The results of supply side analysis are defined by 
the fact that a traditional demand function for public goods always under-predicts the growth of 
the public sector. An analysis of public consumption drawing support from Baumol‟s 
productivity inequality model shows that this growth has exceeded the rate implied by the mutual 
price and income effects. The developed model is used to explain both the relative and absolute 
growth of various measures of public expenditure. Bacon and Eltis exaggerate the impact of 
increases in local government employment on the national economy, because they do not allow 
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for cheaper part-time and female labour, and they do not allow for the fact that a proportion of 
the extra salaries and wages is paid back to government in taxes and rates. 
This chapter, furthermore, presented four different models of the Public Choice 
Approach to the growth of government. These included „bureaucracy and the growth of 
government‟, „interest groups and the growth of government‟, „median voter and redistributors 
government model‟, and „fiscal illusion‟. 
Government expenditure increases when government allocates additional expenditure to 
interest groups in order to get support from the groups. The expenditure may be on the level of 
government redirecting resources from the general public interest to the interest group at the 
expense of the general society. It gives us an opportunity to argue that as interest groups increase 
in society, government expenditure may increase. 
The median-voter model, together with the stylised fact regarding the relationship 
between median and mean income, suggests that the public sector will be overly concerned with 
redistribution, but may provide too few goods and services. While these consequences from the 
median-voter models are suggestive, they do not give the basis for a general theory of public 
expenditure determination.  
In an attempt to understand government growth through political economy approach, 
rentier state approach is also considered, which is particularly relevant in the case of Saudi 
Arabia.  
After identifying the main theoretical models, the next chapter focuses on the technical 
aspect of government expenditures by discussing the definitional and measurement issues. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES: 
CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
The economies of most of the countries in recent decades have been characterized by 
growth in the government intervention and government expenditure expansion. Thus, due to 
various reasons weather welfare state understanding or whether due to late developmentalism, 
the public sector has played an important role in the economic policy making in many 
countries. Wagner (1890) pointed out that the share of public sector output in the context of 
economic development leads the economy to grow due to increased demand for public goods 
and services. Consequently, in the process of economic development, government spending is 
expected to grow. It this process, government expenditure is an endogenous factor and an 
outcome, not a principle cause of growth (Wagner, 1883). 
It should be noted that the nature and mechanism of government and public 
expenditures differs from one country to another, as the multidimensional nature of 
government intervention in the economy means that the intervention could include various 
government activities (Gemmell, 1993). While most of the studies focused solely on size as 
one might expect, Abizadeh and Basilevsky (1990:3) states that “the choice of different 
variables would lead to a different size with distinct meaning and implications.” 
This chapter, hence, presents aspects of public sector measurement accompanied by 
an explanation of the concept of the public sector, or government. This is followed by an 
explanation of the remarkable complexity of the indicators used to measure of the size of the 
public sector. 
 
 
4.2. THE CONFUSION OF CONCEPTS  
It is useful to give some thought to the importance and growth of government, as it 
requires clear understanding as to what we need to measure. Peters and Heisler (1983:179) 
aims to make it easy when the state that the measurement should be “in forms in which data 
are more readily available, in quantifiable form, ubiquitous units, and preferably in internal 
form.” 
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 A critical examination of the literature indicates that a number of concepts are used to 
describe the government expenditure growth or government growth including „state‟, „public 
sector‟, „public expenditure‟, „government expenditure‟, etc. It is clear that there is a difference 
in these concepts and components in terms of size or area, and there is a difference in the 
identification of these components from one country to another. According to Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1980:16) “there are several different ways in which the size of the public sector can be 
measured, and there is a substantial element of arbitrariness in any definition.”  
 The following sections thus aim to shed some light unto these concepts in better 
understanding the subject matter. 
 
4.2.1. The Concept of the State  
In an attempt to understand that conceptual issues, the first concept is to explore is 
the „state‟, which is defined as the group of people associated by certain bonds governed by a 
system of designated authority (Trotman and Dickenson, 1996).Beyond, this legal notion of 
the state, „state‟ is also used commonly as word in political systems. It means a relationship 
between geography and citizen, but also a contract between individual citizens and their 
governance. According to Peters and Heisler (1983), the „state‟ refers to the relationships 
between a government and its citizens. 
The notion and definition of state has changed through the centuries and therefore its 
impact and conceptualisation and its boundaries in economic life has changed from one 
political setting to another.  While communist economies experiences a heavy presence of 
state in the economy, liberal capitalist economies aimed at small state in terms of state 
intervention in the economy. 
The nature of the political setting also defined the functions of the state in different 
ways over the centuries.   While classical political economists recognised the classical functions 
of the state from defence to security and legal system to governance, modern welfare state 
understanding as the blend of socialism and capitalism resulted in state providing public and 
merit good most of the time free of charge to its citizen in developing a nation state.  
In terms of the size of the government as the subject matter of this research, 
measuring the size of the state is a more complicated and sophisticated matter; as the 
definition states modern state is large and complex phenomenon with various economic 
implications. As the constitutional economics states, then the measurement of the government 
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expenditures should start with the economic implications of the various agencies of central 
authority and other agencies. However, such definitions and attempts are difficult to conduct. 
 
4.2.2. The Concept of Government  
Government is part of the composition of the state and has the authority to make and 
enforce laws and regulations. Peters and Heisler (1983:184) define government as “the 
institution that imparts direction to society by various means of collective decision-making and 
exercises the state‟s authority on a daily basis.” As the one of the oldest political institutions in 
the world, whose mission can be summarised as four fundamental tasks (World Bank, 1997): 
(i) Establishing a foundation of law; 
(ii) Investing in basic social services and infrastructure; 
(iii) Protecting the vulnerable; 
(iv) Protecting the environment. 
Government thus constitutes the functional and executive articulation of the state in 
economic and political system, which has particular implications for public expenditures.  
However, being a different concept, it is terrible difficult to establish the demarcation lines 
between the state and the government as far as public expenditures are concerned. 
 
4.2.3. The Concept of Public Sector  
There are different ways to explain the concept of the public sector. Since public 
sector refers to public expenditures and incomes policies in the form of fiscal policy, Brown 
and Jackson (1990:4) pointed out that “public sector economics are, therefore, the study of the 
effect of public expenditure and taxes on the economy”. In other words, since the concern in 
this study is related to the size of government involvement in the economy, the concept of the 
public sector includes not only public expenditure but also the taxes and the creation of public 
debt.  
It should be noted that the multiplicity of public enterprises in each state can make the 
process of measuring public sector as a difficult process (Trotman and Dickenson, 1996).In 
supporting this, Aulichet al. (2001:1) notes that the concept of the public sector “represents the 
activities undertaken almost solely by government agencies, and is accomplished by a mix of 
departments of state, statutory authorities and other legal and political institutions.”   
Since this chapter aims to identify the differences between different categories related 
to the subject matter, it should be stated that there are differences between the concepts of 
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„government; and „public sector‟. Saunders and Klau (1985) provide a comparison in aspects of 
„government‟ and „public sector‟. Accordingly, public sector includes expenditures, taxes and 
government activities including the following: 
 General government transfers in goods and services. 
 Transfers of income and capital. 
 Economic activities of public enterprises and industries. 
 Tax expenditures. 
 Public sector lands. 
 Loans to private-sector borrowers. 
 It should be stated that the development of the public sector in developing countries is 
similar to a large extent in that most economic activities of the state tend to focus on the 
construction of infrastructure, provision of social services, the regulation of foreign trade, and 
regulation of the production of goods and services (Beck, 1982). 
 In concluding, in the study of government expenditure, the nature of the measurement 
and how this relates to different levels of the measurement categories and entities has to be 
identified in order to develop a consistent result. 
 
4.3. THE PROBLEMS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT 
All government spending and income, such as public employment and tax revenues, 
are included in measuring the public sector as managed by a particular government. However, 
as Larkey et al.(1981:163) states ''it is not obvious what should be counted as „public‟ and what 
as „private‟, nor is it obvious how the measures ought to be expressed e.g. in per capita terms, 
share of GNP, GDP or NNP. The choices depend on both the research purposes as well as 
on technical considerations.'' 
For the identified aim of this study, total government expenditures as stated in the 
consolidated budget are taken as the main measurement. In other words, the money actually 
passing through budget rather than ways in which governments can affect the economy 
through regulation and other devices is considered in this study. 
Despite clarifying the nature of public expenditures, the issue of how to represent the 
measurement of the public expenditures is an issue, which is discussed in the following 
sections. 
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4.3.1. Absolute or Relative Size  
Using the absolute size of government expenditures may not do justice in 
understanding the growing size of the public expenditures. Musgrave (1978) and Brown and 
Jackson (1990) also stated that the absolute size of the public sector is a somewhat 
meaningless concept. Rather, the relative size of the public sector is the typical measurement 
utilised as a ratio or comparison between the estimates or the absolute measurement of the 
public sector variables and the total national income. The measure of the relative size of the 
public sector is not especially easy, as a ratio it involves public sector measure to total national 
income, and hence the definitions of these variables are still disputed (Cullis and Jones, 1987). 
 
4.3.2. Nominal or Real Values 
Inflation has been a common economic terms and phenomenon for all the nations. 
One of the main sources of the growth in public revenues and in public expenditures is clearly 
inflation. The other related aspect is the relative price effect which should be taken into 
account even when estimating the size by real values. As Cullis and Jones (1987) 
acknowledged, we need to distinguish changes in relative prices of public services and their 
volume, since prices of publicly and privately provided goods do not go up at the same rate. 
Musgrave (1978:16) indicates that in fiscal policy measures, “a correction must be 
made for inflation” and add that the observation on nominal levels would not be meaningful. 
On the other hand, as indicated by Abizadeh and Basilevsky  (1990:356), Buchanan and 
Flowers and  lewis-Beck and Rice favoured the nominal values, "reflect changes in prices along 
with changes in government's real share in economic activity…. (while giving) a better 
indication of  government's scope and power vis-a-vis the national economy." 
 
4.3.3. The Implications of Deflating Public Expenditures by the GDP Deflator. 
As indicated by  Monacelli and Perotti, (2006:8) "instead of the GDP deflator, one 
could have used government expenditures own deflator to express government spending in 
real terms. Most models predict that this action should have a positive effect on employment 
and output: in a neoclassical model, this happens via a negative wealth effect on the private 
sector, whereas in a 'Keynesian model', via a higher demand. Yet, if we used government 
expenditures own deflator, real government expenditure would not change and we would not 
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be able to capture. Only by employing the GDP deflator will we be able to capture the positive 
effect on output."  
 
4.3.3. The Measurement of Relative Size  
Since the absolute size of the public sector does not render an efficient understanding, 
at least measurements can be developed to examine the direction and magnitude of change in 
the public sector expenditures over time.  
The measurement of the relative size of the public sector to total national income is 
important in interpreting and understanding the expansion of the public sector over time.  As 
noted previously, one of the most important of such relative size is the proportional share of 
the government in the economy, such as the proportion of government expenditure in GNP. 
Nevertheless, there are some difficulties regarding the measurement of the magnitude of this 
ratio as well.  
 
4.3.3.1. The Public Revenues Ratio  
One of the indicators that deserve attention in estimating the size of the government 
sector is public revenue. An increase in government spending or any other part of these 
financial aspects must bear in mind the growth of public revenues. 
Public revenue is the sum of money levied by the state from various sources to finance 
public expenditures to meet public needs. Public revenue is the financial means to enable the 
state to implement public policy. There are several types of income associated with increasing 
functions of the state and its intervention in economic and social affairs. 
Revenues obtained from taxes are the largest sources of public revenue, and these 
taxes require a strong private sector, which is obliged to pay them. The comparison between 
the total taxes from the private sector renders an indication of the resources of governments 
(Gillie, 1979). 
There are many types of public revenue, the bulk of which is received from three main 
sources. There are the fees for the provision of public services, followed by income tax, and 
the third source, consists of credit and loans, domestic and external.  With the increased 
functions of the state, the variety of public revenues have changed and diversified. 
The public revenue ratio to GDP provides an understanding on the extractive power 
of the state and hence its power on the economy. 
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4.3.3.2. The Ratio of Public Expenditure  
Considering that Wagner (1883) pointed out that rapid growth in public expenditure is 
most often a function of a quickly growing national income, relative size of public expenditure 
in terms of ratio of public expenditures to national income can be considered as an efficient 
measure.  In supporting this, Jackson (1980:330) noted that “the relative size of the public 
sector can be simply expressed as a ratio of some absolute measure of public expenditure 
divided by a national income aggregate such as GNP.”  
The ratio of public expenditure involves a number of aspects beginning with 
numerators measures (Cullis and Jones, 1987), which are depicted in Table 4.1: 
(i) The sum of the local and central government expenditure plus the capital of corporations 
(nationalised industries) and tax expenditure; 
(ii) The sum of the local and central government expenditure plus the capital of corporations 
(nationalised industries), but after excluding tax expenditure, despite the opinion of some 
that it could be added to the miscellaneous expenses of governmental activities; 
(iii) The sum of the local and central government expenditure, but after the excluding the 
capital of corporations (nationalised industries) and their tax expenditure, as they are 
largely autonomous; 
(iv) It is similar to (iii) but excludes all expenditure on financial assets, because it reflects the 
role of local and central government as financial intermediaries; 
(v) Local and central government expenditure, as this figure assumes that local and central 
government expenditure is less than the total spending on financial assets; 
(vi) The latest measurement of the ratio of government spending, where there are attributes 
and the ratio of value-added, which requires the input dimensions of the procurement 
market of the expenses, detailed in this way and not as part of the spending output. 
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Table 4.1: The Numerators Measures 
 Measure Including Excluding 
1 Local and central government expenditure Nationalized 
Industries 
+ 
Tax Expenditure 
-------- 
2 Local and central government expenditure Nationalized 
Industries 
Tax Expenditure 
3 Local and central government expenditure -------- Nationalized 
Industries 
+ 
Tax Expenditure 
4 Local and central government expenditure -------- All expenditures on 
financial assets 
5 Local and central government expenditure 
6 Local and central government expenditure Value – Added 
 
Source: Cullis and Jones, (1987:69-71)  
 
 
 
Somewhat differently, Cullis and Jones (1987) present eight possible denominators, 
with six possible numerators, to measure the ratio of government expenditure, and thus the 
size of government. They have noted that “While the estimate of government expenditure is 
larger when selecting the appropriate numerator, the public sector appears larger by choosing 
the smallest denominator” (Cullis and Jones, 1987:71). Cullis and Jones (1987:70), therefore, 
state that “it is very easy to see how very differing views on the size and growth of public 
sector are readily sustained.” 
In identifying the difficulties in the use of such a ratio, Jackson (1980) pointed out that 
the nationalised industries consume public sector resources, and thus make this ratio smaller 
than the potential ratio. Therefore, Brown and Jackson (1990) suggest an expanded the ratio as 
the total of public sector consumption, the total of public sector investment, government 
subsidies, transfers of capital, interest on debt, and finally the net loans to the private sector. 
Transfer expenditures are considered as another complicated part of the numerator of 
such a ratio; as some suggests that transfer expenditures being non-economic by nature should 
not be included.  However, rightly so, Buchanan and Flowers, as quoted by Abizadeh and 
Basilevsky (1990:356) noted that “Transfer is as much a real cost as direct outlays for tanks, 
planes and paperclips. When estimating the real cost of government, the distinction between 
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productive and transfer expenditure is not useful.” Hence, in order to have a full picture of the 
public sector growth, transfer expenditures should also be considered. 
In all cases, change and differences in analysis and political outlook, analysts have the 
opportunity to choose any measurement of the ratio of government spending which proves 
useful. However, it is nonetheless quite clear that „any measure or standard for measuring the 
change in the size of government is arbitrary‟ (Jackson, 1980). 
The important point is that the nature of the ratio of government expenditure should 
be identified. For example, Eltis (1983:79) stressed that “the expression has been made in 
terms of conventional national income accounts; these are, however, not the ideal tools to use 
in an examination of the influence of growth in public expenditure on the development of the 
economy.”  Thus, national income may be the best indicator of economic output to be used as 
a denominator. Consequently, GDP can be employed as the national income aggregate 
statistics in the estimation of the public expenditure ratio.  
It should be noted that an additional problem with regard to figures or estimates of 
national income is related to the estimation of the national income whether at factor costs and 
market prices. Brown and Jackson (1990) indicated that the composition and construction of 
public revenue in different countries will affect the GDP at market prices, even if they have a 
similar figure at factor prices. Because of this, they preferred GDP at factor cost as the most 
appropriate measurement in estimating the size of public sector through public expenditure 
ratio. 
Among the national income measures, Musgrave (1978:18) found that the GNP is the 
favoured standard for measurement of the size of government, noting that his “inclination is 
to use GNP at market price where purchases or the total expenditure ratio are concerned, 
while using net national product at factor cost when dealing with transfer payments or direct 
taxes.” However, Oshima (1957: 388) argued that “valuation of products at factor cost is not 
suitable, since it excludes indirect taxes which are a large part of the share of government.”  
Furthermore, Eltis (1983:79) suggests that “(if our goal is to measure) real resources available 
for investment and consumption by the companies and workers of the private sector, then the 
provision of un-marketed public services should be excluded from the output because they 
can be neither invested nor privately consumed.” 
As a result, even if GDP is chosen as a denominator, six different ways of interpreting 
it still is an issue. However, varying percentage of increased in nominator and denominator 
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also results in unrepresentative ratio. For instance, if the government expenditure increase is 
lower than the increase in the GDP or GNP, then the ratio will be lower comparatively. 
 
4.3.4. Public Employment Measurement  
Government employment can be employed as another significant indicator of the size 
of government. However, one of the main difficulties found by some economists and 
researchers in the field of government employment is the difficulty in separating the 
employment interaction and participation between the government and the private sector, 
making the expense of workers in the public sector rather difficult to estimate. 
Rose (1983:165) asserted that “defining employees in terms of attributes of the 
employer rather than of the employee, avoids many problems.” The difficulty that may arise is 
the development of a classification for some functions not falling within any job classification, 
and so may not come within the scope of the classification and thus become invisible in the 
process of calculation. This can also give rise to confusion, as stated by Rose (1983:165) “if 
public employment is disaggregated into functions components, the same government can be 
changing in different directions at the same time.” 
There are also some jobs in the public sector, with a low level of minimum income, 
which are filled by individuals who do not receive a fixed wage per day, which must also be 
taken into account when calculating the total number of jobs in this sector. 
In short, using public employment as a measure can pose certain other difficulties in 
terms of defining and understanding the various aspects of public sector employment. 
 
4.3.5. The Measurement of the Off-Budget Activities of Government  
It is clear that the assessment method and system of government expenditures must 
take into account a more inclusive society, where it is necessary to identify the various 
government activities and what activities add to the total government budget. The 
governments use their power to issue legal and regulatory legislation to create revenues and 
expenditures areas beyond the formal budget of the country, which are called off-budget 
funds.  The creations of such funds are sometimes due to political manoeuvre and sometime 
due to the policies of the governments to circumvent rigid bureaucratic regimes. 
The study of the phenomenon of off-budget activities of government is far removed 
from the study of traditional data. Measures to deal with the public sector should include the 
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additional activities of governments, such as off-budget activities (Saunders and Klau, 1985). 
The previous standards, such as tax expenditure, subsidies, and regulation rejected the 
traditional measurement of the public sector, especially when there is difficulty in finding 
estimates of the size of government. These off-budget activities are essential, constituting a 
large alternative area in the performance of direct actions of the government budget. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, in particular funds in the form of sovereign wealth funds 
(SWF) should be considered as an important part of government‟s increasing expenditure 
power, through which government has been undertaking investments and generating wealth 
beyond the state‟s budget. Considering that these SWFs have managed to pool very large 
amount of funds available to be used by the state mainly for economic and financial 
investments, their inclusion in the calculation of growth of government should include these 
funds.  Since they are investment oriented and owned and regulated by the state, it is 
important that they should be considered as part of the government expenditure structure. 
 
4.3.6. Tax Expenditure  
Tax Expenditure is a term used to describe various allowances, which are used to 
reduce the burden of income tax. Tax expenditure has been seen as analogous to direct 
payments, or subsidies provided by the government. 
Tax is a financial burden received by the state according to the rules of parliamentary 
mandates, to provide the necessary funds to cover the expenses of the state so as to achieve 
the economic goals of the community, that is, the economic objectives to encourage savings 
and investment, to encourage some sectors of the economy, to reduce the negative effects of 
economic stagnation and to curb inflationary pressures. 
In addition, the government directs spending without resources and without the actual 
collection or compilation of some types of expenditure in the tax system, which means it is 
government-supported or subsidised, as in the case of tax expenditure. According to Saunders 
and Klau (1985:79) “Tax expenditure can take various forms, such as exemptions from tax, tax 
allowances, tax credits or special tax reliefs designed to assist particular groups or activities.” 
In addition, the amount obtained by the government as income tax will be low and without 
any charge to the direct expenditure. 
Cullis and Jones (1987:75) note that “Attempts have been made to quantify some of 
those implicit expenditures”, which includes tax expenditures.  Gillie (1979:15) argued that 
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“There is no systematic estimate of revenue foregone because of these reliefs, but it seems 
likely to be substantial.”  
With the purpose of measuring the implicit expenditure, as argued by Saunders and 
Klau (1985:79) “there should be agreement on what represents the normal tax structure, since 
tax expenditure is usually defined as departures from the generally accepted normal or 
benchmark tax structure.” 
It should be noted that the traditional estimation methods of measurement, although 
familiar, can only be approximate estimates of tax and tax expenditure. There are additional 
problems, and in spite of the fact that increasing numbers of states find a separate system to 
measure these taxes, they are exceptional budgets, as noted by Saunders and Klau (1985). 
 A quick review of the government expenditure growth literature, however, does not 
show any study using tax expenditures as a measure of government growth. 
 
4.3.7. Laws and Regulations  
Laws and regulations are an important aspect in the organisation of public sector 
activities and, therefore, the size of government. The policies that work in the regulatory 
process in general have a significant impact and provide clear guidance in the private and 
public sectors. As noted by Rose (1983:161), “laws are a unique resource of government”, as 
through laws are regulations, government defines resources allocation in the society as well as 
tax burden of the citizens. Therefore, their role goes beyond the extent to which they can be a 
real alternative to direct government spending or tax measures (Brown and Jackson, 1990), as 
laws and regulations have explained the importance of advancing the public sector and 
performance; also, the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector have a significant 
impact on the public and the private sectors.  
There are some problems related to measuring and determining the kind and quality of 
laws and regulations, but that is a catalyst for regeneration and development. Moreover, laws 
and regulations need to adapt to a lasting interest for economic growth and development of all 
activities of the state, but are not limited only to mere work provided for under these laws; 
they must take into account the rapid development of economic concepts over time. Saunders 
and Klau (1985:85) argue that “attempts to estimate the economic costs of regulatory activity 
in monetary terms are satisfactory”, for which various benchmarks can be developed.  For 
instance, if the objective is to measure the regulatory process in the economy, there are 
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descriptions of the rate of economic activity and industrial activity, and the purpose of the 
laws and regulations in this case is to control prices or production (Saunders and Klau, 1985). 
It is important, however, to state that measuring the government size through laws and 
regulations can be a difficult process, as locating their impact can only be through micro-data 
related method which can be terribly time consuming. 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION  
This chapter attempted to discuss many of the benchmarks and indicators to highlight 
confusion over the concepts related to the increasing government size, but also the difficulties 
in using a particular measurement for this end.  
The difference between the government and the public sector is important, as we 
mentioned earlier that the government authorities in their legislative capacity produce laws for 
all sectors and in their executive capacity follow up and manage these laws. Therefore, a 
proportion of the public sector in the economy in general and in the determination of the size 
of government is of particularly great importance. 
As mentioned above, there is considerable controversy among economists and 
politicians regarding the description of the growth of public sector over time.  In overcoming 
all these controversy and difficulties, the optimum policy is that “the choice of estimate should 
be tailored to the issue in question” (Cullis and Jones, 1987:76).  
In identifying the confusion over various estimates, table 4.2depicts the public 
expenditure ratios for the UK for 1977 and 1987 as estimated by Gillie (1979) and Brown and 
Jackson (1990) respectively. 
 
Table 4.2: UK Public Expenditure Ratios 1977 and 1987 
UK – General government total expenditure ratios 1977 and 1987 
Measure (Gillie, 1979) – 1977 (Brown and Jackson, 1990) –  1987 
The national income % 60.5% 54.3% 
GDP 
Factor cost 
53.6% 47.7% 
GNP 53.1% 47.0% 
GDP 
Market prices 
47.8% 40.5% 
GNP 47.4% 40.0% 
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Table 4.2 presents a variety of measures, and compares UK Public Expenditure ratios 
between 1977 and 1987. Gillie (1979) and Brown and Jackson (1990:158) estimated that “the 
differences between the ratios depends upon whether it is the national or the domestic 
product that was used in the denominator and whether the denominator was measured at 
market prices or factor cost”. As can be seen, the lowest ratio in Gillie‟s calculation in 47.4% 
and the highest is 53.6%, while these are 40% and 54.3% in Brown and Jackson. Thus, rather 
important differences are produced by each of the calculation method, which refers to the 
confusion discussed in this chapter.  It should be noted that in rendering a political economy 
understanding, Gillie (1979:7) argue that “you can[not] push public expenditures significantly 
above 60% and maintain the values of a plural society with adequate freedom of choice.”  
In addition, in locating the direct impact of government expenditures in the sense of 
economic expenditures of the government, table 4.3 presents UK general government 
expenditure ratios on goods and services for 1977 and 1987 as estimated by Gillie (1979) and 
Brown and Jackson (1990) respectively.  
 
Table 4.3: UK Public Expenditure Ratios on Goods and Services 1977 and 1987 
Measure (Gillie, 1979) – 1977 (Brown and Jackson, 1990) - 1987 
The national income % 33.0% 49.1% 
GDP 
Factor cost 
29.3% 24.4% 
GNP 29.0% 22.9% 
GDP 
Market prices 
26.2% 26.2% 
GNP 25.9% 24.4% 
 
As can be seen in table 4.3., variation in the estimates of the measures of government 
growth is a reality. In Brown and Jackson (1990) estimates it runs from 24.4% to 49.1% 
indicating a huge difference in the results produced by different measurement methods. 
Regardless of the various figures and theories that support the concepts discussed in 
the above-mentioned figures, each one provides a different way of looking at the reality in 
terms of the size of government and its role in the economy, as the definition and choices of 
measurement remain arbitrary rather being objective. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA:  
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Past decades have witnessed the increased role of government in most of the states in the 
world and in particular in the developing countries through increased measures, procedures, and 
engagement in social services but also economic activities including transfer expenditures. These 
indeed have had fiscal and monetary policy implications and also raised questions about the 
efficiency of government expenditures against the so-called achieved objectives. 
In particular with the Keynesian policies, but also due to the realism of the need of 
development in the developing countries, the government expenditures have been assigned an 
important role to provide the development needs of the respective countries.  Considering that 
the presently developing countries have not had much private capital to finance economic 
development, having the extensive involvement of state in economic development was not a 
matter of choice but an imperative. 
The role of government and the growth in the size of the public sector have been the 
focus of attention for several decades. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Wagner initiated the initial 
theorisation of the relationship between government expenditure and the GDP through what is 
now known as Wagner’s Law, who, at least in the case of Germany and the Europe observed 
and evidenced a strong relationship between public expenditures and economic expansion in the 
form of economic growth but also economic development. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the economic growth and development of the country has 
been possible mainly due to the government expenditures which is financed through revenues 
raised from the oil sector, which still dominates the economy, as Saudi Arabia is a late 
developmentalist country without any private capital in its formation. Albatel (2003:77), 
therefore, argues that "the government has an important influence on the economy through its 
expenditure on activities including its overall development strategy financed mostly by revenues 
generated from oil, under which many of the economic and social services used to be provided 
to the citizens with less than their cost”. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, hence, has used oil income to fund its economic growth 
and development but also the country has been developing strategies to diversify sources of 
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income in the economy away from oil dependence. It should be noted that adaptation to the 
global economy and the presence of the oil, since the first five-year development plan (1970-
1975) until the seventh development plan (2000-2005) has seen sector diversification become a 
more and more prominent objective. 
The steps the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has taken towards the goal of economic growth 
and development involve building the infrastructure necessary to create, stimulate and activate 
economic growth in non-oil sectors (Development Plan, 1970-2009). In order to organise an 
efficient economic development in the country, Saudi Arabia still prepares development plans.  
Planning automatically goes into every effort directed by state policy, but often it is effective only 
when there is a meaningful effort for the overall development of the society’s well-being. It is 
clear that development activities have achieved much through the development of plans and 
obstacles have retreated after each period. 
Since this study aims to examine the stated nexus between government expenditures and 
economic growth in the case of Saudi Arabia, the purpose of this chapter is to outline 
development and trends in economic performance, government expenditures by referring to the 
stages of economic development in Saudi Arabia envisioned from the beginning. The economic 
policies pursued are classified into periods, organised into general trends in GNP/GDP with 
goals in human development indexed in reference to five-year plans.  
It should be noted that the components of public sector/government expenditure in 
Saudi Arabia have been presented in chapter four and contextualise development objectives for 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
5.2. STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SAUDI ARABIA 
In general, the development plans that have been implemented since 1970 succeeded in 
increasing economic growth and employment, and have identified areas of infrastructures and 
institutions to be financed by government expenditures for supporting the economic activities 
and developments, modernisation and transfer of advanced technology. The development plans 
have also succeeded in achieving good levels of education and health and social services, which 
are clearly reflected in the improvement of living standards for all citizens. 
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5.2.1. Stages of Economic Development 
An overview of the economic performance in table 5.1 evidences that the value of the 
GDP at current prices has increased rapidly, from 22,565 million SAR in 1970 to 1,154,504 
million SAR in 2005 and to 1,629,998 million SAR in 2010,  at an average annual growth rate of 
about 16.7% indicating an state the percentage. This is an indication of the level of economic 
achievement made so far (table 5.1).  
In terms of development planning, first phase covers the first three development plans, 
from 1970 to 1984. Growth rate of the economy from 1970 to 1984 stood at an annual average 
of 23.2% during this first phase of economic growth planning (table 5.1). 
The second phase of development planning covers the development plans from the 
fourth to the seventh planning, for the period from 1985 to 2005. The growth rate of the 
economy was lower during the period, at an average annual rate of 4.0% (table 5.1), lower than 
the previous stage.  
The strategic objectives for long-term development have been formed since the 
beginning of preparations for the first development plan in 1970. During the past three decades, 
planning for the development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been on-going, through 
harmonisation of all the conditions of interim plans to work flexibly and efficiently towards the 
next phase with changes and updates, and through preparation of the subsequent plan which 
comes next. The average growth rate during the seven development plans in the first year of the 
Eight Development Plan (2005) stood at approximately 11.9% (table 5.1), while total exports of 
9.7 billion SAR in 1970 climbed to 678.5 billion SAR in 2005 indicating another successful 
performance thanks to oil exporting. 
The First Development Plan for 1970-1974 called for a growth rate of real capacity of 
9.8% of the GDP with an annual average (table 5.1). The actual growth rate achieved was 18.7% 
which more than doubled annual average growth during that period. This was achieved due to 
high oil revenues as a result of oil shock in 1973, and high oil revenues helped to increase 
government spending to the actual 75.5 billion SAR, which according to the plan was expected 
to be only 41.3 billion SAR, or an increase of 82.8% over government income and spending 
projected (First Development Plan, 1970). This initial development is enough to understand the 
crucial role played by oil in the development of the country. 
The Second Development Plan covered the period of 1975-1979 and demonstrated even 
further increase in government spending, and consequently spending amounted to about 684.4 
billion SAR, an increase that was more than nine times that of government spending in the first 
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development plan. This increase in government spending was result of the GDP increases due to 
high oil prices and, hence revenues. However, during this period, high rates of real growth 
(around 8.9%) in non-oil production sectors were also achieved as a result of initial economic 
diversification attempt. During the same period, the growth of the oil sector was about 2.4%. To 
further contextualise this, during the Second Development Plan, the public sector achieved that 
average 5.5% real growth rates, while the private sector achieved real average annual growth of 
10.1%(Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006). 
During the Third Development Plan from 1980-1984,  the planned level of government 
spending was 1200 billion SAR, which was nearly twice the value of actual spending during the 
Second Development Plan (684.4 billion SAR). By the end of the Third Development Plan, 
actual spending amounted to 1,213 billion SAR due to a sharp increase in government revenues. 
During that period, the private sector increased its share in gross fixed capital formation 
at current prices from 37.7 billion SAR in 1980 to 50.2 billion SAR in 1984 (Third Development 
Plan, 1980), which culminated into further economic growth despite the fact the world 
economies were experiencing recession due to the high oil prices. During this period, support for 
the development of private sector continued with the application of economic policies aimed at 
expansion of incentives given to stimulate private investment in the country. 
The Fourth Development Plan, 1985-1989, saw a significant decrease in oil revenues due 
to the impact of lower prices on the global market, reflected in a relative decline in total 
government expenditure, to 802.1 billion SAR, contrasting with the planned 1,000 billion SAR. 
This decline was a reflection of the reduction on the rates of GDP growth, as the average rate of 
annual growth with real prices during the plan was only 0.6% annually during the plan period 
(Fourth Development Plan, 1985).However, development efforts of the time were able to 
continue supporting the economic sectors, notably agriculture, which achieved high-growth 
rates, resulting in 13.4% annual average growth. Similarly, the petrochemical industries sector 
achieved a quantum leap in the rate of annual growth with averaged growth rate of 47.3%. 
During this period, the annual growth in oil and natural gas was 4.4% (Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, 2006).  
The Fourth Development Plan focused on a new strategic direction aiming at increasing 
the profit generated by the oil and natural gas sector. It also became clear that there was a need 
to focus on the petrochemical industry, which has a great a comparative advantage for Saudi 
Arabia with high value-added. The plan also saw positive signs in terms of increase in the average 
annual rate of growth of non-oil exports, which rose from 18% in the Third Development Plan 
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to 29.3% during the Fourth Development Plan. Domestic production increased during the 
period, particularly of consumer goods, and in agriculture there was increased substitution of 
imports of these commodities. The period saw also increases in the share of private-sector 
investment to the total, representing about 54.9% during the fourth plan, reaching 239.2 billion 
SAR at constant prices of 1999(Fourth Development Plan, 1985). 
In the Fifth Development Plan, 1990-1994, the average annual growth rates of the GDP 
were about 4.4%, during which period the private sector achieved average annual growth of 
2.1%. The rates of growth in the oil and government sectors were 9.7% and 2.9% respectively. 
The high rate of growth of the oil sector and the increase in oil revenues increased the economic 
growth significantly in the period in question(Fifth Development Plan, 1990).  
The total value of private investments amounted to 283.6 billion SAR, growing at an 
average annual rate of 5.9%, while government investments amounted to 178.8 billion SAR. The 
value of total government spending amounted to 1078.1 billion SAR mainly due to the increase 
in oil revenues. During the plan period, the balance of trade realised a surplus averaging around 
15.6% of GDP (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006). 
The Sixth Development Plan stretching from 1995 to 1999 focused on strategic 
directions in human resource development. The plan prioritised human resource development, 
job creation, and implementation of a policy of privatisation, which also took a strategic 
direction of increasing the proportion of the contribution of non-oil sectors. In the 
diversification of economy towards private sector certain achievements were demonstrated, as in 
real GDP at 1999, the private sector’s role was 51.1% in 1969 which increased to 69.7% in 1999 
(Sixth Development Plan, 1995).The Plan also concentrated on increasing the share of non-oil 
sectors in real GDP from 51.2% in 1969 to 69.7% in 1999, the last year of the Sixth 
Development Plan. 
The Seventh Development Plan 2000-2004 set the goals of economic growth in most 
non-oil sectors at an annual rate of 5.1% (table 5.1), and encouraged the private sector to achieve 
a growth rate of an average annual rate of 5%. The investment sector was growing at an annual 
average of 3.6% (Saudi Arabian Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006). The non-oil sectors 
during the Seventh Plan had real annual growth averaging about 3.9%; the percentage 
contribution of these sectors to the GDP rose to 16.7% in 2004 (table 5.1).  
The private sector had achieved a real growth rate averaging 4.3% during the Seventh 
Development Plan period, 2000–2004. Its percentage share of GDP increased from 52.4% in 
1999 to 54.6% in 2004, compared to the plan target of 55.4%. During the same period, private 
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investment grew at an average annual rate of 3.5% compared to the plan target of 8.3% (Seventh 
Development Plan, 2006). In addition, the seventh plan aimed at improving the current account 
balance of payments deficit which was -3.0% of GDP in 1999 to a surplus of 6.9% of GDP in 
2004.  
The developments and trends in various dimensions of GDP are depicted in table 5.1 
and Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3and Figure 5.4.As can be seen in Table 5.1; Figure 5.1, 
Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, in 1970 the growth of GDP  was about 11.9, which 
increased to 200.4 in 1974 and decreased to 16.7 in 2010.  Also, the growth rate of oil sector was 
about 16.9%, which increased to 280.3 in 1974 and decreased to 25% in 2010. On the other 
hand, the growth rate of non-oil sector was about 7.8 in 1970, which increased to 66.2 in 1974.  
1n 2010 the growth rate of non-oil sector decreased to 9.1. 
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Table 5.1: Annual Changes in Gross Domestic Product by Sectors 
Source:  Ministry of Economy and Planning (2010) 
 
 
Year GDP 
 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
Oil 
Sector 
Oil  Sector 
Growth Rate 
Non-Oil 
Sector 
Non-Oil  Sector 
Growth rate 
1970 22,565 11.9 8,689 16.9 13,590 7.8 
1971 30,497 35.2 15,186 63.9 14,938 10.1 
1972 38,259 25.5 20,447 31.8 17,372 17.4 
1973 53,531 40.3 30,687 48.0 22,361 29.0 
1974 159,719 200.3 119,166 280.3 40,111 66.2 
1975 163,670 2.4 97,568 -17.0 65,588 76.8 
1976 225,347 37.6 128,476 31.6 95,963 48.3 
1977 260,960 15.6 136,869 6.3 122,680 30.5 
1978 272,267 4.2 120,368 -11.0 150,072 24.0 
1979 375,469 38.0 187,745 56.0 185,564 21.3 
1980 546,603 45.7 323,048 67.8 221,021 19.3 
1981 622,175 13.9 355,736 11.5 263,802 17.9 
1982 524,197 -15.9 235,975 -33.1 284,974 11.5 
1983 445,210 -15.2 143,865 -36.0 297,668 4.6 
1984 420,388 -5.7 120,305 -13.8 296,110 -1.0 
1985 376,319 -10.6 88,286 -25.7 284,123 -2.8 
1986 322,021 -14.4 61,262 -30.4 257,514 -8.2 
1987 320,932 -0.4 63,390 8.4 254,089 -3.0 
1988 330,518 1.5 61,711 -2.6 260,571 2.9 
1989 357,065 8.7 83,847 28.6 266,478 2.5 
1990 437,334 22.8 138,650 60.9 291,684 7.9 
1991 491,852 12.7 156,964 13.2 327,888 12.4 
1992 510,458 3.4 174,942 11.3 326,416 -1.2 
1993 494,906 -3.1 147,703 -14.9 337,926 4.7 
1994 503,054 1.9 146,984 -0.3 347,781 3.1 
1995 533,504 6.3 163,777 10.8 362,227 4.0 
1996 590,748 10.6 200,321 20.6 381,552 5.1 
1997 617,902 4.6 200,941 0.8 407,861 7.1 
1998 546,648 -11.9 129,480 -33.0 407,155 0.9 
1999 603,589 10.7 173,102 30.2 420,853 2.9 
2000 706,656 17.4 259,847 45.3 437,159 3.3 
2001 686,296 -2.6 227,607 -11.6 451,556 3.9 
2002 707,067 3.0 234,206 3.1 465,474 3.0 
2003 804,648 13.8 291,326 25.4 505,235 6.9 
2004 939,426 16.7 393,519 28.4 537,069 8.5 
2005 1,182,514 26.1 618,291 45.8 595,759 9.5 
2006 1,335,581 13.0 720,664 16.6 603.892 9.0 
2007 1,430,547 8.0 778,353 9.5 640.395 6.3 
2008 1.522.500 23.8 801.232 37.1 708.545 7.5 
2009 1,614.453 -21.8 824.110 -38.8 776.697 4.7 
2010 1,629.998 16.7 827.561 25.0 788.348 9.1 
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 Figure 5.1: The Growth in GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: The Growth in Oil Sector 
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Figure 5.3: The Growth in Non-Oil Sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The Growth of Total GDP, Oil Sector and Non Oil Sector 
 
In sum, in terms of the consequences of economic policies of the Development Plans, 
during the past development plans, including the first year of the ninth plan, the development 
efforts of government resulted in the achievement of several significant economic and 
developmental goals. These achievements were reflected in the increased rates of economic 
growth, job opportunities, and facilitated diversified economic activities and development of 
tangible and positive shifts in the economic structure. These accomplishments have manifested 
themselves in the increased role of the private sector in production and investment activity, and 
improved business conditions in the market economy, which were based on competition. For 
the same period, the effectiveness and significance of economic, fiscal, monetary, investment and 
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trade policies varied in line with the nature of the prevailing general conditions. For example, 
during the First and Second Development Plans (1970-1979), which concentrated on laying 
strong foundations for infrastructures, high public expenditure brought about the phenomenon 
of price inflation, which peaked to reach 31.2% in (1976) as well as increased numbers of foreign 
labour force personnel in the country. In the context, fiscal policy was adjusted in 1979 and 1980 
when it was decided to stop increases in public expenditure. 
It should be noted that government expenditure did, however, increase in the arena of 
public labour training and work began on application of Saudi policy with the commencement of 
the Fourth Development Plan's implementation process. 
 
5.2.2. Human Development  
While economic growth is related to the expanding capacity of the economy, economic 
development includes also human development, which, according to the endogenous growth 
theories, is an essential element of economic growth. Thus, development needs a focus beyond 
economic growth. While economic growth is essential in generating income, human 
development and well-being is also essential. With the recent changes in economic development 
understanding, human development is now considered as essential. In other words, real 
development is investment in human development, which in turn is society. In order to do this, 
there is a significant body of opinion calling for newly re-examined plans for the overall 
development of the state on the basis that such development plans are designed to, on an 
objective basis, demonstrate that human development is paramount and that the development of 
physical, economic and industrial infrastructures should emerge in concert with building a broad 
base of human development and well-being. Mostly, industrialised countries have been 
successful in invigorating their human development as well. 
In reflecting the importance of human development as part of the development process, 
Human Development Index or HDI was developed by UNDP, which is depended primarily on 
a number of features of the human situation, the educational level, the social situation, family, 
and other characteristics of the other population. HDI has become a standard for economic 
development in terms of its human face, specifying that the new concept of development has a 
close relationship to education (figure 5.5).  
The Sixth Development Plan in Saudi Arabia (1995-2000:265) highlighted the 
development of human resources as “the basic pillar for realising the objectives and aspirations 
of the development process. This is attributed to the fact that education and training raise the 
quality and productivity of the work force, as well as contributing to the cultural and personal 
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development of the individual”. In addition, The Sixth Development Plan (1995:41) “have 
placed great importance on human resources development through continuous advances in 
primary, intermediate, secondary, and higher education, as well as in technical education and 
vocational training.” This implies that the Saudi government has acknowledged the crucial 
importance of human development for economic development beyond economic growth. 
Therefore, “the result was a great increase in the productive employment of Saudi Arabian 
citizens and a steady upgrading of the skill levels and occupational achievements of the Saudi 
Arabian labour force” (The Sixth Development Plan, 1995: 41).  In other words, education and 
training but also general welfare oriented social spending increased in the country immensity for 
the human well-being in the country. This is evidenced in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.5, which shows 
the financial allocations made to human resource development in Saudi Arabia over the years 
indicating immense increases over the years. As can be seen in table 5.2, resource allocation for 
human development was increased from the first plan to the eight plan that it was 7 billion SAR 
to 347.6 billion SAR; also, the human development index (HDI) increased year by year from 
0.473 in the first plan to 0.748 in the eight plan. 
 
Table 5.2: Financial Allocation for Human Resources (HR) Developments (in billion SR) 
 
Sector 1th Plan  2ndPlan 3rd Plan 4th Plan 5th Plan 6th Plan 7th Plan 8th Plan 
Resource Allocation 
for Human 
Development 
7.0 80.0 129.9 135.0 164.6 216.6 276.9 
 
347.6 
 
HDI Index 0.473 0.502 0.556 0.620 0.643 0.690 0.732 0.748 
 
Sources: Development Plans (1970-2010). 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Human Development Index: Trends 1970 to 2010 
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The development plans in Saudi Arabia have focused on creating opportunities to 
increase economic growth and the financing of the development of public facilities and services 
to improve the living standards of citizens. This is in line with the global trends, as “the structure 
of government expenditure has thus shifted away from the provision of more traditional 
collective goods (defence, public administration and economic services) towards those associated 
with the growth of the welfare state (education, health and income maintenance), which provide 
benefits on an individual rather than a collective basis and where redistributive objectives are 
more important”, according to Saunders and Klau (1985:83). 
 
5.2.3. Budgeted Expenditures in Saudi Arabia during the Development Plans.  
The Saudi budget "classifies expenditures under four chapters. Chapters 1,2, and 3 
include recurrent expenditures, and Chapter 4 includes capital expenditures. Within the first 
three chapters, the composition has been relatively stable. Typically between 40% and 50% of 
recurring expenditures is for Chapter 1, salaries. About 20% is allocated to Chapter 2, operating 
expenses. The remainder, under Chapter 3, is for other expenditures" (Johany et.al, 1986:65). The 
steps of "budget preparation" are following (Joharji, 2009:60-63): 
1. Distribution of Budget guidelines by the Saudi Ministry of Finance.  
2. Preparation of estimates by line ministries and department. The budget preparation 
process starts in the line ministries and departments during the fourth month of the 
fiscal year by forming an internal committee for budget preparation.  
3. Submission of Budget proposal to the Ministry of Finance. The budget proposal is 
typically submitted the Saudi Ministry of Finance by the deadline set in the budget 
circular. 
4. First sectoral negotiations of budget estimates. After receiving budget proposals 
starts the review procedures and negotiation process with each line ministry or 
department. The negotiation process normally takes place during August and 
September.  
5. First Draft of Budget review by Deputy Minister of Finance.  
6. Second sectoral negotiations of budget estimates. The purpose of this round is to set 
priorities for the government agencies’ requests if further reduction in the budget 
estimates is needed.  
7. Second Draft of Budget review by the Saudi Minister of Finance. Subsequently, a 
second draft is prepared for the review by the Minister of Finance.  
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8. Final Draft of Budget send to the council of the Ministries for submission and 
approval 
9. Royal approval of the budget. In this step the final approval by the Prime Ministers, 
the King. This final stage normally takes place in the last two weeks of the fiscal year 
and concludes with the announcement of the new budget.     
When oil prices began to rise in 1970, actual revenue began to be higher than 
expenditures. During the First development Plan (1970-1974), the high oil revenue helped to 
increase government expenditure to the actual 75.5 billion SAR.  the authorities continued to 
present perfectly balanced budget. At the same time it was obvious that expenditures were 
lagging far behind budgeted expenditures. Even more marked was the divergence between 
expenditures and revenues. This situation was officially acknowledged in the first year of second 
development plan (1975) budget. 
In the Second Development Plan (1975-1979), oil revenues increased much more slowly. 
At the same time , the economy was showing signs of overheating. Most obviously, the inflation 
rate increased dramatically. The government followed policies which are typically prescribed for 
such conditions by attempting to restrain expenditures. The government expenditure amounted 
to about 684.4 billion SAR, an increase that was more than nine times that of government 
expenditure in the first development plan. 
During the Third Development Plan (1980-1984), the planned level of government 
expenditures was 1200 billion SAR, which was nearly twice the value of actual expenditures 
during the second development plan (684.4 billion SAR), both the price and quantity of oil rose 
dramatically. In 1983 it was possible to reduce expenditures sufficiently that a small surplus was 
realised, despite the substantial discrepancy between budget and actual revenue (Fourth 
Development Plan, 1980). 
The Fourth Development Plan, 1985-1989, saw a significant decrease in oil revenues due 
to the impact of lower prices on the global market, reflected in a relative decline in total 
government expenditure, to 802.1 billion SAR, contrasting with the planned 1,000 billion SAR. 
This Plan focused on a new strategic direction aiming at increasing the profit generated by the oil 
and natural gas sector. It also became clear that there was a need to focus on the petrochemical 
industry, which has a great a comparative advantage for Saudi Arabia with high value-added. 
(Fourth Development Plan, 1985). 
In the Fifth Development Plan, 1990-1994, the government reduced the government 
expenditure to faced the high expenditures in 1990 and 1991 regarding to Gulf War in those 
years. The value of total government spending amounted to 1078.1 billion SAR mainly due to 
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the increase in oil revenues. During the plan period, the balance of trade realised a surplus 
averaging around 15.6% of GDP (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006). 
The Sixth Development Plan stretching from 1995 to 1999 focused on strategic 
directions in human resource development. The plan prioritised human resource development, 
job creation, and implementation of a policy of privatisation, which also took a strategic 
direction of increasing the proportion of the contribution of non-oil sectors (Sixth Development 
Plan, 1995). 
The Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004), in this plan the government tried to 
intervene to push the economy by using the open economy policy.  
The Eight Development Plan (2005-2009), the value of total government spending 
amounted to 1784,4 billion SAR mainly due to the increase in oil revenues. The height of public 
revenue in the first year of the Eighth Plan of Development was hitting 555 billion SAR  
(Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2008). 
"All the Development plans identify the aim of government intervention as being to raise 
the standard of living and ensure equitable distribution of wealth and welfare of the citizenry. 
Within the framework of national development planning, several problems affecting urban areas 
were addressed" (Garba, 2004:13).  
 
5.3. DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN 
SAUDI ARABIA 
As mentioned, Saudi Arabia is a late developmentalist country, which has witnessed the 
heavy presence and intervention of state in the economy to finance economic growth and 
development through the revenues raised from oil export. Being a rentier state together with 
developmentalist state implies that government expenditures remains at the hearth of social and 
human development, and constitutes the main locomotive for economic stimulus in the private 
sector as well as conducting public sector economic activity.  As a result, over the years, the 
government expenditures have shown an upward trend in the economy in terms of its magnitude 
and role. 
In the case of the Saudi Arabian economy, thus, government expenditure increased in 
the budget of the Kingdom from 6.4 billion SAR in 1970 to 8.3 billion SAR in 1971 and 
multiplied by about five times in value by the end of the first development plan, up to 32 billion 
SAR in 1974. Government expenditure continued to rise to 216.4 billion SAR in 1984, in order 
to continue funding projects to improve education, health, housing, transportation, and 
communications. The expenditure helped to support the programmes and projects of human 
development and achievement of the growth objectives of the identified sectors in the plan. The 
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total average annual growth rate in public expenditure during the actual development plan first 
reached 49.5% and 42.5% and 2.8% in the second and third development plans. It was due to 
growth in public expenditure during the first three development plans that many of the goals of 
economic and social development were achieved, as the private capital accumulation was not 
there to initiate a national economy. As a result, the size of the national economy has increased 
and strengthened the capacities of new building of modern infrastructures in the key sectors of 
transportation, communications, education, health, housing, agriculture and industry due to 
government expenditures (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2009). 
As can be seen in Table 5.3, during the years of the Fourth Development plan, the 
decline in the growth of public expenditure observed, which dropped to an average annual 
capacity of 7.1%, which was the result of completion of most infrastructure projects during the 
period. The expenditure for 1985 was about 184 billion SAR and fell to 149.5 billion SAR in 
1989. However, 1990 and 1991 showed an increase in public expenditure and a moderate 
decrease then rising in 2000 to 235.3 billion SAR and then increasing to 255.1 billion SAR in 
2001 in the Seventh Development Plan. In 2003, public expenditure was about 257 billion SAR, 
increasing in 2004 to 285.2 billion SAR. Public spending continued to rise in the first year of the 
Eighth Development Plan, reaching 341 billion SAR (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2008).  
Regarding the components of public expenditure, the sector shares of total development 
expenditure during the first plan for the development was 34.1 billion SAR, equivalent to 45.2% 
of the total financial requirements of the plan. This rose to 347.2 billion SAR in the Second 
Development Plan (Figure 5.6), constituting 50.7% of the total amount of the approved budget. 
In the Third Development Plan, the value of the resources allocated to development was 625.2 
billion SAR, or 51.6% of total public financial resources. 
A better way of making meaning out of the increased government expenditures is the 
traditional use of ratio of government expenditures to GDP, which is calculated in table 5.3 and 
depicted in figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Trends in the Share of Government Expenditure in GDP at Current Price 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.6 depending on the growth of GDP and the 
growth rate of government expenditures, the ratio of government expenditures in GDP has not 
shown secular trends but rather followed ups-and-downs. As can be seen, in 1970 the ratio was 
about 15%, which decreased to 13.28% in 1973. However, with the enormous increases in the oil 
revenues in 1974 after the first oil shock and increased GDP, the share of government 
expenditures relatively fell to 8% despite showing an increase. However, increased oil revenues 
encouraged government to develop infrastructure projects in line with the increased GDP and 
therefore immediate adjustment witnessed in government expenditure with the share of 
government expenditure increasing to 13.24% in 1975, which reached a pick at about 22.04% in 
1978.  However, in 1980 it declined to its lowest level14.42% since 1975 due to the global 
recession as a result of oil prices. Immediately, in 1981 the increasing trend in the share of 
government expenditures to GDP set in and reached to 27.04% in 1983. The declining trends in 
the ratio were observed from 1984 to 1989, falling to 30.95% in 1989 only with a pick in 1987 
with 32.18%. As can be seen in (Table 5.3) and (Figure 5.6), the impact of government 
expenditures can immediately see in  1991 with the share of government expenditures in GDP 
increasing to 32.32% .  Since then, a decreasing trend observed in the ratio of government 
expenditures to GDP until the present times.  Immediately after the war, the ratio fell down to 
about 27.56% and then followed a decreasing trend to 22.43% in 2009. In such a declining trend, 
rather than government expenditures growth in absolute level declining, high increases in GDP 
as the denominator due to the oil price plays an important role. 
 As can be seen in table 5.3, the growth of  public expenditures was0.12 in 1971, which later 
increased to 0.38in 1978.  This trend continued, and in 1982 it was 0.13. In 1990 the decreasing 
trend in the growth of government expenditures was0.09. Immediately after the war, the growth 
of government expenditure fell down to about - 0.06 in 1994 and then increasing trend to 0.1 in 
2010 
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Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
 
 
Table 5.3: Gross Domestic Product and Total Expenditure at Current Price 
Year 
Current 
GDP 
The 
Growth of 
current 
GDP 
Government 
Expenditure 
Government 
Expenditure 
Growth 
The Ratio of Government 
Expenditure/Current 
GDP 
1970 22,565 11.9 3,478 _ 0.15 
1971 30,497 35.2 3,898 0.12 0.13 
1972 38,259 25.5 4,621 0.185 0.12 
1973 53,531 40.3 7,110 0.54 0.13 
1974 159,719 200.3 12,321 0.73 0.08 
1975 163,670 2.4 21,671 0.76 0.13 
1976 225,347 37.6 34,513 0.59 0.15 
1977 260,960 15.6 43,436 0.26 0.17 
1978 272,267 4.2 60,020 0.38 0.22 
1979 375,469 38.0 73,786 0.23 0.20 
1980 546,603 45.7 78,841 0.07 0.14 
1981 622,175 13.9 110,459 0.40 0.18 
1982 524,197 -15.9 124,682 0.13 0.24 
1983 445,210 -15.2 120,403 -0.03 0.27 
1984 420,388 -5.7 115,159 -0.04 0.27 
1985 376,319 -10.6 108,816 -0.06 0.29 
1986 322,021 -14.4 101,057 -0.07 0.31 
1987 320,932 -0.4 103,263 0.02 0.32 
1988 330,518 1.5 92,823 -0.10 0.28 
1989 357,065 8.7 110,498 0.19 0.31 
1990 437,334 22.8 120,285 0.09 0.28 
1991 491,852 12.7 158,980 0.32 0.32 
1992 510,458 3.4 140,673 -0.11 0.28 
1993 494,906 -3.1 122,879 -0.13 0.25 
1994 503,054 1.9 115,102 -0.06 0.23 
1995 533,504 6.3 118,483 0.03 0.22 
1996 590,748 10.6 134,844 0.14 0.23 
1997 617,902 4.6 151,043 0.12 0.24 
1998 546,648 -11.9 144,993 -0.04 0.27 
1999 603,589 10.7 148,892 0.03 0.25 
2000 706,656 17.4 175,234 0.18 0.25 
2001 686,296 -2.6 179,411 0.02 0.26 
2002 707,067 3.0 175,438 -0.02 0.25 
2003 804,648 13.8 188,398 0.07 0.23 
2004 939,426 16.7 210,885 0.12 0.22 
2005 1,182,514 26.1 257,190 0.22 0.22 
2006 1,335,581 13.0 303,425 0.18 0.23 
2007 1,430,547 8.0 314,768 0.04 0.22 
2008 1.522.500 23.8 336,142 0.07 0.22 
2009 1,614.453 -21.8 362,063 0.08 0.22 
2010 1,629.998 16.7 398,352 0.10 0.24 
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With respect to real GDP, table 5.4  depending on the growth of GDP and the growth 
rate of government expenditures, the ratio of government expenditures in GDP has not shown 
secular trends but rather followed ups-and-downs. As can be seen, in 1970 the ratio was about 
13%, which decreased to 10% in 1973. However, with the enormous increases in the oil 
revenues in 1974 after the first oil shock and increased GDP, the share of government 
expenditures relatively increased to 13% despite showing an increase. However, increased oil 
revenues encouraged government to develop infrastructure projects in line with the increased 
GDP and therefore immediate adjustment witnessed in government expenditure with the share 
of government expenditure increasing to 18% in 1975, which reached a pick at about 24% in 
1978.  However, in 1980 it increased but slowly to 25% since 1975 due to the global recession as 
a result of oil prices. Immediately, in 1981 the increasing trend in the share of government 
expenditures to GDP set in and reached to 39% in 1983. The declining trends in the ratio were 
observed from 1984 to 1989, falling to 29% in 1988 only with a pick in 1987 with 36%. As can 
be seen in (Table 5.4) and , the impact of government expenditures can immediately see in  1991 
with the share of government expenditures in GDP decreasing to 29%. Since then, a decreasing 
trend observed in the ratio of government expenditures to GDP until the present times.  
Immediately after the war, the ratio increased to about 31% and then followed a increasing trend 
to 37% in 2009.  
 The growth of public expenditures was 18.5% in 1971, which later increased to 33.5% in 
1973.  This trend continued, and in 1977 it was 8%. In 1990 the decreasing trend in the growth 
of government expenditures was -2.5%. Immediately after the war, the growth of government 
expenditure increased to about 1.9% in 1994 and then increasing trend to 1% in 2010 (Table 
5.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government Expenditures in Saudi Arabia: Developments and Trends 
 
92 
 
Table 5.4: Gross Domestic Product and Government Expenditure at Constant Price (1999=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
 
 
 
Year Real GDP 
The Growth of 
Real GDP 
Real 
Government 
Expenditure 
Real Government 
Expenditure 
Growth 
The Ratio of Real 
Government 
Expenditure/Real GDP 
1970 174,469 11.35 22 -- 0.13 
1971 203,960 16.90 24 18.5 0.12 
1972 245,494 20.36 25 1.9 0.10 
1973 301,154 22.67 30 33.5 0.10 
1974 369,207 22.60 48 14.5 0.13 
1975 37 3,307  1.11 66 5.4 0.18 
1976 417,894 11.94 78 29.5 0.19 
1977 440,704 6.89 80 8.0 0.18 
1978 442,273 -0.99 107 -2.3 0.24 
1979 485,366 9.74 122 -4.0 0.25 
1980 517,283 6.58 129 -6.1 0.25 
1981 542,093 4.80 167 -4.2 0.31 
1982 485,570 -10.43 180 -1.3 0.37 
1983 447,440 -7.85 176 -12.4 0.39 
1984 433,793 -3.27 169 15.2 0.39 
1985 408,474 -5.50 159 -4.2 0.39 
1986 428,792 4.85 152 16.5 0.36 
1987 412,670 -3.76 150 -0.4 0.36 
1988 446,608 8.22 131 -15.6 0.29 
1989 446,887 0.06 151 -7.2 0.34 
1990 484,106 8.33 145 -2.5 0.30 
1991 588,170 9.10 169 16.7 0.29 
1992 552,625 4.63 168 6.6 0.31 
1993 552,769 0.03 142 18.5 0.26 
1994 556,448 0.67 132 1.9 0.24 
1995 557,566 0.20 128 33.5 0.23 
1996 576,433 3.38 150 14.5 0.26 
1997 591,370 2.59 160 5.4 0.27 
1998 608,141 2.83 158 -1.1 0.26 
1999 603,589 -0.75 154 -2.8 0.26 
2000 632,951 4.86 185 20.8 0.29 
2001 636,417 0,55 189 0.4 0.30 
2002 636,230 0.13 187 0.9 0.30 
2003 686,037 7.66 198 5.6 0.29 
2004 722,173 5.27 221 11.4 0.31 
2005 762,277 5.55 250 12.9 0.33 
2006 766,348 3.16 280 12.0 0.37 
2007 802,211 2.02 286 2.4 0.36 
2008 836,133 4.23 304 6.0 0.36 
2009 836,938 0.10 307 1.0 0.37 
2010 875,707 4.64 310 1.0 0.35 
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5.4. GENERAL TRENDS IN GOVERNMENT REVENUES 
The development of the public sector in developing countries is to a large extent seen in 
terms of most economic activities of the state which tends to focus on the construction of 
infrastructures, the provision of social services, and the regulation of foreign trade, and the 
production of goods and services falling within the scope of the natural monopolies. This has 
been the case for Saudi Arabia as well, which is mainly due to the increased the economic power 
and influence of oil-producing countries as a result of rises in oil revenues. In other words, the 
state is now involved in a larger set of economic activity and provides the structure of the 
national economic activity. However, it is important that the role of government revenues should 
be considered as an important determining factor of public expenditures in Saudi Arabia as well 
as in other countries. Due to the enormous increases in public revenues, Saudi Arabian 
government has managed to spend for the social and economic development of the economy. 
The oil wealth was utilised by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since 1970sto provide the 
financing power for the government to invest in infrastructure and structural projects, and the 
establishment of institutions and public bodies to invest the resources of the state and its 
components, which are not available in the private sector.  
The first and the second development plans were characterised by a significant increase 
in the general revenues under conditions on world oil markets and the increase in oil prices, with 
the value of the total state revenues rising from 7.9 billion SAR in 1970 to 100.1 billion SAR in 
1974, to 211.2 billion SAR in 1979. The average annual growth in revenues during the first 
development plan was 77.6%, and reached 16.1% during the Second Development Plan. In the 
third plan, world oil markets witnessed the negative changes that led to a decline in oil revenues 
which fell by an average of -4.1% a year. Total income decreased from 348.1 billion in 1980 to 
171.5 billion in 1984, and continued to decline during the years of the Fourth Development Plan, 
as public revenue amounted to 133.6 billion SAR in 1985, then fell to 114.6 billion SAR in 1989. 
There was an annual rate of decline of-7.7% during the plan period, and during the years of the 
Fifth Development Plan, public revenues rose at an average annual rate of 2.4%, and then 
continued to increase during the Sixth Development Plan at an annual average rate of 2.7%. 
Income also recorded the highest increase since 1997 and amounted to 205.5 billion 
SAR, which soon fell to 147.5 billion SAR in 1999. It rose in 2000 to 258.1 billion SAR at the 
beginning of the Seventh Development Plan, a result of increased oil revenues, which amounted 
to 214.4 billion SAR. In 2001, general revenue increased to 228.2 billion SAR, of which 183.9 
billion SAR were from oil revenues. In the fourth year of the Seventh Development Plan in 2003 
public revenue amounted to about 293 billion SAR and the percentage from oil revenues by 
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78.8%. In the fifth year of the plan, 2004 revenue amounted to 392.3 billion SAR and the 
proportion from oil revenues by 84.1% (table 5.5).  
The height of public revenue in the first year of the Eighth Plan of Development was 
hitting 555 billion SAR. With the increase in economic activity and expansion of the productive 
base and services in the country, there have been increases in the value of public revenue from 
other sources than oil (table 5.4); it has risen from 79.40 billion SAR in 1970 to about 171.50 
billion SAR in 1984. It then started with some 392 billion SAR in 2004 and 564 billion SAR in 
the first year of the Eighth Development Plan. This is due to the fluctuations that have occurred 
in some items of income, such as customs revenue services, ports, airport charges and the sale of 
real estate and rent, which since 1984 has declined significantly (Ministry of Economy and 
Planning, 2008). 
As can be seen in table 5.5, the growth of  public revenue was 0.35 in 1971, which later 
decreased to 0.04 in 1978.  This trend continued, and in 1982 it was -0.16. In 1990 the increasing 
trend in the growth of public revenue was 0.22. Immediately after the war, the growth of public 
revenue fell down to about - 0.03 in 2001, and then increasing trend to 0.01 in 2010. 
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Table 5.5: The Ratio of Public Revenue in GDP 
Year Public Revenue GDP 
The Growth of Public 
Revenue 
Public Revenue/ 
GDP 
1970 7940 22,565 _ 0.35 
1971 11120 30,497 0.35 0.36 
1972 15368 38,259 0.25 0.40 
1973 41705 53,531 0.40 0.78 
1974 100103 159,719 1.98 0.62 
1975 103384 163,670 0.02 0.63 
1976 135957 225,347 0.38 0.60 
1977 130659 260,960 0.16 0.50 
1978 131505 272,267 0.04 0.48 
1979 211196 375,469 0.38 0.56 
1980 348100 546,603 0.46 0.64 
1981 368006 622,175 0.14 0.59 
1982 246182 524,197 -0.16 0.47 
1983 206419 445,210 -0.15 0.46 
1984 171509 420,388 -0.06 0.41 
1985 133565 376,319 -0.10 0.35 
1986 76498 322,021 -0.14 0.24 
1987 103811 320,932 0.00 0.32 
1988 84600 330,518 0.03 0.26 
1989 114600 357,065 0.08 0.32 
1990 114600  437,334 0.22 0.26 
1991 316639 491,852 0.12 0.64 
1992 169647 510,458 0.04 0.33 
1993 141445 494,906 -0.03 0.29 
1994 128991 503,054 0.02 0.26 
1995 146500 533,504 0.06 0.27 
1996 179085 590,748 0.11 0.30 
1997 205500 617,902 0.05 0.33 
1998 141608 546,648 -0.12 0.26 
1999 147454 603,589 0.10 0.24 
2000 258065 706,656 0.17 0.37 
2001 228159 686,296 -0.03 0.33 
2002 213000 707,067 0.03 0.30 
2003 293000 804,648 0.14 0.36 
2004 392291 939,426 0.17 0.42 
2005 564335 1,182,514 0.26 0.48 
2006 673682 1,335,581 0.13 0.50 
2007 642800 1,430,547 0.07 0.45 
2008 1100993 1.522.500 0.07 0.72 
2009 509805 1,614.453 0.08 0.32 
2010 559834 1,629.998 0.01 0.34 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
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5.5. GOVERNMENT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 
The beginning of the modernisation the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was highlighted by the 
interest in the plans for human development, which is extremely important in the strategy for 
overall economic and social development. The size of the many efforts and resources that have 
made for the care and development of its citizens and improve living conditions reflect the 
achievements made in this area during the past decades. 
Considering the efforts made during the years of the Seventh Development Plan, and the 
orientations of the Eighth Development Plan, this is an increasing concern. The development of 
the capacity of citizens to improve living conditions is the basis for the development efforts, and 
lives of individual citizens are considered as an instrument of development. Moreover, significant 
progress can be measured in human development efforts, not only by the standards of local 
historical comparison, but also by global standards, particularly those that have been presented in 
the Human Development Reports of the annual international United Nations Development 
Program (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2006). 
Development plans have made a qualitative leap in the levels of education, training, 
health and social care reflected in many of the following indicators, for which developments and 
trends (Table 5.6): 
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Table 5.6: Government Final Consumption Expenditure in Purchaser’s Value 
Year GPS DEF EDU HT SSWS HOU OCSS OT Total Expenditure 
1970 672 1,510 642 220 11 150 88 185 3,478 
1971 754 1,692 719 246 13 169 98 207 3,898 
1972 894 2,006 853 292 15 200 116 246 4,621 
1973 1,375 3,086 1,312 449 23 307 179 378 7,110 
1974 2,382 5,349 2,273 778 41 533 310 655 12,321 
1975 4,190 9,407 3,998 1,369 71 937 545 1,153 21,671 
1976 6,674 14,982 6,367 2,180 114 1,493 869 1,836 34,513 
1977 8,399 18,855 8,013 2,743 143 1,878 1,093 2,310 43,436 
1978 11,606 26,054 11,073 3,790 198 2,596 1,511 3,192 60,020 
1979 14,267 32,030 13,612 4,660 243 3,191 1,857 3,925 73,786 
1980 15,245 34,224 14,545 4,979 260 3,410 1,985 4,194 78,841 
1981 21,359 47,949 20,378 6,976 364 4,777 2,780 5,875 110,459 
1982 24,109 54,123 23,002 7,874 411 5,392 3,138 6,632 124,682 
1983 23,282 52,266 22,213 7,604 397 5,207 3,031 6,404 120,403 
1984 22,267 49,989 21,245 7,273 380 4,980 2,899 6,125 115,159 
1985 21,041 47,236 20,075 6,872 359 4,706 2,739 5,788 108,816 
1986 20,313 41,392 19,453 6,671 340 4,519 2,612 5,757 101,057 
1987 20,718 41,739 19,643 6,926 349 4,491 2,725 6,672 103,263 
1988 19,527 36,474 18,998 6,190 319 4,361 2,356 4,598 92,823 
1989 24,769 42,325 23,582 7,241 320 5,276 2,351 4,634 110,498 
1990 54,546 45,590 14,906 1,108 473 166 3,276 220 120,285 
1991 42,282 59,195 33,826 10,317 677 1,691 4,228 6,764 158,980 
1992 29,730 56,359 28,055 10,219 414 5,549 3,180 7,167 140,673 
1993 24,984 51,296 27,693 7,587 400 4,687 2,899 3,333 122,879 
1994 24,389 45,503 26,476 7,788 402 4,612 2,777 3,155 115,102 
1995 25,765 46,018 27,233 8,233 533 4,721 3,018 2,962 118,483 
1996 28,651 52,708 29,096 9,554 633 5,505 3,606 5,091 134,844 
1997 31,725 59,661 32,293 10,838 823 6,081 4,107 5,516 151,043 
1998 31,849 55,780 30,741 10,643 825 5,793 4,056 5,303 144,993 
1999 30,546 42,285 45,362 16,921 583 7,210 4,439 1,546 148,892 
2000 33,006 51,353 49,645 21,565 864 9,691 5,536 3,574 175,234 
2001 34,584 51,516 49,730 22,271 857 10,283 5,643 4,527 179,411 
2002 33,818 50,375 48,629 21,778 838 10,055 5,518 4,427 175,438 
2003 36,316 54,096 52,221 23,387 900 10,798 5,926 4,754 188,398 
2004 40,651 60,553 58,454 26,178 1,007 12,087 6,633 5,321 210,885 
2005 55,871 63,949 69,429 30,503 1,149 12,215 7,461 16,613 257,190 
2006 62,909 75,206 83,273 37,283 1,252 14,530 8,084 20,888 303,425 
2007 68,902 80,157 81,279 39,086 1,465 15,685 9,406 18,788 314,768 
2008 74,443 84,932 87,436 42,652 1,738 16,546 10,395 18,000 336,142 
2009 82,324 86,551 92,891 46,772 2,515 18,743 12,567 19,700 362,063 
Notes: GPS (General Public Services), DEF (Defence), EDU (Education), HT (Health), SSWS (Social Security and 
Welfare Services), HOU (Housing and Community), OCSS (Other Community and Social Services), OT (Other 
Purpose). 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
 
 
Government Expenditures in Saudi Arabia: Developments and Trends 
 
98 
 
5.5.1 Education Expenditures 
There have been efforts and interest in development of education capacity in Saudi 
Arabia, characterised by the development of human resources with continuing increases in the 
number of schools and educational institutes and colleges for boys and girls, and the continuing 
rise in the number of graduates and of undergraduates at different stages of development. 
The importance of planning for development lies clearly in the development of human 
resources - the basis of education - that give it a privileged position in terms of the objectives, 
strategies and development plans initiated in 1970.It has increased and sustained allocations to 
human resource development, especially after the establishment of a modern economy.  
As can be seen in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.8, the state allocated 49,381 million SR in the 
budget estimates for 1990/1991 for spending on education and training which represents a 
48.2% proportion of the total approved expenditure for the services sectors and Development 
(Figure 5.7). 
Figure 5.7: The Expenditure of Education in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: The Ratio of Education Expenditures in Government Expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
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Figure 5.9: The Ratio of Expenditure of Education in GDP in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.7; Figure 5.8and Figure 5.9, in 1970 the ratio of education 
expenditures in government expenditure was about 18.45%, which increased to 19.24% in 1986 
and to 25.7% in 2010.  Also, the ratio of education expenditures in GDP was about 8.24%, 
which increased to 6.12% in 2010. By 1996 it had fallen to 4.9 per cent education spending has 
remained relatively steady between 10 and 15 per cent for the past 40 years. In real terms, the 
average annual increase in education spending between 1970 and 2010 was 4.3 per cent. Figure 
5.8) shows that education spending remained almost steadily between 1970 and 1985, after which 
it rose gradually until 1989, then fell very slightly, and has recently begun to increase at a faster 
rate from 2007 to 2010 (Figure 5.9). However, increased oil revenues encouraged government to 
develop the education sector in line with the increased GDP and therefore immediate 
adjustment witnessed in government expenditure(Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.7: The Ratio of Education Expenditures in Government Expenditure and GDP 
  
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Educational 
Expenditures 
Government 
Expenditure 
GDP 
Education Expenditures/ 
Government Expenditures 
Educational 
Expenditures/GDP 
1970 642 3,478 22,565 18.45888 2.845114 
1971 719 3,898 30,497 18.44536 2.357609 
1972 853 4,621 38,259 18.45921 2.229541 
1973 1,312 7,110 53,531 18.45288 2.450916 
1974 2,273 12,321 159,719 18.44818 1.423124 
1975 3,998 21,671 163,670 18.44862 2.44272 
1976 6,367 34,513 225,347 18.44812 2.82542 
1977 8,013 43,436 260,960 18.44783 3.070586 
1978 11,073 60,020 272,267 18.44885 4.066964 
1979 13,612 73,786 375,469 18.44794 3.625333 
1980 14,545 78,841 546,603 18.44852 2.660981 
1981 20,378 110,459 622,175 18.44847 3.275284 
1982 23,002 124,682 524,197 18.44853 4.388045 
1983 22,213 120,403 445,210 18.44888 4.989331 
1984 21,245 115,159 420,388 18.44841 5.053665 
1985 20,075 108,816 376,319 18.44857 5.33457 
1986 19,453 101,057 322,021 19.24953 6.04091 
1987 19,643 103,263 320,932 19.0223 6.120611 
1988 18,998 92,823 330,518 20.46691 5.747947 
1989 23,582 110,498 357,065 21.34156 6.6044 
1990 14,906 120,285 437,334 12.39224 3.408379 
1991 33,826 158,980 491,852 21.27689 6.877272 
1992 28,055 140,673 510,458 19.94341 5.496045 
1993 27,693 122,879 494,906 22.5368 5.595608 
1994 26,476 115,102 503,054 23.00221 5.263053 
1995 27,233 118,483 533,504 22.98473 5.104554 
1996 29,096 134,844 590,748 21.57753 4.925281 
1997 32,293 151,043 617,902 21.38 5.226233 
1998 30,741 144,993 546,648 21.20171 5.623546 
1999 45,362 148,892 603,589 30.46638 7.515379 
2000 49,645 175,234 706,656 28.33069 7.025342 
2001 49,730 179,411 686,296 27.71848 7.246145 
2002 48,629 175,438 707,067 27.71862 6.877566 
2003 52,221 188,398 804,648 27.71845 6.489919 
2004 58,454 210,885 939,426 27.71842 6.22231 
2005 69,429 257,190 1,182,514 26.99522 5.871305 
2006 83,273 303,425 1,335,581 27.44434 6.234964 
2007 81,279 314,768 1,430,547 25.82188 5.681673 
2008 87,436 336,142 1.522.500 26.01163 5.548821 
2009 92,891 362,063 1,614.453 25.65603 5.753.713 
2010 99.763 398,352 1,629.998 25.82504 6.120437 
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5.5.2 Social Development and Health 
Social development and health are foci and consistently feature in all the six five-year 
plans implemented by the Saudi government.  
As a result of the investment and higher support spending on development plans in the 
development of social services and health sector, there has been the allocation of 3.5 billion SAR 
to social development and health, which amounts to 10.3% of the total allocation plan (2005) 
(Table 5.8). In the following development plan there was a higher allocation to social 
development and health of 27.6 billion SAR, 8% of the total investments of the plan. 
During the Third Development Plan, there was again a higher allocation to social 
development and health reaching 61.9 billion SAR, or 9.8% of the total. In addition, the Fourth 
Development Plan maintained the high rates of expenditure, accounting for funds allocated for 
social sector development, health, of 61.9 billion SAR, or 17.7% of the total. This means that the 
high share of these sectors rose to 50.7% of the total development in the Fourth Development 
Plan. Moreover, in the fifth plan, the government spending as the allocation of social 
development and health was 68 billion SAR, or 20% of the total, which would raise the share to 
68% of the total investments for development. In the Sixth Development Plan, allocations 
increased for social development and health to 87.5 billion SAR, or 20.8% of the total and, 
therefore, these two sectors represent 72.3% of total investments allocated to the sectors of 
development in the plan. Appropriations increased with the Seventh Development Plan’s 
marked increase of the financing of human development and founded the basic education sector 
and the financing of projects of social development and health, increasing again until it reached 
approximately 21.5%.  
The secular increase in health expenditures can be associated with a steady population 
growth rate which is higher than population growth rates in most of the world, and the 
considerable rise in the cost of health services which is found not just in the Kingdom but also 
all over the world, all nations together paying an annual bill for health services estimated at two 
trillion dollars. The trends in the health expenditures in Saudi Arabia can be seen in Figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10: The Expenditure of Health in Saudi Arabia  
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.8; Figure 5.10and Figure 5.11, in 1970 the ratio of health 
expenditures in government expenditure was about 6.32%, which increased to 19.24% in 1986 
and to 25.7% in 2010.  Also, the ratio of health expenditures in GDP was about 8.24%, which 
increased to 6.12% in 2010. The ratio of health spending in government expenditure remained 
almost steadily between 1970 and 1985, after which it rose gradually until 1996, then fell very 
slightly, and has recently begun to increase at a faster rate from 1999 to 2010.  
 
  
Figure 5.11: The Ratio of Health Expenditures in Government Expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
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Figure 5.12: The Ratio of Health Expenditures in GDP 
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Table 5.8: Health Expenditures in Government Expenditure and GDP 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Health 
Expenditures 
Government 
Expenditure 
GDP 
Health 
Expenditures/Government 
Expenditures 
Health 
Expenditures/GDP 
1970 220 3,478 22,565 6.325474 0.974961 
1971 246 3,898 30,497 6.310929 0.806637 
1972 292 4,621 38,259 6.318979 0.763219 
1973 449 7,110 53,531 6.315049 0.838766 
1974 778 12,321 159,719 6.314423 0.487105 
1975 1,369 21,671 163,670 6.317198 0.836439 
1976 2,180 34,513 225,347 6.31646 0.967397 
1977 2,743 43,436 260,960 6.315038 1.051119 
1978 3,790 60,020 272,267 6.314562 1.392016 
1979 4,660 73,786 375,469 6.315561 1.241114 
1980 4,979 78,841 546,603 6.315242 0.910899 
1981 6,976 110,459 622,175 6.315465 1.121228 
1982 7,874 124,682 524,197 6.315266 1.502107 
1983 7,604 120,403 445,210 6.315457 1.707958 
1984 7,273 115,159 420,388 6.315616 1.730068 
1985 6,872 108,816 376,319 6.315248 1.82611 
1986 6,671 101,057 322,021 6.601225 2.071604 
1987 6,926 103,263 320,932 6.707146 2.15809 
1988 6,190 92,823 330,518 6.668606 1.872818 
1989 7,241 110,498 357,065 6.55306 2.027922 
1990 1,108 120,285 437,334 6.921146 2.253353 
1991 10,317 158,980 491,852 6.489496 2.097582 
1992 10,219 140,673 510,458 7.264365 2.001928 
1993 7,587 122,879 494,906 6.174367 1.533018 
1994 7,788 115,102 503,054 6.766173 1.548144 
1995 8,233 118,483 533,504 6.948676 1.543194 
1996 9,554 134,844 590,748 7.085224 1.617272 
1997 10,838 151,043 617,902 7.17544 1.754 
1998 10,643 144,993 546,648 7.340354 1.946957 
1999 16,921 148,892 603,589 11.36461 2.803398 
2000 21,565 175,234 706,656 12.3064 3.051697 
2001 22,271 179,411 686,296 12.4134 3.245101 
2002 21,778 175,438 707,067 12.4135 3.080048 
2003 23,387 188,398 804,648 12.41361 2.906488 
2004 26,178 210,885 939,426 12.4134 2.786595 
2005 30,503 257,190 1,182,514 11.8601 2.579504 
2006 37,283 303,425 1,335,581 12.28739 2.791519 
2007 39,086 314,768 1,430,547 12.4174 2.732242 
2008 42,652 336,142 1.522.500 12.68869 2.81096! 
2009 46,772 362,063 1,614.453 12.91819 2.89708 
2010 53.661 398,352 1,629.998 13.01347 3.29209 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
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5.5.3 Community and Social Services 
The community and social services include health, housing and educational services, and 
education. In Saudi Arabia, these functions accounted for the largest share of recurrent 
expenditure (Figure 5.13). 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Community and Social Services in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14: The Ratio of Community and Social Services Expenditures in Government 
Expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
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Figure 5.15: The Ratio of Community and Social Services Expenditures in GDP 
 
 
           Table 5.9; Figure 5.14 and  Figure 5.15, in 1970 show the ratio of Community and Social 
Services expenditures in government expenditure was about 2.53%, which increased to 2.67% in 
1996  and to 3.73% in 2010. Also, the ratio of Community and Social Services expenditures in 
GDP was about 8.24%, which increased to 0.9% in 2010. The ratio of Community and Social 
Services spending in government expenditure remained almost steadily between 1970 and 1998, 
then fell very slightly, and has recently begun to increase at a faster rate from 1999 to 2010.  
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Table 5.9: Community and Social Services Expenditure in Government Expenditure and GDP 
Year 
 
Community 
and Social 
Services 
Expenditures 
Government 
Expenditure 
GDP 
Community and Social 
Services 
Expenditures/Government 
Expenditures 
Community and 
Social Services 
Expenditures/GDP 
1970 88 3,478 22,565 2.53019 0.389984 
1971 98 3,898 30,497 2.51411 0.321343 
1972 116 4,621 38,259 2.510279 0.303197 
1973 179 7,110 53,531 2.517581 0.334386 
1974 310 12,321 159,719 2.51603 0.194091 
1975 545 21,671 163,670 2.514882 0.332987 
1976 869 34,513 225,347 2.517892 0.385627 
1977 1,093 43,436 260,960 2.516346 0.418838 
1978 1,511 60,020 272,267 2.517494 0.55497 
1979 1,857 73,786 375,469 2.516738 0.494581 
1980 1,985 78,841 546,603 2.517726 0.363152 
1981 2,780 110,459 622,175 2.516771 0.44682 
1982 3,138 124,682 524,197 2.516803 0.59863 
1983 3,031 120,403 445,210 2.517379 0.680802 
1984 2,899 115,159 420,388 2.517389 0.689601 
1985 2,739 108,816 376,319 2.517093 0.72784 
1986 2,612 101,057 322,021 2.58468 0.811127 
1987 2,725 103,263 320,932 2.638893 0.84909 
1988 2,356 92,823 330,518 2.538164 0.71282 
1989 2,351 110,498 357,065 2.12764 0.658424 
1990 3,276 120,285 437,334 2.723532 0.749084 
1991 4,228 158,980 491,852 2.659454 0.859608 
1992 3,180 140,673 510,458 2.260562 0.62297 
1993 2,899 122,879 494,906 2.359231 0.585768 
1994 2,777 115,102 503,054 2.412643 0.552028 
1995 3,018 118,483 533,504 2.547201 0.565694 
1996 3,606 134,844 590,748 2.674201 0.610413 
1997 4,107 151,043 617,902 2.719093 0.664669 
1998 4,056 144,993 546,648 2.797376 0.741977 
1999 4,439 148,892 603,589 2.981356 0.735434 
2000 5,536 175,234 706,656 3.159204 0.783408 
2001 5,643 179,411 686,296 3.145292 0.82224 
2002 5,518 175,438 707,067 3.145271 0.780407 
2003 5,926 188,398 804,648 3.145469 0.736471 
2004 6,633 210,885 939,426 3.145316 0.706069 
2005 7,461 257,190 1,182,514 2.900968 0.630944 
2006 8,084 303,425 1,335,581 2.66425 0.60528 
2007 9,406 314,768 1,430,547 2.988233 0.657511 
2008 10,395 336,142 1.522.500 3.092443 0.674328 
2009 12,567 362,063 1,614.453 3.470943 0.778061 
2010 14.873 398,352 1,629.998 3.733633 0.912551 
   
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning (2010) 
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5.5.4  Social Security and Welfare 
The growth of population and the associated welfare spending including social security 
has resulted in increased government expenditures in Saudi Arabia, which is depicted in Figure 
5.16. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.16: The Expenditure of Social Security and Welfare Sector in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.17: The Ratio of Social Security and Welfare Expenditures in Government Expenditure 
in Saudi Arabia 
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Figure 5.18: The Ratio of Social Security and Welfare Expenditures in GDP 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.10; Figure 5.17and Figure 5.18, in 1970 the ratio of 
Social Security and Welfare expenditures in government expenditure was about 0.316%, 
which increased to 0.4% in 1995 and to 0.8% in 2010.  Also, the ratio of Social Security 
and Welfare expenditures in GDP was about 0.0487% in 1970, which increased to 0.9% 
in 2010. However, increased oil revenues encouraged government to develop the Social 
Security and Welfare sector in line with the increased GDP and therefore immediate 
adjustment witnessed in government expenditure. 
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Table 5.10: Security and Welfare Expenditure in Government Expenditure and GDP 
Year 
 
Social Security 
and Welfare 
Expenditures 
Government 
Expenditure 
GDP 
Social Security and Welfare 
Expenditures/ 
Government Expenditures 
Social Security and 
Welfare 
Expenditures/GDP 
1970 11 3,478 22,565 0.316274 0.048748 
1971 13 3,898 30,497 0.333504 0.042627 
1972 15 4,621 38,259 0.324605 0.039206 
1973 23 7,110 53,531 0.323488 0.042966 
1974 41 12,321 159,719 0.332765 0.02567 
1975 71 21,671 163,670 0.327627 0.04338 
1976 114 34,513 225,347 0.33031 0.050589 
1977 143 43,436 260,960 0.32922 0.054798 
1978 198 60,020 272,267 0.32989 0.072723 
1979 243 73,786 375,469 0.329331 0.064719 
1980 260 78,841 546,603 0.329778 0.047567 
1981 364 110,459 622,175 0.329534 0.058504 
1982 411 124,682 524,197 0.329639 0.078406 
1983 397 120,403 445,210 0.329726 0.089171 
1984 380 115,159 420,388 0.329979 0.090393 
1985 359 108,816 376,319 0.329915 0.095398 
1986 340 101,057 322,021 0.336444 0.105583 
1987 349 103,263 320,932 0.337972 0.108746 
1988 319 92,823 330,518 0.343665 0.096515 
1989 320 110,498 357,065 0.289598 0.08962 
1990 473 120,285 437,334 0.393233 0.108155 
1991 677 158,980 491,852 0.42584 0.137643 
1992 414 140,673 510,458 0.2943 0.081104 
1993 400 122,879 494,906 0.325523 0.080823 
1994 402 115,102 503,054 0.349255 0.079912 
1995 533 118,483 533,504 0.449854 0.099906 
1996 633 134,844 590,748 0.469431 0.107152 
1997 823 151,043 617,902 0.544878 0.133193 
1998 825 144,993 546,648 0.568993 0.15092 
1999 583 148,892 603,589 0.391559 0.096589 
2000 864 175,234 706,656 0.493055 0.122266 
2001 857 179,411 686,296 0.477674 0.124873 
2002 838 175,438 707,067 0.477662 0.118518 
2003 900 188,398 804,648 0.477712 0.11185 
2004 1,007 210,885 939,426 0.477511 0.107193 
2005 1,149 257,190 1,182,514 0.446751 0.097166 
2006 1,252 303,425 1,335,581 0.412623 0.093742 
2007 1,465 314,768 1,430,547 0.465422 0.102408 
2008 1,738 336,142 1.522.500 0.517043 0.132631 
2009 2,515 362,063 1,614.453 0.69463 0.557803 
2010 3,465 398,352 1,629.998 0.874352 0.913681 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
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5.5.5 Housing and Community Development 
The housing sector in Saudi Arabia contributes to economic growth; prosperity and 
social stability, and government allocated large amounts to make sure that well-being of the 
society can be served through housing and community development. The development and 
trends in the housing and community development expenditures can be seen in Figure 5.19. 
 
Figure 5.19: The Expenditure of Housing and Community Development Sector in Saudi 
Arabia 
 
 
 
Figure 5.20: The Ratio of Housing and Community Development Expenditures in 
Government Expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
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Figure 5.21: The Ratio of Housing and Community Development Expenditures in GDP 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.11; Figure 5.20and Figure 5.21, in 1970 the ratio of 
housing and community development expenditures in government expenditure was 
about 4.31%, which increased to 4.7% in 1989 and to 5.1% in 2010.  Also, the ratio of 
housing and community development expenditures in GDP was about 0.66% in 1970, 
which increased to 1.25% in 2010. However, increased oil revenues encouraged 
government to develop the housing and community development sector in line with the 
increased GDP and therefore immediate adjustment witnessed in government 
expenditure. 
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Table 5.11: The Ratio of Housing and Community Development Expenditure in Government 
Expenditure and GDP 
Year 
 
Housing and 
Community 
Development 
Expenditures 
Government 
Expenditure 
GDP 
Housing and Community 
Development 
Expenditures/Government 
Expenditures 
Housing and 
Community 
Development 
Expenditures/GDP 
1970 150 3,478 22,565 4.312823 0.664746 
1971 169 3,898 30,497 4.335557 0.554153 
1972 200 4,621 38,259 4.328068 0.522753 
1973 307 7,110 53,531 4.317862 0.573499 
1974 533 12,321 159,719 4.325948 0.333711 
1975 937 21,671 163,670 4.323751 0.572493 
1976 1,493 34,513 225,347 4.325906 0.662534 
1977 1,878 43,436 260,960 4.323603 0.719651 
1978 2,596 60,020 272,267 4.325225 0.953476 
1979 3,191 73,786 375,469 4.324669 0.84987 
1980 3,410 78,841 546,603 4.325161 0.623853 
1981 4,777 110,459 622,175 4.324682 0.76779 
1982 5,392 124,682 524,197 4.324602 1.028621 
1983 5,207 120,403 445,210 4.324643 1.16956 
1984 4,980 115,159 420,388 4.324456 1.18462 
1985 4,706 108,816 376,319 4.324732 1.250535 
1986 4,519 101,057 322,021 4.471734 1.403325 
1987 4,491 103,263 320,932 4.349089 1.399362 
1988 4,361 92,823 330,518 4.698189 1.319444 
1989 5,276 110,498 357,065 4.774747 1.477602 
1990 166 120,285 437,334 0.138006 0.037957 
1991 1,691 158,980 491,852 1.063656 0.343803 
1992 5,549 140,673 510,458 3.944609 1.087063 
1993 4,687 122,879 494,906 3.814321 0.947049 
1994 4,612 115,102 503,054 4.006881 0.9168 
1995 4,721 118,483 533,504 3.984538 0.884904 
1996 5,505 134,844 590,748 4.082495 0.931869 
1997 6,081 151,043 617,902 4.026006 0.984137 
1998 5,793 144,993 546,648 3.995365 1.059731 
1999 7,210 148,892 603,589 4.842436 1.194521 
2000 9,691 175,234 706,656 5.530319 1.371389 
2001 10,283 179,411 686,296 5.731533 1.498333 
2002 10,055 175,438 707,067 5.731369 1.422072 
2003 10,798 188,398 804,648 5.731483 1.341953 
2004 12,087 210,885 939,426 5.73156 1.286637 
2005 12,215 257,190 1,182,514 4.749407 1.032969 
2006 14,530 303,425 1,335,581 4.788663 1.087916 
2007 15,685 314,768 1,430,547 4.983035 1.096434 
2008 16,546 336,142 1.522.500 4.922324 1.100321 
2009 18,743 362,063 1,614.453 5.176723 1.16095 
2010 20.341 398,352 1,629.998 5.149466 1.25846 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning (2010) 
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5.5.6 General Government Services 
 
The Government Services include all government offices. As can be seen in Figure 5.22 
and table (5.5), in 1970, the expenditures for general government services were 672 SAR and it 
has increased to 74,443 million SAR in 2008. 
 
 
Figure 5.22: The Expenditure of General Government Services in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
5.6 DEFENCE EXPENDITURES 
Defence affairs are expenses related to the administration and operation of defence. 
Considering the geo political importance of the Middle East and the Gulf region and the 
instability associated with these regions, Saud Arabia has been investing in great amount for the 
development of its defence and security forces. As mentioned previously, Gulf Wars had huge 
impact and resulted in large burdens on Saudi Arabia’s budget.  
As can be seen from Figure 5.23, defence affairs are expenses related to the 
administration and operation of defence this amount to about 46,018 in 1995 increased to and 
60,553 in the year 2004. This share increased in 1991 to 75.99% because of the effect of the 
Gulf War one.  The share of defence expenditure in GDP in Saudi Arabia was 13.7%, since 1971. 
Defence expenditure has a large share of total government expenditure. According to statistical 
report in Saudi Arabia, the annual average of defence expenditurefrom1970 to 2010 was around 
46% of government expenditure (Table 5.12). The ratio of government spending on defence 
fluctuated during 1990s. As we know the Gulf has witnessed three wars, which was a reason to 
increase the expenditures of defence in the Gulf. .  
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Figure 5.23: Defence Expenditures in Saudi Arabia 
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Table 5.12: The ratio of Defence Expenditure  
 
Year GDP 
 
Defence Expenditures 
 
Defence Exp /GDP 
1970 22,565 1,510 0.07 
1971 30,497 1,692 0.06 
1972 38,259 2,006 0.05 
1973 53,531 3,086 0.06 
1974 159,719 5,349 0.03 
1975 163,670 9,407 0.06 
1976 225,347 14,982 0.07 
1977 260,960 18,855 0.07 
1978 272,267 26,054 0.10 
1979 375,469 32,030 0.09 
1980 546,603 34,224 0.06 
1981 622,175 47,949 0.08 
1982 524,197 54,123 0.10 
1983 445,210 52,266 0.12 
1984 420,388 49,989 0.12 
1985 376,319 47,236 0.13 
1986 322,021 41,392 0.13 
1987 320,932 41,739 0.13 
1988 330,518 36,474 0.11 
1989 357,065 42,325 0.12 
1990 437,334 45,590 0.10 
1991 491,852 59,195 0.12 
1992 510,458 56,359 0.11 
1993 494,906 51,296 0.10 
1994 503,054 45,503 0.09 
1995 533,504 46,018 0.09 
1996 590,748 52,708 0.09 
1997 617,902 59,661 0.10 
1998 546,648 55,780 0.10 
1999 603,589 42,285 0.07 
2000 706,656 51,353 0.07 
2001 686,296 51,516 0.08 
2002 707,067 50,375 0.07 
2003 804,648 54,096 0.07 
2004 939,426 60,553 0.06 
2005 1,182,514 63,949 0.05 
2006 1,335,581 75,206 0.06 
2007 1,430,547 80,157 0.06 
2008 1,522,500 84,932 0.06 
2009 1,614,453 86,551 0.05 
2010 1,629,998 90,324 0.06 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Planning, (2010) 
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5.7 TRANSFER EXPENDITURES 
The development efforts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia include supporting the 
government's economic activity, as well as private and social benefits through the development 
plans that have been implemented. This support aims to strengthen the economic capacities of 
individuals and social groups to assist in the generation of independence, and social benefits 
aimed at improving the living standards of low income citizens. Development plans and financial 
resources are provided for the granting of loans and social benefits for the beneficiaries.  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to provide such subsidies in 1970, with 49 million 
SAR, continuing to rise to the highest value in 1979, amounting to 12.9 billion SAR, dropping 
subsequently to nearly 10.3 billion SAR in 2004 (Figure 5.24). Moreover, the first year of the 
Eighth Development Plan saw government subsidies in 2005 of about 7.8 billion SAR (Eighth 
Development Plan, 2005). 
 
Figure 5.24: The Transfer Expenditure in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
 
5.8 SOVERIGN WEALTH FUND (SWF) 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) are government-owned investment funds composed 
of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, property, metals or other financial instruments.  This is 
set up for a variety of macroeconomic purposes. They are commonly funded by the transfer of 
foreign exchange assets that are invested long term, overseas. According to Greene and Yeager 
(2008: 248) “a state-owned or influenced fund that obtains its funding from foreign-currency 
reserves or commodity export revenues, through its certain instances, government budget 
surpluses and pension surpluses have also been transferred to SWFs”.  
SWFs are not new, and some of the longer-established funds, for example those of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Singapore, have existed for decades. However, high oil prices, 
financial globalization, and sustained, large global imbalances have resulted in the rapid 
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accumulation of foreign assets particularly by oil exporters and several Asian countries. As a 
result, the number and size of SWFs are rising fast and their presence in international capital 
markets is becoming more prominent (Allen and Caruana, 2008).  
Saudi Arabia, as one of the GCC countries, has been attempted to plan the economic 
development utilising the finance provided by oil revenues accumulated in SWFs (Asutay, 2008). 
As can be seen in Table 5.13, Saudi Arabia, with 5 SWFs, has some of the largest SWFs in the 
total assets of SWFs in the GCC countries. 
  
 
Table 5.13: Largest GCC SWFs by Assets under Management 
Country Abbreviation Fund Name Assets (Billion Dollars) Inception Origin 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 Abu Dhabi 
 
ADIA 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority 
627 1976 Oil 
IPIC 
International 
Petroleum Investment 
Company 
48.2 1984 Oil 
MDC 
Mubadala 
Development 
Company 
13.3 2002 Oil 
ADIC 
Abu Dhabi 
Investment Council 
X 2007 Oil 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Dubai 
ICD 
Investment 
Corporation of Dubai 
19.6 2006 Oil 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Ra's al Khaymah 
RIA 
RAK Investment 
Authority 
1.2 2005 Oil 
United Arab 
Emirates –
Federal 
EIA 
Emirates Investment 
Authority 
X 2007 Oil 
Saudi Arabia SAMA 
SAMA Foreign 
Holdings 
439.1 n/a Oil 
Saudi Arabia PIF 
Public Investment 
Fund 
5.3 2008 Oil 
Kuwait KIA 
Kuwait Investment 
Authority 
202.8 1953 Oil 
Qatar QIA 
Qatar Investment 
Authority 
85 2003 Oil 
Oman SGRF 
State General Reserve 
Fund 
8.2 1980 
Oil & 
Gas 
Oman OIF 
Oman Investment 
Fund 
X 2006 Oil 
Bahrain MHC 
Mumtalakat Holding 
Company 
9.1 2006 Oil 
Total 1,458.8 (billion dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled with data provided on SWF Institute website (http://www.swfinstitute.org/funds.php) 
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SWFs are directly involved economic and financial investment and considering that they are 
owned and regulated by the government, they should be incorporated into the government 
growth measures as to develop a better understanding of the share of the government in the 
economy. Since SWFs are not treated as part of the consolidated budget, it is important to 
endogenous them in measuring the growth of government. 
 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion and presentation shows that Saudi Arabian government has 
extensively used government expenditures to improve the economic development of the country 
and stimulate economic growth.  The rentier nature of the society provides another important 
motivation for the government of Saudi Arabia to extend the government expenditures; 
however, economic development needs has also been an important determining factor. 
One of the important findings that this chapter takes into account involves two 
fundamental issues. First, there was the historical context of the development of the national 
economy by the initiative of the government and its contributions to the productive sectors in it. 
With the start of planning of economic and social development in 1970 with the First 
Development Plan (1970-1974), and an increase in oil revenues in the third year of the plan, the 
dependence on the crude oil sector has increased. However, policies and strategies are also 
developed to increase production and investment in non-oil sectors, on the one hand, and to 
increase the contribution of the private sector in economic growth and employment, on the 
other. The second issue was linked to the development of oil resources and increased production 
and export of oil in the race for development of other sectors.  
In general, economic and development policies achieved further efficiency not only in 
through better general economic stability internally and externally, which marked development 
process over the past twenty-one years, but also in the execution of economic, social and 
environmental infrastructure projects, as well as in the provision of better education, health and 
environmental services to citizens. This has helped the expansion of economic activity and 
acceleration of social development in general. Moreover, business conditions improved in the 
market economy while efficiency performance has been enhanced in particular. 
Accordingly, the government sector in the Kingdom established the foundations of 
administration and economy, as they did not already exist, such as government departments, 
public institutions, companies and governmental organisations, and government investments. In 
addition, government involved in the development of the production activities of the public 
sector in Saudi Arabia which is a major part of the overall GDP. The general climate of the Saudi 
economy has improved markedly due to government investment and regulations through 
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government expenditures and is expected to yield to government efforts aimed at improving the 
investment climate and the state revenues derived from it in the future.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
MODELLING GOVERNMENT GROWTH AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
NEXUS FOR SAUDI ARABIA 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
As the preceding chapters demonstrated, the government expenditures play a vital role in the 
economy and its growth in particular in the late developmentalist countries, which considered 
government expenditures essential for economic development since the mid-20th century. It is due to 
such reasons that the government expenditures are perceived by the developing countries as the 
most essential instrument of the fiscal policy, which has gained importance for the decision-maker 
to achieve the vision of the future of the structuring of economic policy. 
As discussed previously, the Saudi Arabian economy depends on oil as the major source of 
income, which is the main and essential source of financing the government and public 
expenditures. The relationship between the Saudi business cycle and oil revenues is, therefore, very 
strong, which means that if there is any change in this source of income, the rest of the economy 
will be affected accordingly. This is true also for government expenditures, the level of which is 
determined by the revenues mainly raised through oil export. 
Similar to the case of any other developing nations, the Saudi government “has played a 
pivotal role during the past [four] decades in economic development in the country. In addition to 
providing infrastructure, establishing a modern educational system, and stabilising the economy, 
the government has played a significant role in establishing large companies and reducing various 
market distortions that would have worked against economic efficiency” (Albatel, 2003:82). 
This chapter, hence, focuses on modelling of the government‟s growth and development in 
Saudi Arabia after providing descriptive evidence for growth of government expenditures in Chapter 
5. The first section in this chapter presents an overview of the Wagner Law; and then reviews all the 
models derived and developed from Wagner‟s Law over the years. The second section, considers 
the hypothesis; then the models derived and developed from the original Peacock and Wiseman 
hypothesis are discussed and presented in econometric modelling. In doing so, all the variables are 
identified and defined for the empirical work. In addition, the Keynesian Relation is examined and 
the relevant modelling presented to show how the economic development and 
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government expenditure has been modelled in the literature through aggregate supply modelling.  
Since times series econometric modelling is used in this study throughout, in validating the models 
tests such as Unit Root Tests, Co-integration Test, Granger Causality Tests and Error Correction 
Model Test (ECM) are used which are presented in detail in this chapter. 
 
 
6.2. MODELLING WAGNER’S LAW 
 
Wagner‟s general hypothesis has provided scope for a range of different interpretations in 
the existing literature. It is, consequently, possible to identify at least six of these interpretations: 
Peacock and Wiseman (1961), Gupta (1967), Goffman (1968), Goffman and Mahar (1971), Pryor 
(1968), Musgrave (1969), and Mann (1980). These models are depicted in Table (6.1)in a functional 
form.  
As discussed in the earlier chapter, there are significant differences arisen in these 
interpretations of Wagner‟s Law, concerned primarily with issues that are discussed in an earlier 
chapter, which includes the measurement of the economic variables in the hypothesis, the functional 
form of the relationship between the key variables in Wagner‟s Law, and the nature of limits 
to government growth. 
 
Table 6.1: Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with Real GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GEC) = α + β L(GDP) Pryor 1968 
3 L(GE)  = α + β L(GDP / P) Goffman 1968 
4 L(GE/GDP) = α + β L(GDP / P) Musgrave 1969 
5 L(GE/P) = α + β L(GDP / P) Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
6 L(GE/GDP) = α + β L(GDP) Mann 1980 
 
 
In these formulations, the following variables are used (Table 6.2): 
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Table 6.2: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
The symbol (L) Natural logarithm 
GE Total Government Expenditure 
GEC Total Government Expenditure for consumption 
GE / GDP The share of real total Government expenditure in real GDP 
GE / P Total Government Expenditure per capita 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
P Population 
 
The different version of Wagner‟s law has been summarised by Mann (1980), Afxention and 
Serletis (1996), and Demirbas (1999) in the use of „log-log models‟.  
In conducting empirical analysis, some contributors have applied traditional regression 
analysis, while others have used causality testing, and recently, co-integration analysis has appeared in 
the literature.  In searching for empirical validity, Wagner‟s Law has been analysed by many 
researchers among others the following can be mentioned: Bird (1971), Krzyaniak (1974), Sahni and 
Singh (1984), Abizadeh and gray (1985), Ram (1986, 1987), Henrekson (1992, 1993), Courakiset 
al.(1993), Murthy (1993), Oxley (1994) and Ansari et al.(1997). 
The six versions of Wagner‟s Law are briefly discussed in the following sub-sections with the 
objective of constructing the their econometric model to test in this study for Saudi Arabia. 
 
6.2.1. Peacock and Wiseman’s Version (1961) of Wagner’s Law 
 
The Peacock and Wiseman explained and defined Wagner‟s Law, as “the proportion of 
public expenditures to gross national product must be expected to rise over the foreseeable future” 
(Peacock and Wiseman, 1961:10). Their interpretation, hence, states that the level of government 
expenditure is a function of national income and can be expressed in the general relationship shown 
in equation (6.1).  
                 GE = f (GDP)         f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0              (6.1) 
where, GE represents total government expenditure, and GDP denotes Gross Domestic Product. 
The logarithm form can be expressed in the following equation (6.2): 
L(GE) = α + β L (GDP) + ϵ   (6.2) 
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where, α and β are parameters and ϵ  is the disturbance term; β is elasticity (E) of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), equation (6.3). 
  
E (Peacock &Wiseman) = 
d(GE )
d(GDP )
/
GE
GDP
                                      (6.3) 
The elasticity (E) in equation (6.3) is thus interpreted as the percentage change of 
government expenditure for every one percent change of GDP. 
 
6.2.2. Pryor’s Version (1968) of Wagner’s Law 
 
Pryor (1968) analysed the growth of government expenditure for consumption as a 
dependent variable by using a new interpretation of Wagner‟s Law by arguing that, “Wagner … 
asserted that in growing economies the share of government for consumption in the GDP 
increases” (Pryor, 1968:78).  Pryor‟s general relationship of Wagner‟s Law is depicted in equation 
(6.4).  
    GEC = f (GDP)                                        f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0 (6.4)    
where, GEC stands for total government expenditure for consumption, and GDP denotes Gross 
Domestic Product. The logarithmic form is expressed as the in the following equation (6.5): 
 
       L (GEC) = α + β L (GDP) + ϵ  (6.5) 
where, α and β are parameters and ϵ  is the disturbance term, β is elasticity (E) of GDP, equation 
(6.6). 
E (Pryor) = 
d(GEC )
d(GDP )
/
GEC
GDP
(6.6) 
The elasticity (E) in equation 6.6 is thus interpreted as the percentage change of government 
expenditure for consumption for every one percent change in GDP. 
 
6.2.3.Goffman (1968) and Goffman and Mahar’s Version (1971) of Wagner’s Law 
 
In explaining the growth of government in terms of Wagner‟s Law, Goffman (1968: 359) 
stated that “the public sector‟s share of the community‟s output increases with economic 
development”.  He further states that “As a nation experiences economic development and growth, 
an increase must occur in the activity of the public sector and the ratio of increase, when converted 
into expenditure terms, would exceed the rate of increase in output per capita”. 
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Goffman‟s general relationship of Wagner‟s Law, hence, is depicted in equation (6.7).  
            GE = f (GDP / P)                           f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                           (6.7) 
where, GE represents total government expenditure, P population, GDP represents Gross 
Domestic Product and GDP/P stands for per capita GDP. The logarithm form is depicted in 
equation (6.8): 
 
     L (GE) = α + β L (GDP/ P) + ϵ                                                   (6.8) 
where, α and β are parameters and ϵ  is the disturbance term, β is elasticity (E) of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita, equation (6.9). 
  
    E (Goffman) = 
d(GE )
d(GDP /P)
/
GE
GDP /P
                                        (6.9)      
The elasticity (E) in equation (6.9) is interpreted as the percentage change of government 
expenditure for every one percent change in GDP/P. 
 
6.2.4. Musgrave’s Version (1969) of Wagner’s Law 
 
Musgrave (1969) investigated the validity of Wagner‟s law by looking at the ratio of 
government expenditure relative to GDP per capita. He also explained the Wagner‟s law as follows: 
“The proposition of expanding scale, obviously, must be interpreted as postulating a rising share of 
the public sector in the economy; an absolute increase in the size of the budget can hardly fail to 
result as the economy expands” (Musgrave, 1969:74). 
Musgrave‟s conceptualisation of the general relationship between economic growth and 
government expenditures in terms of Wagner‟s Law is depicted in equation (6.10).  
 
 GE / GDP = f (GDP / P)                    f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                (6.10) 
where, GE represents total government expenditure, P population, GDP represents Gross 
Domestic Product, GE / GDP stands for the share of real total Government expenditure in real 
gross domestic product and GDP / P stands for per capita GDP.  
 
The logarithm form of equation 6.10 can be expressed as in equation (6.11): 
L (GE / GDP) = α + β L (GDP/ P) + ϵ(6.11) 
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where α and β are parameters and ϵ  is the disturbance term, β is elasticity (E) of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita, equation  (6.12). 
The elasticity of government expenditures is estimated through equation (6.12), which implies the 
percent change of the share of government expenditure in GDP for every one percent change in 
GDP.  
  
E (Musgrave) = 
d(GE /GDP )
d(GDP /P)
/
GE /GDP
GDP /P
                                 (6.12)      
 
6.2.5. Gupta’s Version (1967) of Wagner’s Law 
  
Gupta (1967) explain the Wagner‟s Law by taking into account the relationship between 
state activity and national income. Thus, according to Gupta (1967: 426) “Government expenditure 
must increase at a rate faster than that of the national income”. 
Gupta‟s general relationship of Wagner‟s law is depicted in equation (6.13).  
GE / P = f (GDP / P)            f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                    (6.13) 
where, GE represents total government expenditure, P population, GDP represents Gross 
Domestic Product, GE / P total Government expenditure in real gross domestic product and GDP 
/ P stands for per capita GDP.  
 
The logarithmic form can be expressed in the following form equation (6.14): 
 
 L (GE / P) = α + β L (GDP/ P) + ϵ                                     (6.14) 
where, α and β are parameters and ϵ  is the disturbance term, β is elasticity (E) of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita, equation (6.15).       
  
                             E (Gupta) = 
d(GE /P)
d(GDP /P)
/
GE /P
GDP /P
     (6.15) 
The elasticity (E) of government expenditure growth is estimated through equation (6.15), 
the result of which is interpreted as the percent change of real government expenditure for every 
one percent change of real GDP or GDP/P. 
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6.2.6. Mann’s Version (1980) of Wagner’s Law 
 
Mann (1980) analyzed the Mexican case over the period from 1925 to 1976 within Wagner‟s 
Law by using six different formulations of the Law. Mann modified the Peacock and 
Wiseman interpretationand called it „a structural version of Wagner‟s law‟. Thus, Mann (1980) 
interpreted the Wagner‟s Law by considering that the share of public expenditure in national income 
should increase at a rate higher than the rate of increase in national income. Mann‟s formulation of 
Wagner‟s law translates into the functional relationship of Wagner‟s law as depicted in equation 
(6.16). 
 
  GE / GDP = f (GDP)             f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                 (6.16) 
where, GE represents total government expenditure, P population, GDP represents Gross 
Domestic Product, GE / GDP stands for the share of real total Government expenditure in real 
gross domestic product.  
 
Equation (6.17) expresses the logarithm form: 
 
 L (GE / GDP) = α + β L (GDP) + ϵ                                   (6.17) 
where,  α and β are parameters and ϵ  is the disturbance term, β is elasticity (E) of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). 
The coefficient of the independent variable in 6.17 gives the estimates of the elasticity, which 
is calculated as in equation (6.18), which shows that the impact of one percent change in national 
income on the share of government expenditures in the national income.  
                            E (Mann) = 
d(GE /GDP )
d(GDP )
/
GE /GDP
GDP
     (6.18) 
 
6.3. MODELLING PEACOCK AND WISEMAN’S DISPLACEMENT HYPOTHESIS  
 
After Wagner‟s Law in explaining the growing government in economy, Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961) offered a working hypothesis to explain the fluctuations in 
government expenditure over time, which emphasised the pattern of public expenditure trends 
(Peacock and Wiseman, 1961; xxiii). According to the Peacock and Wiseman‟s hypothesis, 
government expenditure tends to grow in a step like pattern, coinciding with social upheavals, 
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notably wars. To support its explanatory power, Brown and Jackson (1990:123) noted, “Peacock and 
Wiseman‟s study is probably one of the best-known analyses of the time pattern of public 
expenditure”.  The upward shift in government expenditures due to social upheaval is associated 
with people‟s willingness and readiness to pay for the financing of the social upheaval including the 
wars.  As during such periods, it is argued that people‟s tolerable level of paying tax increases. 
The pattern observed in government expenditures is further explained through the „rachet 
effect‟.  Bird (1972) argued that in the case of the ratchet effect, if Gross National Product or GNP 
declines, then the government expenditure declines, but less than GNP. In addition, in explaining 
and specifying the ratchet effect, he argued that crises are likely to have short-term implications for 
the government expenditure ratio or E/GNP rather than crises leading to 
a permanent upward displacement for E/GNP.  In other words, after the social upheaval ceases, it 
is argued that either government expenditures does not go back to its initial level before the 
beginning of the social upheaval or if it does decreases, it does not decrease as much as the decrease 
in the GNP.  This is explained through government‟s ongoing exploitation of the increased tolerable 
level of tax payment of the citizens.  It should also be noted that Henrekson (1992) argued that the 
E/GNP have a reduction in the short run in times of unexpectedly rapid GNP growth.  
Gupta (1967) may be the first to formulate rigorous statistical tests for a displacement effect, 
separately testing for a shift in the government expenditure level which is associated with the change 
in the income elasticity of government expenditure with relation to economic growth. 
To test the „displacement effect‟, Gupta adopted a double logarithmic functional form, 
which is depicted in equation (6.19).  
                           (GE/ P) = a + b (GNP/ P)                                       (6.19) 
Gupta‟s logarithmic form gives a constant elasticity score for the variable (GE/P) with 
respect to the right hand side variable (GNP/P).Gupta shifted the original formulation adopted by 
Peacock and Wiseman, because the original formulae can only explain shifts in the level of public 
expenditure during wars and crises but cannot explain the shift in the level of public expenditure 
during a depression since taxes are reduced in this period. 
 
 
 
 
Modelling Government Growth and Economic Growth 
 
129 
 
6.4. MODELLING KEYNESIAN RELATION IN EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH NEXUS 
 
As mentioned earlier, Wagner (1893) formulated and expressed his observation that the 
public sector expanded with income growth. This relationship resulting from economic growth leads 
to structural changes in the economic and social relations of society, and to the growth in aggregate 
demand. In other words, government expenditures as part of fiscal policy result in expanding 
economic activity.  Therefore, during recession times, in the past, government expenditures used as 
a stimuli to increase the economic activity in such circumstances.  In a consequential manner, 
increased business activity generates further revenues for government, which, in turn, provides 
further opportunity space for the expansion of government. 
In addition, Michas (1975) suggests that in the relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP per capita, where this relationship assumes that the income 
elasticity is positive, and that for the relationship itself as well as his proposal to Wagner Law to be 
valid, there must be a uni-directional causal relationship from income to government 
expenditure. There also needs to be a causal relationship in the opposite direction of any of the 
share of government spending and GDP per capita, which corresponds with Keynesian approach to 
macroeconomic policies.  Recalling that, the multiplier concept in all Keynesian models is based on 
this particular aspect of public expenditure.  In sum, the Keynesian relation is therefore is closely 
associated with growing government expenditures, which implies that as per capita income increases, 
public sector‟s importance will grow (Bird, 1971:2). 
 
6.5. IDENTIFICATION OF THE EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA 
 
This study aims to model and examine the relationship between increasing government 
expenditures and economic growth in Saudi Arabia for the period of 1968-2010. For this, time series 
data and modelling is utilised to examine the mentioned relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth.  
This study, thus, considers the 43 years period being sufficient to examine the defined 
relationship between the variables described in table 6.1 above. For the purpose of this research, 
mainly secondary data collected from various sources are utilised. There are four main sources 
of data: 
 International Financial Statistics produced by the World Bank (IFS); 
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 SAMA: Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency; 
 The Ministry of Economy and Planning; 
 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the three models as discussed in the preceding sections are 
tested, the specification of which explained in the following sections.  It should be noted that each 
model is tested with oil and non-oil GDP to locate and remove the impact of oil, respectively.  This 
provides a comparative case for capturing the impact of oil, which is the essential source of revenue. 
 
6.5.1. Wagner’s Law and Its Variants 
In testing the variants of the Wagner‟s Law, initial the non-oil GDP as explained in Table (6.3) is 
used. 
 
Table 6.3: Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with Non-Oil Sector of Real GDP 
No Version Function Year 
1 Peacock-Wiseman L(GE) = α + β  L(Non-Oil GDP) 1967 
2 Pryor L(GEC) = α + β L(Non-Oil GDP) 1968 
3 Goffman L(GE)  = α + β L(Non-Oil GDP / P) 1968 
4 Musgrave L(GE/Non-Oil GDP) = α + β L(Non-Oil GDP / P) 1969 
5 Gupta &Michas L(GE/P) = α + β L(Non-Oil GDP / P) 
1967 & 
1975 
6 Mann L(GE/Non-Oil GDP) = α + β L(Non-Oil GDP) 1980 
 
The research also utilises the oil sectors included GDP in searching for the growth of 
government in Saudi Arabia by using the identified models in Table (6.1).  These new formulations 
are presented in Table (6.4).  
 
Table 6.4: Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with Oil Sector of Real GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(Oil GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GEC) = α + β L(Oil GDP) Pryor 1968 
3 L(GE)  = α + β L(Oil GDP / P) Goffman 1968 
4 L(GE/Oil GDP) = α + β L(Oil GDP / P) Musgrave 1969 
5 L(GE/P) = α + β L(Oil GDP / P) Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
6 L(GE/Oil GDP) = α + β L(Oil GDP) Mann 1980 
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6.5.2. Peacock and Wiseman Models  
 
To test the „displacement effect‟ in Saudi Arabia, Gupta‟s (1967) as well as Michas‟s (1975) 
double logarithmic functional form as depicted in the Table (6.5) and (6.6) is utilised. The 
„displacement effect‟ is tested by reversing the Peacock-Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law with oil 
and non-oil GDP. 
 
Table 6.5: The Original Version of Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis with Real GDP 
Function Version Year 
L(GE) = α + β  L(GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
 
 
Table 6.6: Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis with Non-Oil Sector Real GDP 
Function Version Year 
L(GE) = α + β  L(Non-Oil GDP) + e Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
 
In order to find whether there is a structural break between the two periods the observations from 
1968 to 2010 were divided into two groups: from 1968 to 1989 and from 1990 to 2010.There are 
several reasons for the choice of these years, which attempt to associate variations to major 
economic and political event in Saudi Arabia during 1968 to 2010. After the 1973 oil shock, prices of 
oil continuedrising -the oil boom began in 1974 - until early 1980‟s, expanding the government 
growth in Saudi economy. In the 1976‟s the Saudi economy suffered high inflation as part of the 
lagged impact of high spending resulting from oil shocks. 
The world recession after 1978 and also Saudi Arabia‟s support for Iraq in its war against 
Iran resulted in fiscal difficulties, as on the one had spending patter was very high, on the other 
hand, oil revenues were affected.  It should be noted that mega projects undertaken during those 
years contributed to increased government expenditures and fiscal crisis. The decrease in oil process 
in 1986, and in the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the war aftermath did not help to the trend in 
Saudi Arabian government‟s budget. Later, in 1998, due to the decline in oil prices in 1998, Saudi 
Arabia experienced its first major slowdown in economic growth since 1995, after the first Gulf 
War.  
From 1999 to 2001, Saudi economy was a major player in OPEC in influencing the price of 
oil, because of that, government expenditure increased for education and other social sectors. In 
2005, King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz became the King of Saudi Arabia, whose aggregate demand 
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increasing policies pushed increasing government expenditure on the all sectors in Saudi economy.In 
the recent past, five years of high oil prices from 2006 to 2010 helped the Saudi economy, but falling 
oil prices and the global economic slowdown in particular since mid-2008 have severely affected 
economic growth adversely. 
The two periods (1968-1990 and 1991-2010), includes many significant economic and 
political development for Saudi Arabia, but also this break marks the adoption of economic 
liberalisation policies in Saudi Arabia, as the country followed the suit in 1990s in liberalising its 
economy and financial sector, but also expressed commitment, hence, to reduce the size of the 
government.  Thus, thus, provides justification for structural break analysis. 
 
In testing the potential structural breakdown in the government expenditure trend, the 
Chow-test is calculated, which is a version of F- test(Equation 6.20): 
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                                          (6.20) 
 
The following hypotheses are developed to search for structural break due to the social 
upheaval or war:  
H0:βi = 0; (There is no structural break )  
H1: β1 ≠ 0; (There is  a structural break )   
 
In addition, dummy variable is used to test for the structural break, which proves to be 
superior over the Chow test to test for structural stability. The dummy variables were set equal to 
zero for all observations except the year in which the observation goes beyond the threshold of two 
standard errors. In these years, the dummy variable takes on the value of 1. However, firstly, the 
Chow test applied to test for structural stability using the formula already defined in equation (6.20). 
 
Y=αt + β1 Xi+ β2 D i + e                                          (6.21) 
 
whereβ = Parameter, D = Dummy Variables, y = year 
The dummy variable considered in this study as the intercept dummy variable, as dummy 
variables can be used to model changes in the slope of the regression line, which is known 
as slope or interaction dummy variables as modelled in equation 6.21. 
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6.5.3. Modelling Keynesian Relation  
 
The Keynesian view postulates that government expenditure as the main component of 
fiscal policy instrument can affect growth. Hence, in the original formulation, the causality runs from 
government expenditure to economic growth, as explained in equation (6.22).  
 
Yt = f xt + et (6.22) 
 
In this study, if  
   Yt = ln(GDP)and,  xt = ln(GE) 
then: 
 
Ln (GDP) = αt +  ln (GE)  +et (6.23) 
 
where GE stands for total government expenditures, GDP denotes GDP, and E is the standard 
error. 
 
The Keynesian relation is tested by reversing the three versions of Wagner‟s Law. Recall 
three related versions of Wagner‟s Law as expressed in Table (6.7): 
 
Table 6.7: The original Three Versions of Wagner’s Law  
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(GDP) +e Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GE)  = α + β L(GDP / P) + e Goffman 1968 
3 L(GE/P) = α + β L(GDP / P) + e Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
 
Accordingly, table (6.8) presents the Keynesian Relations versions with real GDP: 
 
Table 6.8: Three Versions of Keynesian Relations with Real GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GDP) = α + β  L(GE) + e Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GDP/P) = α + β L(GE) + e Goffman 1968 
3 L(GDP/P) = α + β L(GE/ P) + e Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
 
 
In addition, non-oil GDP is modelled as in Table (6.9) to test the variants of Keynesian 
Relations. 
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Table 6.9: Three Versions of Keynesian Relations with Real Non-Oil Sector of GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(Non-Oil GDP) = α + β  L(GE) + e Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(Non-Oil GDP / P) = α + β  L(GE) + e Goffman 1968 
3 L(Non-Oil GDP / P) = α + β  L(GE / P) + e Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
 
 
6.6. ESTIMATION PROCESS 
 
In this section, the estimation methods used in the literature are presented in order to 
determine particular method to be used in this study. These methods are identified as time series 
analysis, co-integration procedure, unit root, and error correction mechanism. 
 
6.6.1. The Unit Root Test 
It is generally known that time-series data contain unit roots as they are dominated by 
stochastic trends (Nelson and Plosser, 1982). Unit root tests are essential in examining the stationary 
test of a time series because the presence of non-stationary repressors invalidates 
many standard hypotheses tests. 
 
(i) Trend vs. Differenced Stationary 
The standard ways of estimation of time-series data are based on the principles of classical 
estimation methods like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Judge et al., 1988). However, the application 
of unit root tests by some macroeconomic time series such as OLS on data with the presence of unit 
roots can produce misguided results, or spurious results. Thus, OLS method 
requires stationary variables.  As a result, in order to avoid the problem of spurious regressions, unit 
root test is carried out to find if the series are stationary or not (Greene, 2003). 
The latest developments in time series analysis indicate that most macroeconomic time series 
has a unit root, and is defined as difference stationary; the first difference of time series is stationary. 
Thus, to test Wagner‟s Law, the non-stationary property of the series tested first. However, there are 
several tests available to consider whether the series is stationary or non-stationary: 
(a) If the variables under consideration are stationary, this means that the variables do not have 
a unit root; the series is I (0); 
Modelling Government Growth and Economic Growth 
 
135 
 
(b) If the variables under consideration are non-stationary in its level form but stationary in its first-
difference form, the variables do have a unit root, the series is I (1). As Maddala and Kim (1998) 
states then according to the null hypothesis there is a unit root in the variable and the series has first-
degree integration. Therefore, there is a need to conduct unit root analysis. 
 
(ii) Unit Root Analysis 
The most widely used Unit Root analysis tests are Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (1981) tests. ADF test is performed by estimating the following equation 
(6.24): 
 
∆ Yt = a0 + a1t + a2Yt−1 +  ai
k
i=1 Yt−1 + et               (6.24) 
where ∆ Y = the first difference of the series;  Yt = is the series under consideration (GDP, 
government expenditures, or government revenues); t is the time trend, k is the number of lag and 
et is a stationary random error (white noise residual). 
 
According to Charemza and Deadman (1992: 135) “the practical rule for establishing the 
value of [φ] ... is that it should be relatively small in order to save degrees of freedom, but large 
enough not to allow for the existence of autocorrelation inet . For example, if for [φ] =2 the 
Durbin-Watson autocorrelation statistic is low, indicating first order autocorrelation, it would be 
sensible to increase m with the hope that such autocorrelation will disappear”. 
 
The simple formula in Dickey-Fuller tests establish whether β = 1 in the model (6.25): 
Yt  = βYt−1+ et     (6.25) 
By deductingYt−1from each side of the equation in re-writing (6.25), the following form is 
established: 
∆Yt  = Ω Yt−1+ et(6.26) 
where Ω = β – 1 
Testing the hypothesis with β = 1 is equivalent to testing the hypothesis Ω = 0 (Enders, 
1995:221). The hypothesis are: 
 
H0: Ω =  0  
H1: Ω ≠  0  
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These procedures are applied to each data time series in order 
to examine their stationary properties by conducting the tests in levels and first difference.  
 
It should be noted that failing to reject the null (H0) hypothesis implies unit root process. 
However, if the outcome indicates that the series is stationary after the first difference; the series 
integrated of order one I(1), then the process is continued with the co-integration test. 
 
6.6.2. Co-integration Test 
In the time-series modelling, the co-integration test is carried out if there exists a stationary 
linear combination of non-stationary random variables. The aim of this test is to examine whether 
the data demonstrate a long-run relationship. 
In brief, this test refers to the situation where multiple series integrate of order (d), or in 
other words, I(d) where (d) represent the number of unit roots contained in the series. These 
can combine to produce series integrated of order (k), where k can range from zero to d-1.  
According to Engle and Granger (1987), the two series are said to be co-integrated of order 
(d, b) ifYt is integrated of order (d)and there exists a vector, β, such that β′Yt is integrated of order (d-
b). 
 
An example of two co-integrated series behaves as in equation (6.27). 
 
Yt  = α+ βXt+ et                                               (6.27) 
 
If the residuals (et) from the regression are I(0), then Xt  and Yt are said to be co-integrated 
and non-stationary. However, the linear combination is stationary. Thus, the series need to be in 
integration of the same order for co-integrated to be possible. 
In this research, the co-integration test is used to substantiate the econometric process in 
relation to each of the model tested.  
 
6.6.3. Causality test 
(i) Standard Granger Causality 
 
Granger causality test is used for testing the long-run relationship between the variables too 
be tested using time series data of Saudi Arabia data for the period 1968-2010. The Granger 
procedure is selected because it consists of more powerful and simpler way of testing causal 
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relationship. Assuming that the two series contain all the information necessary for prediction X 
Granger-causes Y if lagged X's helps predict Y (Granger, 1980). 
Causality test is required to test whether past changes in variables support changes in other 
variables under the following conditions: 
(a) The two variables used in the test must be stationary; 
(b) The two variables are not integrated of the same order; 
(c) The various economic variables are non-stationary in their respective level. 
 
Granger (1980) causality in the models, are defined in equation (6.28) and (6.29): 
 
tit
s
i
iytit
r
i
ixtt yxx   



 
11
0
                             (6.28) 
tit
s
i
ixtit
r
i
iytt xyy   



 
11
0
                             (6.29) 
 
For equation 6.28, the following hypotheses are constructed: 
H0: βxt−i =  0, for   i = 1, 2,............, k 
H1: βxt−i ≠  0 , for at least one i 
Thus, equation 6.28 is used to test whether (Yt) Granger causes (Xt). 
 
For equation 6.29, on the other hand, the hypotheses to be tested are: 
H0: βyt − i =  0 , for   i = 1, 2,............,k 
H1:βyt − i ≠  0 ,  for at least one i 
Consequently, equation 6.29 is used to test whether (Xt) Granger causes (Yt). 
In the case of this research, two fundamental issues have to be checked: 
(a) To test the variables individually for the causality between the dependent variables; 
(b) To check the time series properties and especially the co-integrating properties of the time series 
involved. As Oskooee and Alse(1993:536) pointed out “Standard Granger or Sims tests are only 
valid if the original time series from which growth rates have generated are not co-integrated.” 
 
By following Gujarati‟s (1995) statements there are four possible results to be derived from 
the causality test in the case of this study: 
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(a) Neither variable „Granger causes‟ the other means, independence has suggested that when the 
sets of GDP and GE coefficients are not statistically in both regressions; 
(b) Unidirectional causality from GDP to GE implies that GDP causes GE, but not vice versa 
indicating that Wagner‟s Law applies; 
(c) Unidirectional causality from GE to GDP implies that is GE causes GDP, but not vice versa 
indicating that Keynesian modelling is valid in this case;  
(d) Bi-directional causality of each other between GDP and GE implying that GDP and GE 
„Granger cause‟ each other, so either the Keynesian modelling or Wagner‟s Law is valid. 
 
(ii) Error-Correction Models 
When variables are found to be co-integrated, a mechanism is required to correct their state, 
for which Engle and Granger (1987) provide such a procedure known as the „Error-Correction 
Models‟ (ECM). The aim of ECM is to determine whether co–integration exists between two 
variables; there must be Granger causality in at least one direction, but the most valuable aspect is 
that co-integration does not reflect the direction of causality between the variables.  
The ECM is expressed as in equation (6.30) and (6.31): 
 
∆ Yt = a1 + β1ECTt−1 +  δiΔ
n
i=1 Yt−1 +  ΩiΔ
n
i=1 Xt−1 + et        (6.30) 
 
∆ Xt = a2 + β2ECTt−1 +  µiΔ
n
i=1 Yt−1 +  €iΔ
n
i=1 Xt−1 + et         (6.31) 
 
where (ECTt−1) is the error correction term lagged one period, is equivalent to et =  Yt −  α −
 β  Xt , which represents the disequilibrium residual of a co-integration equation (Fasana and Wang, 
2001). 
According to Enders (1995: 376), the causality in the ECM is applied in three stages: 
(a) Joint  Hypothesis: 
H0:β1  =  0 ,  H0:δi =  0 ,  for all (i) in equation 6.30, or   
H0:β2  =  0 ,  H0:µi =  0,, for all (i) in equation 6.31; 
(b) Test the significance of (δi) and (µi) to check for the possibility of short run causality; 
(c) Analysis of the direction of the (β′s) to see if they infer a long-run equilibrium relationship. 
 
Modelling Government Growth and Economic Growth 
 
139 
 
6.7. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the conceptual and econometric models‟ aiming to model the government 
expenditures and economic growth in Saudi Arabia is presented: Wagner‟s Law, Keynesian model, 
and Displacement Effect. 
As regards to econometric modelling, there are three steps to test the causality between the 
economic growth in GDP and government spending: 
(i) to analyse the time series features to determine the degree of integration; 
(ii) to determine the relationship between the two variables in the long term; 
(iii) to test the direction of causality in the short and long term 
In doing so, the following tests are utilised: 
(i) Ordinary Least Square (OLS); 
(ii) The Unit Root Test, Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test; 
(iii) The Co-integration Test; 
(iv) The Causality Tests, Standard Granger Causality and Error Correction Models (ECM). 
In summary, this chapter describes the models used to determine the significance and 
causality between the identified variables in different models used in this study with the objective of 
explaining the relationship between government expenditures and economic growth over the years. 
The following chapters present the applications of the models presented in this study so far in 
developing the empirical findings.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SEARCHING FOR WAGNER’S LAW IN SAUDI ARABIA:  
AN EMPRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter being the first empirical chapter provides the application of the 
research process discussed in Chapter 6 with the objective of testing the Wagner‟s Law in 
the case of Saudi Arabia. For this econometric time series analysis is utilised, for which 
annual data from 1968 to 2010 were collected.  Thus, an attempt is made to test the 
relationship between government expenditures and economic growth by initially using 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) for both real GDP and real Non-Oil GDP in relations to 
its impact on growing government and vice-versa. 
In addition, as part of the time-series analysis, the stationary properties of the 
data using the ADF test for real GDP and real Non-Oil GDP and other variables were 
conducted. The next step in the time-series analysis is to test whether the variables in the 
six versions of Wagner's Law are co-integrated.  Finally, we have used the Error 
Correction Model (ECM) to discuss the short run adjustment to equilibrium. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section one, presents some 
empirical results of relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth. In section two of this chapter, 
the six versions of Wagner‟s law and their formal expressions presented. Section three, 
investigates the data and empirical results and analysis by using the identified methods, 
which have been mentioned in Chapter Six. In addition, section four, presents the results 
of the analysis by using the time series techniques, while section five, concludes the 
chapters and presents the finding. 
 
7.2. SURVEYING THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON WAGNER’S LAW 
Extensive works have examined the relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth for all six versions of Wagner‟s Law. Early studies, 
including Abizadeh and Gray (1985), Ram (1987) and Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988), 
returned mixed results. The findings of these authors‟ empirical tests regarding the 
validity of Wagner‟s Law differed from country to country. Some of this research 
demonstrated that government expenditure growth was determined by national income 
growth in developed countries, but not in less developed countries. Recent studies, 
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however, have concentrated on the long-term relationship between government 
expenditure and national income. Biswal and Lee (1999) considered the relationship 
between national income and government expenditure in Canada from 1950 to 1995 
using Wagner‟s Law. Their results supported the model. Furthermore, Lall 
(1969) examined cross-section data from 1962 to 1964 and found no support for 
Wagner‟s Law in 46 developing countries. Ram (1987), who also explored the 
relationship between government expenditures and GDP in 115 countries during the 
period 1950–1980, obtained mixed results for Wagner‟s Law. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, Al-Hakami (2002) explored the empirical-causal 
relationship between government expenditure and GDP over the period 1965–1996. He 
used time-series analysis to examine the statistical characteristics of the variables. The co-
integration test – by examining the trend and pattern of the causal relationship between 
the two variables – showed that the two-time series co-integrated. The findings 
highlighted a causal relationship between GDP to government expenditure. Hence, the 
result implies that government expenditure in oil states based on GDP is ineffective as a 
policy tool, which supports Wagner's Law.  
Payne and Ewing (1996) employed the error-correction model 
to determine Granger causality between government expenditure and economic 
growth, measured by GDP per capita. Their results supported Wagner‟s Law. 
Furthermore, Burney (2002) applied Wagner‟s Law when considering the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic development in Kuwait. He had 
available series data from 1969 to 1994, and his findings showed support for 
Wagner‟s Law over this period.  
Courakiset al. (1993), Ahsanet al. (1996), Chletsos and Kollias (1997), and 
Kolluriet al. (2000) supported this long-term relationship, whereas, Burney (2002) found 
that the association described by Wagner‟s Law was not sufficient, accepting instead the 
Keynesian interpretation. The purpose of this thesis is to test the relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth for all the six versions of Wagner‟s Law 
in Saudi Arabia, one of the fastest-growing developing countries. 
 
7.3. FORMULATING THE VERSIONS OF WAGNER’S LAW FOR SAUDI 
ARABIA 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, there are six versions of Wagner‟s law; as Wagner‟s 
general hypothesis has provided scope for a range of different interpretations in the 
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existing literature. It is possible to identify at least six of these interpretations: Peacock 
and Wiseman (1961), Gupta (1967), Goffman (1968), Goffman and Mahar (1971), Pryor 
(1968), Musgrave (1969), and Man (1980), which are depicted in Table (7.1). 
Table 7.1: Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with Real GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GEC) = α + β L(GDP) Pryor 1968 
3 L(GE)  = α + β L(GDP / P) Goffman 1968 
4 L(GE/GDP) = α + β L(GDP / P) Musgrave 1969 
5 L(GE/P) = α + β L(GDP / P) Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
6 L(GE/GDP) = α + β L(GDP) Mann 1980 
 
where:  
 L Natural logarithm 
GE Total Government Expenditure 
GEC Total Government Expenditure for consumption 
GE / GDP The share of real total Government expenditure in real GDP 
GE / P Total Government Expenditure per capita 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
P Population 
 
Each of these models is discussed in the following sections: 
 
(i)  Peacock-Wiseman (1967) Version of Wagner’s Law 
Peacock and Wiseman presented their version of Wagner‟s Law in 1967, which is 
called the traditional version. They (1967:17) stated that “Wagner‟s argument was that 
government expenditure must increase of an even faster rate than output.” This means 
that the increase in total government expenditure is expected to be at a faster rate than 
the growth observed in the GDP. 
The functional form of Peacock and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law is 
defined by equation (7.1):  
GE = f (GDP)                                 f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0 (7.1) 
where: GE = Total Government Expenditure level in real terms; GDP= Gross 
Domestic Product in real terms. 
GE = α + β GDP + e                                                       (7.2) 
 
The equation 7.2 is expressed in logarithm model as in equation (7.3): 
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L (GE) = α + β L (GDP) + e                                                  (7.3) 
The government expenditure elasticity is then defined as: 
E (Peacock & Wiseman) = 
d GE  
d GDP  
GE
GDP
(7.4) 
The elasticity (E) in equation (7.4) is thus interpreted as the percent change of 
government expenditure (GE) for every one percent change of GDP. 
 
(ii) Pryor  (1968) 
According to Pryor (1968:451), "Wagner asserted that in growing economies the 
share of public consumption expenditures in the national income increases".  This 
statement can be expressed in the following functional form (Equation 7.5): 
 
GEC = f (GDP)                                   f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                    (7.5) 
 
where: GEC = Total Government Consumption Expenditure level in real terms, and 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product in real terms. 
 
GEC = α + β GDP + e                                                          (7.6) 
 
The equation by using logarithm model can be expressed as: 
L (GEC) = α + β L (GDP) + e                                                      (7.7) 
The government expenditure elasticity is then expressed as: 
E (Pryor) = 
d(GEC )
d(GDP )
/
GEC
GDP
      (7.8) 
The elasticity (E) in equation (7.8) is thus interpreted as the percent change of 
government expenditure of consumption (GEC) for every one percent change of GDP. 
 
(iii) Goffman  (1968) 
 
Goffman (1968) introduced population into Wagner‟s Law, and therefore 
considered that with the increase in per capita income government expenditures will 
increase.  This can be explained in the following functional form: 
 
GE = f (GDP/ p)                                     f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                  (7.9) 
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where: GE = Total Government Expenditure level in real terms; and GDP/P= Per 
Capita Gross Domestic Product in real terms. 
 This can be transformed into the following equation: 
GE = α + β GDP/ P + e                                                           (7.10) 
 
The equation by using logarithm model can be expressed as: 
L (GE) = α + β L (GDP/P) + e                                                   (7.11) 
The elasticity in equation 7.11 is then expressed as: 
E (Goffman) = 
d GE  
d 
GDP
P
 
/
GE
GDP
P
(7.12) 
The elasticity (E) in equation 7.12 is thus interpreted as the percent change of 
government expenditure (GE) for every one percent change of per capita GDP 
(GDP/P). 
 
(iv) Musgrave  (1967) 
Musgrave (1967) conceptualised the Wagner‟s Law as the relationship between 
per capita income and the government expenditure ratio, which is expressed in the 
following functional form:  
 
GE / GDP = f (GDP/P)                  f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                                               (7.13) 
 
where: GE / GDP= the ratio of Government Expenditure level in real terms; and 
GDP/P= Per Capita Gross Domestic Product in real terms. 
 
Equation (7.13) is expressed in the following equation: 
GE/GDP = α + β GDP/P + e                                                 (7.14) 
 
Equation 7.14 is transformed by using logarithm model as in equation (7.15): 
 
L(GE/GDP) = α + β L (GDP/P) + e                                             (7.15) 
 
The government expenditures elasticity in equation (7.15) is expressed as:       
E (Musgrave) = 
d(GE /GDP )
d(GDP /P)
/
GE /GDP
GDP /P
                                            (7.16) 
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The elasticity (E) in equation (7.16) is thus interpreted as the percent change of 
government expenditure ratio to GDP (GE/GDP) for every one percent change of Per 
Capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP/P). 
 
(v) Gupta  (1967) 
Gupta in his 1967 articulation of the Wagner‟s Law, considered the relationship 
between GDP and government expenditures in terms of per capita, which is explained in 
the following functional format: 
GE /P = f (GDP/P)                       f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0  (7.17) 
 
where: GE/ P= Total Government Expenditure per capita in real terms; and GDP/P= 
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product in real terms. 
This functional relationship can be re-expressed in the following equation: 
 
GE/P = α + β GDP/P + e                                                            (7.18) 
 
The equation by using logarithm model is expressed in the following manner: 
 
      L (GE/P) = α + β L (GDP/P) + e                                                 (7.19) 
 
The elasticity in the equation (7.19) can be expressed in the following equation: 
 
E (Gupta) = 
d(GE /P)
d(GDP /P)
/
GE /P
GDP /P
(7.20) 
The elasticity (E) in equation (7.20) is thus interpreted as the percent change of 
government expenditure per capita (GE/P) for every one percent change of Per Capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP/P). 
(vi) Mann  (1980) 
Mann (1980) interpreted Wagner‟s Law as a relationship between government 
expenditure ratio and GDP, which is expressed in the following functional form: 
 GE / GDP = f (GDP)                                     f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0(7.21) 
 
where: GE/ GDP = the ratio of Government Expenditure level in real terms; GDP = 
Gross Domestic Product in real terms. 
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This can be transformed into: 
GE/GDP = α + β GDP + e                                                         (7.22) 
The equation by using logarithm model is expressed as below: 
L(GE/GDP) = α + β L (GDP) + e                                               (7.23) 
 
The elasticity in equation (7.24) is explained as: 
 
E(Mann) = 
d(GE /GDP )
d(GDP )
/
GE /GDP
GDP
(7.24) 
The elasticity (E) in equation (7.24) is thus interpreted as the percent change of 
the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (GE/GDP) for every one percent change 
of GDP. 
 
7.4. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS WITH OLS 
This section of the thesis presents the research process and the analysis, which 
presents the results as well in a detailed manner.  It starts with describing the OLS 
process: 
 
The ordinary least square test (OLS) is employed to determine the parameters in 
the equations, in which the logarithm model is utilised for the following: 
(i) The parameters of the logarithm model have an explanation as elasticises; 
(ii) The logarithm transformation is used when all the data are positive. According to, 
Gujarati (1995), the normal regression model is obtained by taking logs of both sides of 
the equation (7.25): 
Y = α + β X + e         (7.25) 
to be: 
  
Log Y = α + β Log X + e                                    (7.26) 
 
The slope is determined by as in equation (7.27): 
 
Slope =   
dy
dx
= β ∗
y
x   
                                       (7.27) 
 
The elasticity is: 
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E=Elasticity = 
d(y)
d(x)
/ 
y
x
 = β                              (7.28) 
 
For simplicity, E can be written as: 
 
β = 
d(y)
d(x)
/ 
y
x
                                                     (7.29) 
 
7.4.1. Testing the Versions of Wagner’s Law with Real GDP 
This section provides the results of the empirical analysis by using real GDP 
within the initial OLS framework as explained above. The analysis later is further 
developed by employing cointegration analysis. 
 
(i) Peacock-Wiseman (1967) Version of Wagner’s Law 
According to the specification and functional and logarithmic form expressed in the 
previous section, the following estimates in table (7.2) are established for the Peacock 
and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law for the period of 1968 to 2010 for Saudi Arabia: 
 
Table 7.2: Regression Results for Peacock & Wiseman Version with Real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) 
 
-2.836 
 
L (GDP) 
 
1.1078 
 
0.9016 
 
The estimates in Table (7.2) can be expressed in the following functional form:     
L(GE)= -2.836+ 1.1078 L(GDP)                                       (7.30) 
                 (-3.85)    (19.14) 
The numbers between parentheses are t- statistics for each estimated measure 
and intercept. In equation (7.30), to get the growth rate (elasticity), elasticity (coefficient) 
is directly measured with the coefficient of GDP, namely E = 1.1078 > 0, which 
indicates that the elasticity of government expenditure with respect to GDP is 1.1078. In 
other words, this value means an increase of 1% unit in GDP generates a 1.1078% unit 
increase in Government Expenditure (GE). The independent variable (GDP) explains 
90.16% of the variations in GE, leaving only 9.84% to explain by the stochastic 
disturbance term.  
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It should be noted that this finding for Saudi Arabia for the period in question is 
consistent with Wagner's Law of increasing state activities, which states that the income 
elasticity of demand for public goods is greater than unity. The results above show that 
the expenditure elasticity with respect to GDP (β) is greater than unity (1.1078). This 
study, hence, verifies Wagner‟s Law in its the traditional version as expressed by Peacock 
and Wiseman (1967), which indicates that economic growth has caused government 
expenditure to increase at a faster rate than that of national income.  
 
(ii) Testing Pryor’s (1968) Version of Wagner’s Law 
As defined and expressed in the previous section, the estimates for Pryor‟s 
version of Wagner‟s Law through OLS are presented in Table (7.3) for Saudi Arabia for 
the period of 1968-2010: 
Table 7.3: Regression Results for Pryor Version with Real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Pryor L(GEC) 
 
1.307 
 
L (GDP) 0.8078 
 
0.8555 
 
The results of the OLS can be written in a functional form as: 
L(GEC) = 1.307+ 0.8078 L(GDP)                                 (7.31) 
                  (1.95)   (15.39)       
From equation (7.31), the impact of GDP growth on government consumption 
expenditures, GEC, can be measured through the elasticity (E) or coefficient value 
directly, which is 0.8078 > 0. This implies that 1% unit increase in GDP generates a 
0.8078% unit increase in government expenditure for consumption (GEC). The 
independent variable or GDP explains 86% of the variations in government expenditures 
or as indicated by R²,leaving only 14% to be explained by the stochastic disturbance term 
e, implying that there exist other factors, which explain the variations in government 
expenditure for consumption. It can, therefore, be concluded that Pryor version of 
Wagner‟s Law is also validated in the case of Saudi Arabia as explained. 
 
(iii) Testing Goffman  (1968)  Version of Wagner Law with Real GDP 
As compared to the previous two models, Goffman (1968), as discussed above, 
considers GDP per capita rather than GDP level.  Thus, this section utilise real GDP per 
capita in searching for evidence for government growth in the case of Saudi Arabia from 
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1968 to 2010 by utilising Goffman‟s version of Wagner Law.  The result can be found in 
Table (7.4). 
Table 7.4: Regression Results for Goffman Version with Real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Goffman L(GE) 
 
-3.119 
 
L (GDP/P) 1.4156 
 
0.6734 
 
The results in Table (7.4) can be transformed into functional form as follows: 
 
L(GE) = -3.119 + 1.4156 L (GDP/P)                                (7.32) 
(-1.97)   (9.08) 
 The numbers between parentheses are (t- statistics) for each estimated measure 
and intercept. As the results in table 7.4 for the period of 1968 to 2010 indicate the 
impact of GDP per capita or the elasticity of government expenditure is identified as the 
coefficient of the independent variable, which is 1.4156 > 0. This implies that 1% unit 
increase in GDP per capita generates a 1.4156% unit increase in government expenditure 
or GE. Thus, as predicted by the theory, when people‟s income increases their 
expectations from the state do also increase, as with income increase they move to 
different class segments and the demand for other types of government services beyond 
the classical function increases, which results in increased government expenditures. 
As the estimates in Table (7.4) depict, the independent variable (GDP/P) 
explains 67.34% of the variations in government expenditures, leaving only 32.66% to be 
explained by the stochastic disturbance term, or e.  
It can, thus, be concluded that Goffman version of Wagner‟s Law is also 
validated in the case of Saudi Arabia by using OLS estimation method. 
 
(iv)  Testing Musgrave’s  (1967) Version of Wagner Law 
The fourth version of Wagner‟s Law that is tested in this thesis is by Musgrave, 
who considered the government growth in the form of government expenditure growth 
and GDP per capita.  The OLS estimates for Musgrave‟s version in the case of Saudi 
Arabia for the period of 1968-2010 is depicted in Table (7.5): 
Table 7.5: Regression Results for Musgrave Version Real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Musgrave L(GE/GDP) 
 
-1.7900 
 
L (GDP/P) 0.3184 
 
0.3200 
 
The results are also expressed in a functional form in the following manner:       
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L(GE/GDP) = -1.7900 + 0.3184 L(GDP/P)                            (7.33) 
                           (-1.98)   (0.36) 
The numbers between parentheses are (t- statistics) for each estimated measure 
and intercept. As can be seen from the results, the coefficient of per capita GDP or 
government expenditure growth rate or elasticity is 0.3184 > 0. This implies that a 1% 
unit in GDP generates a 0.3184 % unit increase in the ratio of government expenditure 
(GE/GDP).  
Compared to the previous models, the findings for Musgrave‟s version show 
lower explanatory power for the independent variable or the real per capita income, as 
can be seen  the GDP/P, as the explanatory variable explains only 32% of the variations 
in GE, leaving only 68% to explain by the stochastic disturbance term e.  
It can therefore be concluded that while Musgrave‟s version of Wagner‟s Law is 
validated by this study for Saudi Arabia, due to the low R² value caution should be taken. 
  
(v)  Testing Gupta’s (1967) Version of Wagner’s Law with Real GDP 
Gupta in his version (1967) of Wagner‟s Law relates the per capita GDP with per 
capita government expenditures.  The results for Gupta‟s version of Wagner‟s Law in the 
case of Saudi Arabia for the period of 1968-2010 are depicted in Table (7.6): 
 
Table 7.6: Regression Results for Gupta Version with Real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Gupta L(GE/P) 
 
-1.7900 
 
L (GDP/P) 1.0318 
 
0.7703 
 
The results in table 7.6 can be transformed into functional form as follows: 
L (GE/P) = -1.7900+ 1.0318 L(GDP/P)                               (7.34) 
          (-1.98)   (11.58) 
 
The numbers between parentheses are (t- statistics) for each estimated measure 
and intercept.  The estimated growth rate or elasticity of the per capita government 
expenditures, as measured by coefficient value of the independent variable, namely per 
capita GDP indicates E = 1.0318 > 0. This clearly shows that growth in per capita 
income has strong impact on government expenditures.  In other words, increase of 1% 
unit in GDP generates a 1.0318% unit increase in government expenditure per capita 
(GE/P). This finding is consistent with Wagner's Law of increasing state activities, which 
states that the income elasticity of demand for public goods is greater than unity.  
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The results in Table (7.6) also show that the independent variable (GDP/P) 
explains 77% of the variations in per capita government expenditure change, leaving only 
23% to be explained by the stochastic disturbance term, e.  
It can therefore be concluded that Gupta (1967) version of government 
expenditure growth of Wagner‟s Law is also verified in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
 
(vi) Testing Mann’s (1980) Version of Wagner’s Law with Real GDP 
The Mann‟s version of Wagner‟s Law is tested and the following estimates were found: 
L(GE/GDP) = -2.8366+ 0.10789L (GDP)                                (7.35) 
            (-3.85)   (1.86) 
 
The figures between the parentheses are (t- statistics) for each estimated measure 
and intercept. In equation 7.35, for the period of 1968 to 2010, to get the growth rate 
(elasticity), the estimated value of the coefficient is used as E = 0.10789 > 0, which 
implies that a 1% unit in GDP generates a 0.10789% unit increase in the ratio of 
Government Expenditure (GE/GDP). Thus, the independent variable or GDP explains 
38% of the variations in GE/GDP, leaving only 62% to explain by the stochastic 
disturbance term, e.  
The results in Table (7.7) show that the expenditure elasticity with respect to 
GDP (β) is greater than unity (0.10789); Wagner's Law is, thus, according to Nagarajan 
and Spreares (1990) in their comments on Mann's study indicated the straight income 
elasticity in order to validate the hypothesis would to be (E > 1) and the ratio income 
elasticity need only be (E > 1). Importantly, since the income elasticity is greater than 
zero, Wagner's Law is validated. 
Table 7.7:Regression Results for Mann Version with Real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Mann L(GE/GDP) 
 
-2.8366 
 
L (GDP) 0.10789 
 
0.3791 
 
 
7.4.2. Testing the Versions of Wagner’s Law with Non-Oil real GDP 
In order to avoid the deterministic nature of the oil revenues with an attempt to 
search for the impact of non-oil economic activity on government expenditures, non-oil 
real GDP is utilised.  All the six versions of the Wagner Law are formulated as in Table 
(7.8). 
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Table 7.8: Six Versions of Wagner’s Law with Real Non-Oil Sector of GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(Non-Oil real GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GEC) = α + β L(Non-Oil real GDP) Pryor 1968 
3 L(GE)  = α + β L(Non-Oil real GDP /P) Goffman 1968 
4 L(GE/Non-Oil real  GDP) = α + β L(Non-Oil real GDP/P) Musgrave 1969 
5 L(GE/P) = α + β L(Non-Oil real GDP /P) Gupta &Michas 1975 
6 L(GE/Non-Oil real GDP) = α + β L(Non-Oil real GDP) Mann 1980 
 
(i) Testing Peacock-Wiseman (1967) Version of Wagner’s Law with Non-
Oil Real-GDP 
The estimation for the Peacock and Wiseman version of the Wagner Law for the 
period of 1968-2010 with non-oil real GDP is present as follows: 
 
L(GE)=-2.2224 + 1.0936L(Non-oil real GDP )                  (7.36) 
                 (-13.46)    (85.43) 
As can be seen in equation (7.36), the growth rate or the elasticity value is given 
by the coefficient of the independent variable, namely the non-oil real GDP which is E = 
1.0936 > 0. This implies that an increase of 1% unit in Non-Oil real GDP generates a 
1.0936% unit increase Government Expenditure (GE).  
As can be seen in Table (7.9), the independent variable (Non-Oil real GDP) 
explains 99.45% of the variations in GE, leaving only 0.55% to explain by the stochastic 
disturbance term, e.  
This finding in this section is consistent with Wagner‟s Law of increasing state 
activities, which states that the income elasticity of demand for public goods is greater 
than unity. The results above show that the expenditure elasticity with respect to Non-
Oil real GDP (β) is greater than unity (1.0936). Wagner‟s Law is, thus, according to the 
traditional version, namely Peacock and Wiseman (1967) confirmed, in the sense that 
economic growth indeed has caused government expenditure to increase at a faster rate 
than that of national income in Saudi Arabia (Table 7.9). 
 
 
 
Table 7.9: Regression Results for Peacock and Wiseman Version with Non-Oil 
real GDP 
 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Peacock 
and Wiseman 
L(GE) 
 
-2.2224 
 
L (Non-Oil GDP) 1.0936 
 
0.9945 
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(ii) Testing Pryor (1968) Version of Wagner’s Law with Non-Oil Real-GDP 
The Pryor version of the Wagner‟s Law with non-oil real GDP for the period of 
1968-2010 is: 
L(GEC)=1.8422 +0.79688 L(Non-Oil GDP)                             (7.37) 
             (4.83)   (25.62) 
The figures in the parentheses are t- statistics for each of the estimated measure 
and intercept. As the findings indicate, the growth rate (elasticity), as the coefficient of 
the independent variable is E =0.79688 > 0. This value means an increase of 1% unit in 
Non-Oil real GDP generates a 0.79688% unit increase GEC, or Government 
Expenditure.  
As can be seen in Table (7.10), the independent variable, namely the Non-Oil real 
GDP explains 94% of the variations in GEC. 
 
Table 7.10: Regression Results for Pryor Version with Real Non-Oil GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Pryor L(GEC) 
 
1.8422 
 
L (Non-Oil GDP) 0.79688 
 
0.9426 
 
(iii)  Testing Goffman (1968) Version of Wagner’s Law with Non-Oil Real-
GDP 
 
The Goffman version of Wagner‟s Law with non-oil real GDP for the period of 
1968-2010 is estimated and the results are presented in equation (7.38) and table (7.11): 
L(GE)=-4.701615+1.6529L (Non-Oil-GDP/P)                            (7.38) 
                     (-7.68)   (26.08) 
As the coefficient of the independent variable indicates, the elasticity or the 
growth rate of the government expenditures is E = 1.6529> 0, which implies that a 1% 
unit increase in Non-Oil real GDP/P generates a 1.6529% unit increase Government 
Expenditure (GE). The robustness of the linear relationship can be seen from the value 
of the coefficient of determination, which is 94.45%, and hence non-oil real GDP 
explains about 95% of the variation in GE. 
 
 
Table 7.11: Regression Results for Goffman Version with Real Non-Oil GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Goffman L(GE) 
 
-4.70162 
 
L (Non-Oil GDP/P) 1.6529 
 
0.9445 
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(iv)  Testing Musgrave (1967) Version of Wagner’s Law with Non-Oil Real-
GDP 
 
The estimated Musgrave version of the Wagner‟s Law for the period of 1968-2010 
for Saudi Arabia is presented in equation (7.39) and table (7.12): 
L(GE/Non-Oil-GDP)=-2.448+0.1533L (Non-Oil-GDP/P)      (7.39) 
                                 (-13.88)   (8.40) 
As the t-statistics between the brackets indicates, the independent variable, non-
oil real GDP per-capita, is statistically significant. As to the growth rate of the ratio of 
government expenditure to non-oil real GDP, it is given by the coefficient of the 
independent variable which is E =0.1533> 0, which implies that a 1% unit increase in 
non-oil GDP generates a 0.1533% unit increase the ratio of Government Expenditure 
(GE/Non-Oil GDP). Thus, the impact of non-oil real GDP on government expenditure 
ratio is less than unit.  In addition, as can be seen from table 7.12, the independent 
variable (Non-Oil real GDP/P) explains 64% of the variations in GE indicating a 
moderate relationship. 
 
Table 7.12: Regression Results for Musgrave Version with Real Non-Oil GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Musgrave 
L(GE/Non-Oil 
GDP) 
 
-2.448 
 
L (Non-Oil 
GDP/P) 
0.1533 
 
0.6382 
(v)  Testing Gupta (1967) Version of Wagner’s Law with Non-Oil Real-
GDP 
The Gupta version of Wagner‟s Law for the period of 1968-2010 for Saudi 
Arabia is estimated as follows: 
L(GE/P)=-2.4473+1.1531 L(Non-Oil GDP/P)                        (7.40) 
 (-13.88)   (63.19) 
Equation (7.40) indicates that the non-oil real GDP per-capita, as the dependent 
variable, is statistically significant.  The growth rate of per-capita government 
expenditures as measured through the coefficient of the dependent variable is 
E=1.1531>0. Accordingly, a 1% unit increase in non-oil real GDP generates a 1.1531 % 
unit increase Government Expenditure per capita (GE/P). As regards to the explanatory 
power of the model, as shown in Table (7.13), the independent variable (Non-Oil real 
GDP/P) explains 77% of the variations in GE/P, leaving only 23% to explain by the 
stochastic disturbance term, e.  
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It should be noted that this finding is consistent with Wagner‟s Law of increasing 
state activities, which states the income elasticity of demand for public goods is greater 
than unity. 
Table 7.13: Regression Results for Gupta Version with Non-Oil real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Gupta L(GE/P) 
 
-2.4473 
 
L (Non-Oil GDP/P) 1.1531 
 
0.7703 
 
(vi)  Testing Mann’s (1980) Version of Wagner’s Law with Non-Oil real 
GDP 
 
Equation (7.41) and Table (7.14) presents the results of the estimated Mann‟s 
version of Wagner‟s Law for the period of 1968-2010 for Saudi Arabia: 
L(GE/Non-Oil real GDP)=-2.111+0.0936 L(Non-Oil real GDP)         (7.41) 
             (-13.46)   (7.31) 
As can be seen, the independent variable in the form of non-oil real GDP is 
statistically significant, as the t- statistics indicates. The growth rate of government 
expenditure ratio or the elasticity is E =0.0936 > 0. This value means an increase of 1% 
unit in non-oil real GDP generates a 0.0936% unit increase in the ratio of Government 
Expenditure (GE/Non-Oil real GDP). Thus, the results show that the expenditure 
elasticity with respect to Non-Oil real GDP, (β) is greater than unity. In addition, as can 
be seen in table 7.14, the independent variable (Non-Oil real GDP) explains 57% of the 
variations in GE/Non-Oil real GDP.  
 
 
 
 
Table 7.14:Regression Results for Mann Version with Non-Oil real GDP 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Mann L(GE/Non-Oil GDP) 
 
-2.111 
 
L (Non-Oil GDP) 0.0936 
 
0.5719 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5. Empirical Results of Unit Roots and Cointegration Test 
The preceding section presented the findings from the simple regression analysis 
as done in the original literature of each of the model presented.  However, since then 
the sophistication of econometric analysis has advanced and as mentioned in Chapter 6, 
new methods of econometric analysis applied to the government expenditure growth 
related studies.   
An important part of such sophistication is the time-series analysis based on the 
„unit root test‟ and „co-integration test‟.  As explained in Chapter 6, the unit root test in 
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this study aims to examine the properties of time series data for each of the following: 
government expenditure (LGE), gross domestic product (LGDP), gross domestic 
product per capita (LGDP/P), the level of population (P), the government expenditure 
ratio (LGE/GDP), and government expenditure per capita (LGE/P).  Despite the 
multiplicity of the unit root tests, this study utilises Dickey - Fuller test (Dickey and 
Fuller: 1979), which is expressed in equation (7.42):  
 
∆ Yt = a0 + a1t + a2Yt−1 +  ai
k
i=1 Yt−1 + et               (7.42) 
where: 
∆  = the first difference of the series. 
Yt = is the series under consideration (GDP, government expenditures, or government 
revenues), 
t = the time trend. 
k= the number of lag. 
et = is a stationary random error (white noise residual). 
 
The hypotheses tested are: 
H0: Unit root exists in Y: Y is non-stationary 
H1: Unit root does not exist in Y: Y is stationary 
 
As a rule, if we fail to reject the null hypothesis (H0), and then we have a unit 
root process. If the outcome indicates that the series is stationary after the first 
difference; the series integrated of order one [I(1)], then cointegration test is performed. 
If the null hypothesis is accepted, the variable contains a unit root. Thus, the 
Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure has used to test for unit roots. 
While all variables under examination are time-series variables, the time-series 
properties of the series have to be examined. In order to avoid the problem of spurious 
regression, each series was tested to check if they were stationary. To do so, the ADF 
unit root tests is utilised with its critical value at 5% level of significance to accept or 
reject the null hypothesis. 
Table (7.15.A) presents the calculated t-value from ADF tests on each variable in 
level and first differences in their logarithmic version. As can be seen from the depicted 
results, in the case of the levels of the series, the null-hypothesis of non-stationary cannot 
be rejected for any of the series. Thus, the levels of all series are non-stationary, but it is 
rejected with first differences, which suggests that these variables are I (1).  
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Table 7.15.A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller for Stationary Unit Root Tests  
Variables ADF(0) ADF(1) 
L(GDP) -3.44 -2.746 
L(GEC) -3.16 -2.067 
L(GE) -3.09 -2.757 
L(GE/GDP) -3.38 -1.994 
L(GE/P) -3.37 -2.970 
L(GDP/P) -3.44 -2.535 
L(GE/Non-oil GDP) -3.32 -2.571 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -3.41 -3.291 
L(Non-Oil GDP/P) -3.39 -3.894 
5% C-Value -3.493 -1.687 
 
 
According to the result, each variable used in all six versions of Wagner‟s Law in 
Saudi Arabia for the period of 1968-2010 indicates that the series are non-stationary 
in level but stationary after the first difference.  
Based on this test, it is concluded that all the variables tested (LGDP, LGE, 
LGEC, LGE/P, LGE/GDP, LGDP/P, LNON OIL GDP, LNON OIL GDP /P and 
LGE/NON OIL GDP) have contained a unit root.  However, after the first difference 
the unit root problem disappeared in the model. Thus, applying ADF unit root tests 
(table 7.15.A), we found that each of the variables used in all six versions of Wagner‟s 
Law is I(1). These results are consistent with the standard theory, which assumes that 
most macroeconomic variables are not static level, but become stationary after the first 
difference. 
In the next step, Cointegration test is applied to examine a long-run relationship 
between the variables by using OLS test, the results of which demonstrated in Table 
(7.15.B) for real GDP and Table (7.15.C) for non-oil real GDP. 
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Table 7.15.B: Cointegration Results for the Versions with Real GDP  
Versions 
Dependent 
Variables 
Coefficient t-Stat Probability 𝐑𝟐 DW 
Peacock 
& 
Wiseman 
LGE 1.034 11.12 0.026 0.932 0.912 
Pryor LGEC 1.157 10.86 0.041 0.863 0.920 
Goffman LGE 1.342 8.15 0.013 0.781 0.793 
Musgrave L(GE/GDP) 0.522 1.21 0.033 0.571 0.824 
Gupta L(GE/P) 1.081 12.01 0.004 0.825 0.844 
Mann (LGE/GDP) 0.287 1.92 0.029 0.497 0.885 
 
 
 
Table 7.15.C: CointegrationResults for Non-Oil-Real GDP 
Versions 
Dependent 
Variables 
Coefficient T-Stat Probability 𝐑𝟐 DW 
Peacock 
& 
Wiseman 
LGE 1.103 50.33 0.008 0.951 0.919 
Pryor LGEC 1.682 19.99 0.076 0.963 0.906 
Goffman LGE 1.571 22.21 0.044 0.932 0.834 
Musgrave 
L(GE/Non Oil-
GDP) 
0.231 6.11 0.082 0.690 0.900 
Gupta L(GE/P) 1.097 42.01 0.012 0.758 0.724 
Mann 
(LGE/Non Oil-
GDP) 
0.104 5.89 0.092 0.683 0.855 
 
Table (7.15.B) and (7.15.C) present the cointegration test results for time series 
for the period of 1968 to 2010 which examines the long run relationship between the 
Government Expenditure (GE) and economic growth measure i.e. Real GDP and Non 
Oil real-GDP in the Saudi economy. The results show that there is a long run 
relationship between the Government Expenditure (GE) and Economic Growth (GDP) 
for real GDP and non-oil real GDP in Saudi Arabia. 
The variable used in all six versions of Wagner‟s Law for the period 1968–2010 
indicates that the series are non-stationary in level, but stationary after the first 
difference, which suggests that they are I(1). The estimated results given in Tables 
(7.15.B) and (7.15.C) can be regarded as reliable in explaining the long-run relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth. As shown in Tables (7.15.B) 
and (7.15.C), the real income elasticity for all the versions is greater than zero (i.e. more 
than one in case of absolute versions and more than zero in case of relative versions for 
both real GDP and Non-Oil real GDP). This confirms the validity of Wagner‟s Law in 
Searching for Wagner’s Law in Saudi Arabia: An Empirical Analysis 
 
159 
 
relation to Saudi Arabia. In the long-run, one percent increase in GDP will lead to more 
than one percent growth in total government expenditure. 
 
It should be noted that co-integration can be conducted by using Johansen Co-
integrating test, the results of which presented in the following section. 
 
 
7.5.1. Cointegration Test-Johansen Method 
The concept of cointegration is that if the variables at the same level are of non-
stationary form any package of first class variables (Table 7.15.A), if possible, 
to produce a linear combination is characterised by a static zero-class integrated I (0). In 
this case, the integrated real-time variables of the same level cointegrated; therefore, 
the level variables are not used in the regression, nor is the reduction in this case is a false 
spurious. The null hypothesis is that the variables under consideration are not 
cointegrated. The rejection of the null hypothesis requires that the trace value of the 
cointegration test be greater than, at least one of the independent-critical values. 
Therefore, the non-rejection of null hypothesis of no co-integration leads us to conclude 
that there is no relationship in the long-term equilibrium between government spending 
and national income. Co-integrating test in this study was conducted using the method 
developed by Johansen (1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990).  
Many studies used the Engle-Granger two-step test, but there are those Sinha 
(1998), Al- Hakami (2002) and Al-Qudair (2005), who used Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
test, which had advantages such as it tests for all of the variables and, secondly, all 
variables are treated as internal variables, so that the choice of the variable is 
not absolute. This procedure is the most reliable test for cointegration. 
To determine whether stochastic trends in the series displayed relate to each 
other or not, cointegration test for all the six versions of Wagner‟s Law is conducted. In 
addition, after determining the order of integration by the Augmented Dickey Fuller test, 
it is tested whether the series is co-integrated or not, and if they are, then the 
cointegrating long-run equilibrium relationship has to be determined (Brooks, 2008).  
This section, hence,tests and reports the findings of the test after the 
cointegration test (Real GDP) and Co-integration test (Non-Oil real GDP) by using 
Johansen cointegration test. 
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7.5.1.1 Cointegration Test with (Real GDP) 
 
The existence of a cointegration vector is pointed out by a trace test since the t-
test value exceeds the critical value of 5% level of significance. This means the 
cointegration tests are statistically significant at 5% level of significance for determining 
the long-run relationship between all variables. Otherwise, there is a long run equilibrium 
relationship between Real GDP and Government Expenditures. All versions of 
Wagner‟s Law (Peacock and Wiseman, Pryor, Goffman, Musgrave, Gupta and Mann) are 
tested in this section and it is found that the trace test indicates a level of significance at 
5% significance level. At the trace statistic value in Table (7.16), we can reject the null 
hypothesis of cointegration in all versions of Wagner‟s Law, because the trace statistic 
values are greater than the critical value of 5%. 
 
 
Table 7.16: Johansen Cointegration Test Results with Real GDP 
Versions Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigen value TraceStatistic  Critical Value 5% Prob 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
None 0.29806 22.5771 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.18983 8.4206 3.76 0.0000 
Pryor 
None 0.28467 19.8538 15.41 0.0016 
At most 1 0.14899 6.4532 3.76 0.0004 
Goffman 
None 0.28090 21.6521 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.08098 8.1780 3.76 0.0041 
Musgrave 
None 0.28622 21.7785 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.18721 8.2911 3.76 0.0008 
Gupta 
None 0.28624 21.7771 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.19021 8.2061 3.76 0.0015 
 
Mann 
None 0.29806 22.5771 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.18983 8.4206 3.76 0.0000 
 
The results provide definitive evidence that the real total government 
expenditure (GE) and real GDP are subject to an equilibrium relationship in the long-
run. 
 
7.5.1.2 Cointegration Test with (Non-Oil Real-GDP) 
In the case of non-oil real-GDP, the Table (7.17) shows that there is a long run 
equilibrium relationship between non-oil real GDP and government expenditures as 
found in all versions (Peacock & Wiseman, Pryor, Goffman, Musgrave, Gupta and 
Mann) of Wagner's Law at 5% levels. Thus, the null hypothesis of cointegration is 
rejected in all versions of Wagner‟s Law with respect to non-oil real GDP, because the 
trace statistics values are greater than the critical value of 5%. Co-integrated relationships 
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exist for all six versions of Wagner‟s Law with respect to real non-oil GDP in the case of 
Saudi Arabia, an even stronger result indicating that the real total government 
expenditure and real non-oil GDP are subject to an equilibrium relationship in the long-
run. 
Table 7.17: Johansen Cointegration Test Results with Non-Oil Real-GDP 
Versions 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
Eigen 
value 
Trace 
Statistic 
Critical Value 
5% 
Prob 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
None 0.26793 21.0726 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.19341 8.5974 3.76 0.0000 
Pryor 
None 0.24684 18.2635 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.15895 6.9244 3.76 0.0002 
Goffman 
None 0.33040 17.2814 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.03049 1.2386 3.76 0.0007 
Musgrave 
None 0.29277 25.0288 15.41 0.0083 
At most 1 0.24370 11.1726 3.76 0.0201 
Gupta 
None 0.29277 25.0288 15.41 0.0083 
At most 1 0.24370 11.1726 3.76 0.0201 
 
Mann 
None 0.26793 21.0729 15.41 0.0026 
At most 1 0.19341 8.5974 3.76 0.0066 
 
The Johansen and Juselius (1990) test show a cointegration relationship in all 
versions. Therefore, Granger-Causality thus in the framework of the Error Correction 
Model will be applied. 
 
 
7.6. Causality Test for Wagner’s Law 
After making sure of the time series model that the variables are not stationary in 
the level and stationary in the difference, and then check it all-integrated joint, it is clear, 
that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship. 
According to Engle and Granger (1987), the variables that integratereflect a long-
term relationship. This should be a representation of Error Correction Model (ECM), 
which helps to test and evaluate the relationship in the short and long term between the 
variables of the form, as it avoids problems arising from the spurious correlation. 
To apply the ECM for Wagner‟s Law in Saudi Arabia, the Granger-Causality is applied as 
follows: 
(i) In the context, of Error Correction Model (ECM) of the variables that is cointegrated. 
(ii) Standard Granger-Causal for the variables that do not cointegrated. 
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The following sections present the models and the empirical results for these two 
models. 
7.6.1. Granger Causality Test 
The Granger Causality Test is conducted through Engle and Granger approach, 
which has two phases: 
(i) Assessing the relationship model equilibrium in the long term or the 
joint integration. 
(ii) An Error Correction Model helps  to reflect on the relationship in the short term 
or to reflect on the short-term volatility and also helps to locate the relationship 
in the long-term. 
 
7.6.1.1. Granger Causality Test with Real GDP 
After discussing the rationale for Granger Causality Test, the following section 
presents the findings for all the versions of Wagner‟s Law with real-GDP. 
 
(i) Granger Causality Test for Peacock and Wiseman Version of Wagner’s Law, 
1968-2010 
 
 
Table (7.18) presents the causality test result for Peacock and Wiseman version of 
the Wagner‟s Law for the period of 1968-2010 in the case of Saudi Arabia. The reported 
F-statistics is a standard test for the joint hypothesis that LGDP does not Granger Cause 
LGE.  
As the results indicate, in Saudi Arabia, the probability for accepting the null-
hypothesis is only 0.6% while the hypothesis is rejected by 99.4%, which means that 
there is a high statistical significance for LGDP causing LGE in Peacock and Wiseman‟s 
Version of Wagner‟s Law in the case of Saudi Arabia, which is consistent with Wagner's 
Law.  
The causality from LGE to LGDP is also searched for, where the probability for 
accepting the null-hypothesis is only 15.9%, while 84.1% reject the hypothesis, which 
means LGE causes LGDP about 84.1% of the time. 
 
Table 7.18: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman’s Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGE 16.05 0.0060 
LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP 3.6836 0.1590 
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(ii)  Granger Causality Test for Pryor’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968–2010 
 
Table (7.19) presents the Granger Causality test results for Pryor‟s version of 
Wagner‟s Law in the case of Saudi Arabia for the period 1968–2010. As can be seen, the 
probability of accepting the null-hypothesis that LGEC does not Granger Cause. LGDP 
is only 0.3%, whilst the hypothesis is rejected with 99.7%, implying that LGEC causes 
LGDP around 99.7% of the time in Pryor's version in the case of Saudi Arabia. This 
result is consistent with Wagner's Law.   
It should be noted that there is strong causality between LGDP and LGEC. The 
evidence for LGDP causing LGEC is determined using the standard test for joint 
hypothesis, reported F-statistics that LGDP does not Granger cause LGEC where the 
probability of accepting the null-hypothesis is only 12.4% and 87.6% of rejecting the 
hypothesis, which means LGDP causes LGEC around 87.6 %. 
 
 
Table 7.19: Granger Causality test for Pryor Version’s Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGEC does not Granger Cause LGDP 16.889 0.0030 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGEC 3.1723 0.1240 
 
(iii) Granger Causality Test for Goffman’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968–2010 
 
 
The results of the causality test for Goffman‟s version of Wagner‟s Law based on 
probability values from the Granger Causality Test can be seen in Table (7.20).  
The probability of accepting the null-hypothesis that LGDP/P does not Granger 
Cause LGE is 0.7%, implying that this hypothesis is rejected by 99.3%. Hence, LGDP/P 
causes LGE around 99.3% of the time in Coffman‟s Version, which is consistent with 
Wagner's Law.  
On the other direction of the causality, the probability of accepting the null-
hypothesis that LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP/P is 34.7% and 65.3% reject this 
hypothesis, which means that LGE causes LGDP/P around 65.3% of the time. This also 
indicates the existence of strong causality between LGE and LGDP/P in the long run as 
shown in Table (7.20). 
  
 
 
Table 7.20: Granger Causality test for Goffman’s Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE 9.9422 0.0070 
LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP/P 2.1172 0.3470 
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(iv) Granger Causality Test for Musgrave’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968–2010 
 
The results of the Granger Causality test for Musgrave‟s version of Wagner‟s Law 
is presented in Table (7.21), which shows that the null-hypothesis that LGDP/P does 
not Granger Causality LGE/GDP is accepted with the probability of 0.8%, whilst it is 
rejected by 99.2%. This implies that LGDP/P causes LGE/GDP around 99.2% of the 
time in Musgrave's version, which is consistent with the expectation of Wagner‟s Law.  
It should be noted that the results in Table (7.21) also indicate strong causality 
between LGE/GDP and LGDP/P in the long run. The probability of accepting the 
null-hypothesis that LGE/GDP does not Granger Cause LGDP/P is 11.6%, which is 
rejected by 88.4%. This means that LGE/GDP causes LGDP/P around 88.4% of the 
time. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.21: Granger Causality Test for Musgrave’s Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE/GDP 9.5692 0.0080 
LGE/GDP does not Granger Cause LGDP/P 4.3099 0.1160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(v)   Granger Causality Test for Gupta’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968–2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The results in Table (7.22) show the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis 
that LGDP/P does not Granger cause LGE/P is only 0.3%, which means that LGDP/P 
causes LGE/P around 99.7% of the time in Gupta‟s version. This, again, is consistent 
with the observation of Wagner's Law.  
An investigation of the opposite direction of the causality indicates the 
probability of accepting the null-hypothesis that LGE/P does not Granger cause 
LGDP/P is 11.6%. Hence, it can be inferred that LGE/P causes LGDP/P around 
88.4% of the time suggesting a strong causality. 
 
Table 7.22: Granger Causality Test for Gupta’s Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE/P 15.331 0.0030 
LGE/P does not Granger Cause LGDP/P 4.3099 0.1160 
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(vi)  Granger Causality Test for Mann’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968–2010 
 
The Granger Causality test results for Mann‟s version of Wagner‟s Law are 
presented in Table (7.23). The probability of accepting the null-hypothesis that LGDP 
does not Granger Cause LGE/GDP is 0.8%. This implies a strong causality between 
LGDP and LGE/GDP with the probability of 99.2%, which again verifies the original 
observation of Wagner‟s Law.  
As to the opposite side of the causality, the result obtained in Table (7.23) shows 
moderate level evidence of the existence of feedback causality between LGE/GDP and 
LGDP in the long run. The probability of accepting the null-hypothesis that LGE/GDP 
does not Granger Cause LGDP is 41.3%, which means LGE/GDP causes LGDP 
around 58.7 % of the time and causality between the variables. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.23: Granger Causality Test for Mann’s Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGE/P 9.74 0.0080 
LGE/P does not Granger Cause LGDP 1.766 0.4130 
 
 It can be concluded that most variants of Wagner‟s Law produced positive 
results for Granger Causality from economic growth and government expenditure 
variables. The results the most variants of Wagner‟s Law also evidenced for causality 
from government expenditures to economic growth. Therefore, in such cases, bi-
directional causality is found. 
 
7.6.1.2. Granger Causality Test with Real Non-Oil GDP 
After presenting the causality test results for Wagner‟s Law for real GDP, the 
following section presents the Granger Causality Test results for non-oil real GDP for 
the period of 1968-2010 in Saudi Arabia.. 
(i) Granger Causality Test for Peacock and Wiseman Version of Wagner’s Law, 
1968-2010 
 
Table (7.24) presents the causality test result for Peacock and Wiseman version of 
the Wagner‟s Law.  The reported F-statistics are standard test for the joint hypothesis 
that L Non-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause LGE. As can be seen, the probability for 
accepting the null-hypothesis is only 0.1% while the probability for rejecting the null-
hypothesis is 99.9%.  This implies that L Non-Oil GDP causes LGE by around 99.9% of 
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the time in Peacock and Wiseman‟s Version, which is consistent with the expectations of 
Wagner‟s Law.  
In the feedback of causality from LGE to L Non-Oil GDP shows that the 
probability for accepting the null-hypothesis is 52.6%, which means that LGE causes L 
Non-Oil GDP by the probability level of 47.4% indicating a moderate level of causality. 
 
 
Table 7.24: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version with Non- Oil Real 
GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
L Non-Oil GDP  does not Granger Cause LGE 16.148 0.0010 
LGE does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP  1.2849 0.526 
 
(ii) Granger Causality Test for Pryor’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968-2010 
 
The probability for accepting null-hypothesis that LGEC does not Granger cause 
LN Non-Oil real-GDP is 0.6% while it is rejected by 99.4%.  The implications of this are 
that LGEC causes L Non-Oil real-GDP with the probability of 99.4% in Pryor's version 
of the Wagner‟s Law. This result is consistent with Wagner‟s Law to some extent. 
However, there is strong feedback causality in the opposite direction between L Non-Oil 
GDP and LGEC. The evidence that L Non-Oil real GDP causes LGEC is determined 
by using the standard test for the joint hypothesis reported F-statistics, for which the 
probability of accepting the null-hypothesis is 13.9%. Thus, L Non-Oil GDP causes 
LGEC with the probability of 86.1 % as depicted in Table (7.25). 
 
 
Table 7.25: Granger Causality test for Pryor Version with Non- Oil Real-GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
L Non-Oil GDP GEC does not Granger Cause L GEC 15.578 0.0060 
L GEC does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDPGEC 3.2816 0.1390 
 
(iii) Granger Causality Test for Goffman’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968-2010 
 
 
Table (7.26) present the findings of the causality test based on probability values 
from Granger Causality Test for Goffman‟s version of the Wagner Law. The Null-
Hypothesis that L Non-Oil GDP/P does not Granger cause LGE is accepted with the 
probability of 0.1% indicating a strong case for the causality between L Non-Oil GDP/P 
and LGE with a probability of 99.9%.  The results indicate that Goffman‟s version of 
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Wagner‟s Law is consistent with the expectation of Wagner's Law in the case of Saudi 
Arabia for the period of 1968-2010.  
As regards to the opposition directional causality, the direction of causality from 
LGE to L Non-Oil GDP/P is rejected with the probability of 27.7% and hence implying 
that it is accepted with a probability of 72.3%. Thus, the result of causality test indicates 
the existence of strong feedback causality between LGE and L Non-Oil real GDP/P in 
the long run as shown in Table (7.26). 
 
Table 7.26: Granger Causality test for Goffman Version with Non- Oil Real-GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
L Non-Oil GDP /P  does not Granger Cause LGE 14.514 0.0010 
L GE does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP/P  2.5677 0.277 
 
 
(iv) Granger Causality Test for Musgrave’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968-2010 
 
The result of causality test based on probability values from Granger Causality 
test for Musgrave‟s version of Wagner‟s Law is presented in Table (7.27). The probability 
for accepting the null-hypothesis that L Non-Oil GDP/P does not Granger Causality 
LGE/Non-Oil GDP is 2.5%. This implies that L Non-Oil GDP/P causes LGE/Non-
Oil GDP with the probability of 97.5% in the case of Musgrave‟s version of Wagner‟s 
Law.  This result is in line with the prediction of Wagner‟s Law.  
The results depicted in Table (7.27) also presents medium level evidence of the 
existence of strong feedback causality between LGE/Non-Oil GDP and L Non-Oil 
GDP/P in the long run with the probability level of 48.6%. 
 
Table 7.27: Granger Causality test for Musgrave Version with Non- Oil Real-GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LNon-Oil GDP /P does not Granger Cause L GE / Non-Oil GDP 7.3546 0.025 
L GE/ Non-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause LNon-Oil GDP /P 1.3316 0.514 
 
 
 
(v) Granger Causality Test for Gupta’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968-2010 
 
As can be seen in Table (7.28), the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis 
that L Non-Oil GDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE/P is only 1.6%. Thus, the 
existence of the causality running from non-oil GDP to per capita government 
expenditures is accepted with the probability of 98.4%.  This also validates the prediction 
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of Wagner's Law. As to the oppositional causality, as the results indicate, the Granger 
Causality from LGE/P to L Non-Oil GDP/P is accepted with the probability of 68.2%. 
 
Table 7.28: Granger Causality test for Gupta Version with Real Non- Oil GD 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
L Non-Oil GDP/P  does not Granger Cause L GE/P 8.3048 0.0160 
L GE/P does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP/P  2.2884 0.318 
 
 
 
(vi)  Granger Causality Test for Mann’s Version of Wagner’s Law, 1968-2010 
 
As the results in Table (7.29) shows the Granger causality from L Non-Oil GDP 
to LGE/Non-Oil GDP is accepted with the probability level of 97.6%, indicating a very 
strong causality, which verifies the prediction of Wagner‟s Law.  
As to the opposite side of the causality, the results in Table (7.29) shows that the 
causality from LGE/Non-Oil GDP to L Non-Oil GDP does not suggest a strong 
relationship as the null-hypothesis accepted 52.6%, which means that LGE/Non-Oil 
GDP causes L Non- Oil GDP around 47.4 % of the time in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 7.29: Granger Causality test for Mann Version with Real Non- Oil GDP 
 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LNon-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause L GE/Non-Oil GDP 7.4318 0.024 
L GE /Non-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause LNon-Oil GDP 1.2849 0.526 
 
 
It can therefore be concluded that most variant of the Wagner‟s Law produced 
positive results for Granger Causality from economic growth and government 
expenditure variables.  The similar results in most variants of the Wagner Law are also 
established for the causality from government expenditures to economic growth.  In 
such cases, thus, bi-directional causality is found. 
The next section, extend the analysis into Error Correction Mechanism to find 
out the short-run adjustment.  
 
7.6.2. Error Correction Model (ECM) 
The concept of error correction is related to cointegration, because the 
cointegration relationship describes the long-run equilibrium. If a set of variables has 
cointegrated, then there exists an Error Correction Model (ECM) to describe the short-
run adjustment to the equilibrium (Engle and Granger, 1987). 
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The incidence of mutual co-integration between variables indicates that the 
Granger must be causal in one direction, at least, but the rules of engagement do 
not refer to the direction of causality between the variables. Thus, to verify the rules of 
engagement, tests of causation are tested in this section in the context of (ECM).  
In addition, the t-statistics on the coefficients of the lagged error correction term 
(ECTt-1) should indicate the significance of long-run causality between the two variables. 
The statistical significance of the t-statistics in tests should be at most 5%. 
 
7.6.2.1. Error Correction Model (ECM) with Real GDP 
The results of ECM with real GDP is depicted in Table (7.30), which show that 
there is long-run bi-directional causality that runs from GDP to GE in Peacock & 
Wiseman‟s version; from GDP to GEC in Pryor‟s version; from GDP/P to GE in 
Goffman‟s version;, from GDP/P to GE/GDP in Musgrave‟s version; from GDP/P to 
GE/P in Gupta‟s version; and from GDP to GE/GDP in Mann‟s version.  This result is 
the product of the process that as depicted in Table (7.30), GE, GEC, GE/GDP, and 
GE/P are all statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, six versions of Wagner‟s Law 
are found to hold in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
In the Error Correction Model (ECt-1) the significant results indicate the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium, and reveal the direction of causality, which runs 
from Economic Growth (GDP) to Government Expenditure (GE). 
 
 
Table 7.30: Causality with ECM test with Real GDP 
Versions Variables ECTt-1 t-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.321322 -2.92 
L(GDP) 0.501030 1.19 
Pryor 
L(GEC) - 0.571306 - 3.62 
L(GDP) 0.501030 1.19 
Goffman 
L(GE) -0.21070 -2.39 
L(GDP/P) 0.500729 2.09 
Musgrave 
L(GE/GDP) -0.89640 -2.28 
L(GDP/P) 0.588325 1.38 
Gupta 
L(GE/P) -0.308073 -2.77 
L(GDP/P) 0.588326 1.38 
 
Mann 
L(GE/GDP) -0.822166 -2.59 
L(GDP) 0.501033 1.19 
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7.6.2.2. Error Correction Model (ECM) with Non-Oil Real-GDP 
An attempt also made to find the ECM test results for non-oil real-GDP, the 
results of which are depicted in Table (7.31). The results show that there is long-run bi-
directional causality that runs from Non-Oil-GDP to GE in Peacock and Wiseman 
version; from Non-Oil-GDP to GEC in Pryor‟s version; from Non-Oil-GDP/P to GE 
in Goffman‟s version; from Non-Oil-GDP/P to GE/ Non-Oil-GDP in Musgrave‟s 
version; from Non-Oil-GDP/P to GE/P in Gupta‟s version, and from Non-Oil-GDP 
to GE/ Non-Oil-GDP in Mann‟s Version of Wagner‟s Law.  This result is a product of 
empirical analysis which indicates that the variables used in each of the model GE, GEC, 
GE/Non-Oil-GDP, and GE/P are statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, six 
versions of Wagner's Law are found to hold for non-oil-GDP in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Table 7.31: Causality with ECM test with Non-Oil Real GDP 
Versions Variables ECTt-1 T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.5824323 -3.52 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -0.1989443 -1.67 
Pryor 
L(GEC) -0.0344679 -0.42 
L(Non-Oil GDP) 0.0861542 2.95 
Goffman 
L(GE) 0.0534302 3.40 
L(Non-Oil GDP/P) 0.0381747 3.96 
Musgrave 
L(GE/ Non-Oil GDP) -0.0009502 -0.95 
L(Non-Oil GDP/P) -0.0028346 -3.69 
Gupta 
L(GE/P) -0.0037831 -3.07 
L(Non-Oil GDP/P) -0.0028333 -3.69 
 
Mann 
L(GE/ Non-Oil GDP) -0.3834886 -3.09 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -0.1989445 -1.67 
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7.7. CONTEXTUALISING THE RESULTS 
 
Various studies have aimed to explain and validate Wagner‟s Law in many 
countries either through time-series or cross section methods.  Wagner (1883:8) noted 
that “There is a proportion between public expenditure and national income which may 
not be permanently overstepped”. 
In our findings, the cointegration results suggest that Wagner‟s Law holds in 
Saudi Arabia, and that there is strong feedback causality for all versions. Moreover, the 
Error Correction Model (ECM) establishes that all six versions of Wagner‟s Law are 
found to be significant for both real GDP and non-oil-GDP in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
implying short-run adjustment process towards long-run equilibrium. 
Similar results were reached, for example, by Biswal and Lee (1999). From a 
different perspective, Asutay and Al Fazari (2007) investigated but provided no evidence 
for the impact of government spending on GDP in Oman by using time-series data from 
1971 to 2002. Their results supported causality between government expenditure and 
GNP per capita.  
Moreover, Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998) used Wagner‟s Law to examine 
the effect of government expenditure on economic development in South Korea by 
modelling the relationship through causality tests. Their research supported Wagner‟s 
Law, as it studies. Furthermore, they confirmed the finding of Al-Hakami (2002) in a 
trivariate model, when GDP was added. However, the results are in contrast with Al-
Hakami (2002) and Albatel (2002), who, in the case of Saudi Arabia, found that there is a 
strong feedback causality that runs from government revenues to government 
expenditure. 
 
 
7.8. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed empirically the relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth. Wagner‟s Law was examined – six versions that were 
developed over the years – in the case of Saudi Arabia by using time-series annual data 
for the period 1968–2010.  
In the empirical analysis, three distinct time-series techniques were applied to test 
the six versions of Wagner‟s Law by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) for real GDP 
and non-oil GDP. The unit root tests were utilised using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
for determining the existence of stationary for real GDP and non-oil GDP. The 
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Cointegrating test for real GDP and non-oil GDP was also utilised. Finally, it was 
considered the Granger causality tests and the Error Correction Model (ECM). 
 The results of the regression analysis – for six versions of Wagner‟s Law using 
OLS for real GDP and non-oil real GDP – show that the elasticity coefficient of 
government expenditure, with respect to GDP, was greater than unity in Peacock and 
Wiseman (1968), Pryor (1969), Goffman (1968),and Gupta (1967). Thus, the findings in 
the case of these four versions are in accordance with Wagner‟s expectation. The 
empirical results also indicate that the elasticity coefficient of 
government expenditure, with respect to GDP, is inelastic in the case of Musgrave‟s 
(1969) and Mann‟s (1980) versions of Wagner‟s Law, although their independent variable 
is still statistically significant. Nagarajan and Spreares (1990), furthermore, stated that in 
order to verify Wagner‟s Law, the income elasticity needs to be E>1, i.e. greater than 
unity, and the ratio income elasticity needs only be E>0, i.e. greater than zero.  
According to this rule, Mann‟s version of Wagner‟s Law does not hold in the case of 
Saudi Arabia. 
As regards non-oil real GDP – the independent variable in the versions of 
Wagner‟s Law – Peacock and Wiseman provide support for Wagner‟s Law, whilst 
Pryor‟s, Musgrave‟s and Mann‟s versions do not hold for Saudi Arabia. In addition, since 
elasticity is greater than unity in the results of Goffman‟s model, this version of Wagner‟s 
Law is consistent for Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Gupta provides evidence for Wagner‟s 
Law in the case of Saudi Arabia; the expected elasticity is higher than a unit, i.e. E>1. 
Moreover, since the income elasticity needs to be higher than a unity (E > 1), and 
the ratio income elasticity is expected to be higher than zero (E > 0), 
Mann's version does not provide evidence for Wagner‟s Law in Saudi Arabia. 
In extending the analysis, the unit root test in the form of Augmented Dickey-
Fuller is utilised to examine stationary of the time-series of all the variables. The results 
indicate that the levels of all series are non-stationary, and hence all the variables are 
cointegrated at first order [I (1)]. 
The results suggest that there is a co-integrating relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP per capita, and Wagner‟s Law holds in the case of 
Saudi Arabia through the cointegration analysis. Therefore, the equilibrium relationship 
indicates that the major determinant of government expenditure in Saudi Arabia, in the 
long run, is national income. 
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The econometric analysis further employs the Granger causality test in order to 
verify the causality and its direction between the variables. The results demonstrate 
statistically significant evidence in favour of per capita GDP for the long-run 
relationship. In addition, it is found that Granger-causing the share of government 
expenditure in GDP. This finding is consistent with the expectation of Wagner‟s Law. 
Thus, the result of the causality test indicates the existence of strong feedback causality 
for all versions of Wagner‟s Law in the long run. 
Lastly, by using the Error Correction Model (ECM), it is established that all the 
six versions of Wagner‟s Law are significant for both real GDP and non-oil-GDP in the 
case of Saudi Arabia. This suggests a short-run adjustment process towards long-run 
equilibrium. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
  
LOCATING KEYNESIAN RELATIONS IN 
ECONOMICGROWTH AND GOVERNMENT EXPENDITIURES 
NEXUS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Keynesian policies are considered a new attempt in the modern times allowing 
government back into economic equilibrium, as he recognised and attached important 
role for fiscal policy in affecting the aggregate demand.  As part of the dynamic fiscal 
policy, Keynes suggested that the government should ‘revive’ the economy by 
increasing public expenditure or tax cuts during economic recession, which, he 
suggested would increase the aggregate demand to keep the economy moving towards 
equilibrium.  Thus, in the Keynesian political economy, fiscal policy and particularly 
government expenditures work as an ‘invisible hand of capitalism’.  Such government 
intervention mostly is paid by budget deficits during recession times implying that the 
government spends more than their resources (Keynes, 1936). For Keynes this did not 
mean the rejection of capitalism or its working mechanism, but rather using fiscal 
policy meant the salvation of capitalism.  Due to such views raised by Keynes, Virginia 
School and in particular Buchanan (1977) accused Keynes for the ever growing 
government in the Western societies by labelling this as the ‘legacy of Keynes’. 
The data used in this empirical chapter aims to analyze the relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth in Saudi Arabia within the Keynesian 
relation with time series annual data for the period of 1968 to 2010. The rest of the 
chapter is organised as follows: section one, presents some empirical results of relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between government expenditure 
and economic growth in Keynesian relation. Section two, presents the three versions of 
Keynesian relations and their formulae. Section three, investigates the data and 
empirical results and analysis by using the methods, mentioned in Chapter 6, while 
section four presents the results of analysis by using the time series techniques. Lastly, 
section five, concludes the chapters and presents the finding. 
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8.2.THE KEYNESIAN RELATION 
The Keynesian argument is in favour of effective government expenditure and 
fiscal policy to stabilise the economy during recession times (Keynes, 1936). His 
arguments that the government not only could but should use public expenditure as a 
tool of economic policy to manage a national economy and to counteract unemployment 
found ready acceptance in a world in 1930s that had not yet recovered from the great 
depression.   
Keynesian theory emerged in the economy through a critical period of world 
history, namely between the World Wars, I and II, overshadowed by the Great 
Depression. The Keynesian theory came to oppose the classical theory in the economy, 
developed since Adam Smith. Keynes (1933) supported the idea that there is an effective 
role to be played by fiscal policy and government expenditures for economic growth.  
Keynes’ economic policy prescriptions helped the world economy to recover 
after the great depression and therefore had been used as part of economic policy 
making effectively until 1960s in the industrialised world.  However, due to the nature of 
capital shortage in the developing countries, one way or another developmentalism need 
necessitated an active or passive Keynesian policy to be pursued, as with the Saudi 
Arabian government’s direct involvement in the economy over the years. 
It should, however, be noted that Keynes’ theory was not designed to analyse the 
problems of developing countries, but focused only on the economic stagnation in the 
industrialised countries in 1930s. Keynesian idea of aggregate demand and its role in the 
economy in stabilising the economy was central to his argument, as he considered that 
total income is a function of the level of operation in any country, and hence the greater 
the scale of operation, the greater the total income. Therefore, he suggested expansionary 
economic policies through fiscal policy for the growth of the economy.  Due to the 
nature of economic policies suggested by Keynes, it can be applied for the developing 
countries which are in need of economic growth.  Within such a convergence in ideas, 
then Keynesian tools for developing economies can include the following:  
(i)  Effective demand: According to Keynes, unemployment occurs because of a 
lack of effective demand and to eliminate unemployment Keynes proposed an increase 
in both consumption and investment to boost the effective demand to overcome 
recession and result in economic growth.  Thus, the importance of aggregate demand 
and expansion in national income through fiscal policies for developing countries as well. 
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(ii)  Marginal efficiency of capital: Keynes considered that the marginal efficiency 
of capital is one of the key determinants of investment, as there is an inverse relationship 
between investment and the efficiency of capital.  Thus, he suggested that economic 
policy making has to strike a balance in resource allocation by taking into account the 
marginal efficiency of capital.  This again is an issue for developing countries. 
 (iii) Interest rate: Keynes re-analysed the effect of the interest rate on 
investment. In the classical model, the supply of funds (saving) determined the amount 
of fixed business investment. That is, since all savings was placed in banks, and all 
business investors are considered to be in need of borrowing funds go to the banks, the 
amount of savings determine the amount that was available to invest. To Keynes, the 
amount of investment was determined independently by long-term profit expectations 
and, to a lesser extent, the interest rate.  
In sum, a crucial aspect of Keynesian theory is its recognition of the importance 
of fiscal policy in overcoming economic stagnation, by increasing spending or tax cuts. 
He was convinced that otherwise the economy will be unable to correct itself.  This is in 
contrast to the classical theory, which is based on the principle of non-intervention. 
Keynes, thus, acknowledged the occurrence of balance at any level of economic 
operation, and therefore called for state intervention to treat causes of the crises that 
might hinder the national economy. 
 
8.3. SURVEYING EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON KEYNESIAN RELATION 
 
In the relatively large body of knowledge, Ansari et al. (1997) investigated the 
Granger causality test to test the income-government expenditure hypothesis for three 
African countries; and found that the hypothesis of public expenditure causing national 
income was not supported by the data for these African countries. 
Another study by Samudramet al. (2009) tested the Keynesian Relation and 
Wagner’s Law on the role of government expenditure on economic growth for Malaysia 
during the period of 1970–2004. They used the Auto-Regression Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) model to explain the evidence of a long run relationship between Government 
Expenditure and Gross National Product (GNP). Their results show that the long run 
relationship is bi-directional for GNP and Government Expenditure on administration 
and health, with the structural break in 1998.  Thus, they found supporting evidence by 
for Keynesian Relation and Wagner’s Law.  
  Tang (2008) investigated the relationship between government expenditure and 
Keynesian Relation: An Empirical Analysis 
 
177 
 
economic growth in the light of Wagner’s Law and the Keynesian Relation in Malaysia. 
The results indicate that the relationship between government expenditure and economic 
growth are not stable. The causality supports Wagner’s Law during 1985 to 2000, while 
the Keynesian Relation was present only before 1980. 
Biswalet al. (1999) tested Wagnerian versus Keynesian Relation by investigating 
the relationship between national income and total government expenditure for Canada 
from 1950-1995. They used the two econometric methods, Engle – Granger, two-step 
Co-integration, and Error Correction Models (ECM). Their findings support the 
Keynesian hypotheses, which produced evidence for short-run causation implying that 
national income has increased by increase in government expenditure in the short run. 
Likewise, Azam (1998) tested the Keynesian relation by reversing the Gupta’s definition 
to see the effect of government expenditure on GNP. He obtained the same result by 
using differenced variables. 
As the recent sample literature demonstrates, the results are mixed in the case of 
Keynesian relation.  This study aims to contribute to the literature by searching for 
evidence for Keynesian Relation in the case of Saudi Arabia.  
 
8.4. FORMULATING THE VERSIONS OF KEYNESIAN RELATIONS AND 
APPLYING ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
In modelling the Keynesian Relation, three versions of Wagner’s Law as depicted 
in Table 8.1 are reversed as displayed in Table 8.2.  These formulations are based on real 
GDP. 
Table 8.1: The Original Three Versions of Wagner’s Law 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GE)  = α + β L(GDP / P) Goffman 1968 
3 L(GE/P) = α + β L(GDP / P) Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
 
Table 8.2: Three Versions of Keynesian Relations with Real GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GDP) = α + β  L(GE)  Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(GDP/P) = α + β L(GE)  Goffman 1968 
3 L(GDP/P) = α + β L(GE/ P)  Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
 
The Keynesian Relation is also formulated with non-oil GDP as in Table 8.3): 
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Table 8.3: Three Versions of Keynesian Relations with Real Non-Oil Sectorof GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(Non-Oil GDP) = α + β  L(GE)  Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
2 L(Non-Oil GDP / P) = α + β  L(GE)  Goffman 1968 
3 L(Non-Oil GDP / P) = α + β  L(GE / P)  Gupta &Michas 1967 & 1975 
 
As regards to the econometric methodology, OLS is employed to determine the 
parameters in the equations. This is followed by time-series analysis in the form of Unit 
Root and cointegration test. 
The Unit Root test aims to examine the properties of time series annual data for 
each of the following: government expenditures (LGE), gross domestic product 
(LGDP), gross domestic product per capita (LGDP/P), Population, the ratio LGE to 
GDP, and government expenditure per capita (LGE/P) for the period 1968-2010. To 
test the stationary time series model for the study variables, it requires the unit root test 
(Enders, 1995). Despite the multiplicity of the unit root tests, Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and 
Fuller: 1979) is employed which is expressed as in equation(8.1):  
∆ Yt = a0 + a1t + a2Yt−1 +  ai
k
i=1 Yt−1 + et(8.1) 
where: 
∆  = the first difference of the series. 
Yt =  Is the series under consideration (GDP, government expenditures, or government 
revenues); 
t = the time trend; 
k= the number of lag. 
et= is a stationary random error (whitenoise residual). 
 
The hypotheses for unit root tests are: 
H0: Unit root exists in Y ∶ Y is non− stationary  
H1: Unit root dose not exists in Y ∶ Y is stationary  
 
 
Cointegration test in this study follows the method developed by Johansen 
(1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990). Many studies used the Engle Granger two-step, 
but there are those who use Johansen and Juselius(1990), for so many advantages, such 
as first, that tests for all the variables and, secondly, all variables are treated as internal 
variables, so that the choice of the variable is not arbitrary. This procedure is the most 
reliable test for cointegration. To determine whether stochastic trends in series have 
related to each other or not, cointegration test is conducted for all the three versions. In 
addition, after determining the order of integration by Augmented Dickey Fuller test, test 
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is conducted to find whether the series are cointegrated or not, and if they are, the 
cointegrating long-run equilibrium relationship has to be identified (Brooks, 2008). 
According to Engle and Granger (1987), the variables that integrate common 
equilibrium reflect a long-term relationship, which can be modelled through Error 
Correction Model (ECM). ECM has the potential to test and assess the relationship in 
the short and long term between the variables of the form, as it avoids problems arising 
from the spurious correlation.  To apply the ECM for Keynesian Relation in Saudi 
Arabia, Granger-causality test is utilised. 
As regards to the Granger Causality Test, it is conducted through Engle and 
Granger approach, which has two phases: 
(i) Assessing the relationship model equilibrium in the long term or the 
joint integration; 
(ii) An Error Correction Model helps to to reflect on the relationship in the short 
term or to reflect on the short-term volatility and also helps to locate the 
relationship in the long-term. 
 As regards to the ECM, it is related to co-integration as the co-integration 
relationship describes the long run equilibrium. If a set of variables is co-integrated, then 
there exists an error correction model to describe the short run adjustment to 
equilibrium (Engle and Granger, 1987).   
The incidence of mutual co-integration between the variable indicates that the 
Granger must be causal in one direction, at least, but the rules of engagement does not 
refer to the direction of causality between the variables. To verify the rules of 
engagement tests of causation is conducted in the context of ECM. With regard to 
periods of lag length, the same lag length is used for each version of Keynesian Relations, 
as was used in co-integration. 
In addition, the t-statistics on the coefficients of the lagged error correction term 
(ECTt-1)indicates the significance of the long-run causality between the two variables. 
The statistical significance of the t-statistics should be at most 5% level. 
 
 
8.5. SEARCHING FOR KEYNESIAN RELATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA 
After identifying the econometric modelling and methodology, this section provides 
the findings through each stage by commencing with the OLS results. 
 
 
 
 
Keynesian Relation: An Empirical Analysis 
 
180 
 
8.5.1. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Results 
In presenting the results for OLS method, initially the results with real GDP is 
presented in the case of three identified model as defined above. 
 
8.5.1.1. Testing Keynesian Relation with Real GDP 
In this section, the results for three identified model with real GDP is presented. 
 
(i) Peacock-Wiseman (1967) version of Keynesian Relation  
The estimated model of Peacock and Wiseman version of the Keynesian Relation 
model is presented for the period of 1968-2010, as follows in equation (8.2): 
L(GDP)= 3.5575+ 0.81375 L(GE)                                    (8.2) 
         (7.40)    (19.14) 
The figures between parentheses are t- statistics for each estimated measure and 
intercept, which indicates statistically significant result. The estimated results in equation 
(8.2) provides the elasticity of government expenditures through its coefficient, as E 
=0.81375 > 0, which implies that an increase of 1% unit in GE or government 
expenditures generates a 0.81375% unit increase in the GDP. As can be seen in table 
8.4., the model through independent variable explains 90.16% of the variations in GDP, 
leaving only 9.84% to be explaining by the stochastic disturbance term e (table 8.4). 
 
Table 8.4: Regression Results for Peacock & Wiseman Version of Keynesian Relation 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Peacock 
&Wiseman 
L(GDP) 3.5575 L (GE) 0.81375 0.9016 
 
(ii) Goffman (1968) version of Keynesian Relation 
The estimated Goffman version of Keynesian Relation for the period of 1968-2010 
for Saudi Arabia is as follows: 
      L (GDP/P) = 4.792+ 0.479 L (GE)                                (8.3) 
                            (8.10)   (9.08) 
The t- statistics are provided in the brackets below the equation (8.3); and it 
indicates that GE is a statistically significant variable.  The growth rate or the elasticity of 
government expenditure is estimated as E =0.479 > 0. This indicates that 1% unit 
increase in GE generates a 0.479% unit increase the GDP per capita (GDP/P). As 
depicted in Table (8.5), the independent variable (GE) explains 67.34% of the variations 
in GDP/P, leaving only 32.66% to be explaining by the stochastic disturbance term e.  
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Table 8.5: Regression Results for Goffman Version of Keynesian Relation 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Goffman L(GDP/P) 4.792 L (GE) 0.479 0.6734 
 
(iii) Gupta (1967) version of Keynesian Relation 
The Gupta version of the Keynesian Relation is estimated for the period of 1968-
2010 for Saudi Arabia with real GDP and the result is depicted in equation (8.4) as 
follow: 
      L (GGDP/P) =3.663+0.747 L (GE/P)                               (8.4) 
  (6.53)   (11.58) 
   The t- statistics in brackets show statistically significant result for per capita GE 
for each estimated measure and intercept. The elasticity of GE per capita being E =0.747 
implies that an increase of 1% unit in government expenditure per capita GE/P 
generates a 0.747% unit increase in the GDP per capita (GDP/P). As the coefficient of 
determination in Table (8.6) indicates, the independent variable (GE/P) explains 77% of 
the variations in GDP/P, leaving only 23% to be explaining by the stochastic disturbance 
term e (Table 8.6).  
 
Table 8.6: Regression Results for Gupta Version of Keynesian Relation 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Gupta L(GDP/P) 3.663 L (GE/P) 0.747 0.7703 
 
8.5.1.2. Testing Keynesian Relation with Non-Oil Real GDP 
This section presents the results of the OLS analysis for the Keynesian Relation 
through the identified models with non-oil GDP. 
(i) Peacock-Wiseman (1967) Version of Keynesian Relation 
The Peacock and Wiseman version of Keynesian relation with non-oil real GDP is 
presented as follows in equation (8.5): 
L(Non-Oil-real GDP)=1.9866+ 0.90945L(GE)                               (8.5) 
         (16.52)    (85.43) 
The results, thus, indicates that GE is a statistically significant variable, with an 
elasticity of 0.90 which implies that a 1% unit increase in GE generates a 0.90945 % unit 
increase the non-oil real GDP. The independent variable (GE) explains 99.45% of the 
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variations in non-Oil real GDP, leaving only 0.55% to be explaining by the stochastic 
disturbance term e (Table 8.7). 
 
Table 8.7: Regression Results for Peacock and Wiseman Version of Keynesian 
Version 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Peacock 
&Wiseman 
L(GDP) 1.9866 L (GE) 0.90945 0.9945 
 
(ii) Goffman  (1968) Version of Keynesian Relation with non-oil GDP 
The Goffman version of Keynesian version is estimated for Saudi Arabia for the 
period of 1968-2010 with non-oil real GDP and the results are: 
L(Non-Oil realGDP/P)=3.22157+0.57139L(GE)                           (8.6) 
  (13.01)   (26.08) 
The t- statistics in parentheses indicates that GE is a significant variable with an 
elasticity of 0.57 which implies that 1% unit increase in GE results in 0.57139% unit 
increase the non-oil per capita GDP. The independent variable (GE) explains 99.45% of 
the variations in Non-Oil real GDP/P, leaving only 0.55% to be explaining by the 
stochastic disturbance term e (Table 8.8).  
 
Table 8.8: Regression Results for Goffman Version of Keynesian Relation 
Versions D-Variable 
Constan
t 
In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Goffman L(Non-Oil real GDP/P) 3.22157 L (GE) 0.57139 0.9445 
 
 
(iii) Gupta (1967) Version of Keynesian Relation with non-oil GDP 
The Gupta version of Keynesian version is also estimated for Saudi Arabia for the 
period in question, as follows in equation (8.7): 
L(Non-Oil real GDP/P)=2.19671+0.85847 L(GE/P)                        (8.7) 
  (18.57)   (63.19) 
The t- statistics indicates that percapita GE is a statistically significant variable 
with an estimated elasticity of E =0.85847 > 0. This value means an increase of 1% unit 
in GE generates a 0.85847 % unit increase the non-oil gross GDP per capita. The results 
in table 8.9 show that the GE per capita explains 99% of the variations in Non-Oil 
GDP/P, leaving only 1% to be explaining by the stochastic disturbance term e (Table 
8.9). 
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Table 8.9: Regression Results for Gupta Version of Keynesian Relation 
Versions D-Variable Constant In-Variable Coefficient R² 
Gupta L(GDP/P) 2.19671 L (GE/P) 0.85847 0.9901 
 
 
In overall, the OLS regression analysis produced some encouraging result 
indicating the positive impact government expenditures have on economic growth or 
GDP variables.  However, in terms of econometric analysis, the results may suffer from 
spurious regression; and therefore the time-series features have to be investigated to 
overcome this in establishing robust results.  
 
8.5.2. Unit Root Test 
The theoretical explanation of Unit Root and Cointegration is explained in a 
previous chapter and also above.  This section provides the estimated results for Saudi 
Arabian data for the period of 1968-2010. 
Since all variables under examination are time-series variables; the times series 
properties of the series has to be investigated to avoid the problem of spurious 
regression. For this, each series are tested for stationary through apply ADF unit root 
tests. 
Table (8.10) presents the unit root test estimation through ADF tests In the case 
of the levels of the series, the null-hypothesis of non-stationary cannot be rejected for 
any of the series. Thus, it is concluded that the levels of all series are non-stationary, but 
it is rejected with first differences, which suggests that these variables are integrated at 
the first order or I (1).  
 
 
Table 8.10: Augmented Dickey-Fuller for Stationary Unit Root Tests for Real GDP and 
Non-Oil GDP 
Variables ADF(0) ADF(1) 
L(GDP) -3.44 -2.746 
L(GE) -3.09 -2.757 
L(GE/P) -3.37 -2.970 
L(GDP/P) -3.44 -2.535 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -3.41 -3.291 
L(Non-Oil GDP/P) -3.39 -3.894 
5% C-Value -3.493 -1.687 
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In the Table (8.10), the results indicate that each of the series is non-stationary 
when the variables are defined in levels. Considering 5% level of significance, the results, 
thus, suggest that all the variables are integrated of order one in the unit root test. The 
results of each variable used in all the three versions of Keynesian Relations in the case 
of Saudi Arabia for the period of 1968-2010 indicate that the series are non-stationary in 
level but stationary after the first difference.  
Based on these test it can be concluded that all variables tested (LGDP, LGE, 
LGE/P, LGDP/P, LNON OIL GDP, LNON OIL GDP /P) are contained a unit root 
at the significance level of 5% for ADF Unit Root in the first difference. These results 
are consistent with the standard theory, which assumes that most macroeconomic 
variables are not static level, but become stationary in the first difference (Enders, 1995). 
 
8.5.3. Cointegration Analysis 
After making sure that the series are stationary at the first difference, in the next 
step, Cointegration test applied to examine the long-run relationship between the 
variables by using OLS test, . Since applying ADF unit root tests it is established that 
each of the variables used in all three versions of Keynesian Relation are I(1) (see table 
8.10), the long-run relationship between the variables can now be tested.  
 
Table 8.11: Contegration OLS Regression Results for Real GDP 
Versions 
Dependent 
Variables 
Coefficient  T-Stat Probability 𝐑𝟐 DW 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
LGDP 0.874 17.89 0.026 0.912 0.890 
Goffman L(GDP/P) 0.539 10.07 0.018 0.702 0.733 
Gupta L(GE/P) 0.793 12.01 0.005 0.795 0.804 
 
 
Table 8.12: CoinetgrationOLS Regression Results for Real Non Oil-GDP 
Versions 
Dependent 
Variables 
Coefficient  T-Stat Probability 𝐑𝟐 DW 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
LGDP 0.923 72.14 0.018 0.961 0.919 
Goffman L(GDP/P) 0.621 25.37 0.051 0.940 0.903 
Gupta L(GE/P) 0.897 52.71 0.024 0.975 0.881 
 
Table (8.11) and (8.12) presents the estimation for OLS method for the period of 
1968 to 2010 in examining the long run relationship between the Government 
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Expenditure (GE) and economic growth as measured by Real GDP and Non-Oil Sector 
in the Saudi economy. The results show that there is a long run relationship between the 
Government Expenditure (GE) and economic growth in terms of non-oil GDP. 
The next step is to test co-integration by using Johansen Co-integrating test of 
the models with real GDP and real-non-oil GDP. 
The existence of a cointegration vector is pointed out by a trace test since t-test 
value exceeds the critical value of 5% level of significance. This means the cointegration 
tests are statistically significant at a level of 5% for determining the long-run relationship 
between LGDP and LGE. Otherwise, there is a long run equilibrium relationship 
between Real GDP and Government Expenditure.  
In the case of all the related versions of Wagner’s Law (Peacock and Wiseman, 
Goffman, and Gupta) with real GDP, it was found that the trace tests indicate a 5% level 
of significance. At the Trace Statistic value in Table (8.13), we the null hypothesis of co-
integration in all versions of Keynesian relations with respect to real GDP can be 
rejected, because the Trace Statistic values are greater than the critical value of 5%. Thus, 
co-integrated relationships exist for three versions of Wagner’s Law (Peacock and 
Wiseman, Goffman, and Gupta) with respect to real GDP in the case of Saudi Arabia, an 
even stronger result indicating that the real total government expenditure and real GDP 
are subject to an equilibrium relationship in the long-run. In the other words, the 
versions of Peacock and Wiseman, Goffman and Gupta show that co-integration 
relationships is found and the test supported the existence of one cointegration in the 
case of real GDP, which implies that there is a long-run relationship between 
government expenditures and real GDP. 
 
Table 8.13: Johansen Cointegration Test Results with Real GDP 
Versions 
Hypothesize
d No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigen 
value 
Trace 
Statistic 
(Long 
Run) 
Critical 
Value 5% 
Prob 
Peacock 
& 
Wiseman 
None 0.29806 22.5771 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.17821 8.4206 3.76 0.0000 
Goffman 
None 0.29090 21.8521 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.08098 8.3778 3.76 0.0000 
Gupta 
None 0.28622 21.7785 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.18721 8.2911 3.76 0.0000 
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In the case of real non-oil GDP, the Table (8.14) shows that there is a long run 
equilibrium relationship between real non oil GDP and government expenditure, or GE, 
as found in Peacock and Wiseman, Goffman, and Gupta versions of Keynesian relations 
at 5% levels. In other words, the null hypothesis of cointegration in all versions of 
Keynesian relations with respect to real non-oil  GDP, as  the Trace Statistic values are 
greater than the critical value of 5%. 
 
Table 8.14: Johansen Cointegration Test Results with Real Non-Oil GDP 
Versions 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen 
value 
Trace 
Statistic 
Critical 
Value 5% 
Prob 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
None 0.26793 21.0726 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.19341 8.5974 3.76 0.0000 
Goffman 
None 0.33040 17.2386 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.03049 3.8238 3.76 0.0000 
Gupta 
None 0.29277 25.0288 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.24370 11.1726 3.76 0.0000 
 
 
8.5.4. Causality Test 
After making sure of the time series’ model to study the variables that they are 
not stationary in the level and stationary in the difference, and then check it all integrated 
joint, clearly that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship.  The existing relationship, 
as discussed previously, is modelled through ECM and ECM in this study is applied for 
Keynesian Relation in Saudi Arabia through Granger-causality test. The following is 
hence the findings from Granger Causality Test. 
 
8.5.4.1. Granger Causality Test for Keynesian Relation with Real GDP 
In this section, Granger Causality results in the case of three form of Keynesian Relation 
are presented with real GDP. 
 
(i) Granger Causality in Peacock and Wiseman Version of Keynesian Relation 
 
The probability values from Granger Causality Test are depicted in Table (8.15). 
The reported F-statistics are a standard test for the joint hypothesis that economic 
growth or LGDP does not Granger Cause government expenditures or LGE. The 
probability for accepting the null-hypothesis is only 0.30% while the probability of 
rejecting it is 99.7%.  This implies that economic growth or LGDP causes government 
expenditures or LGE around 99.7% of the time in Peacock and Wiseman’s Version of 
Keynesian relation. 
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The causality from LGE to LGDP is also searched for, where the probability for 
accepting the null-hypothesis is only 15.9%, while 84.1% reject the hypothesis, which 
means LGE causes LGDP about 84.1% of the time. 
 
 
 
Table 8.15: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGE 3.6836 0.003 
LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP 16.6836 0.159 
 
 
(ii) Granger Causality in  Goffman Version of Keynesian Relation 
 
 
 Table (8.16) presents the result of the causality test based on probability values from 
the Granger Causality Test. The probability for accepting the null-hypothesis, LGE does 
not Granger Cause LGDP/P is 34.7% and rejecting it is 65.3%. This means that 
LGDP/P causes LGE around 65.3% of the time in the Goffman’s version of Keynesian 
relation. In the other direction, the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis of LGE 
does not Granger Cause LGDP/P is only 0.70% and the probability of rejecting is 
99.7%, which means LGE cause LGDP/P around 99.993%. The result of causality test, 
thus, indicates the existence of strong feedback causality between LGE and LGDP/P in 
the long run as shown in Table (8.16). 
 
 
Table 8.16: Granger Causality test for Goffman Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP/PC does not Granger Cause LGE 2.1172 0.347 
LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP/PC 9.9422 0.007 
 
 
(iii) Granger Causality in Gupta Version of Keynesian Relation  
 
The result of causality test based on probability values from Granger Causality 
Test for the Gupta version of Keynesian relation is presented in Table (8.17). The null-
hypothesis that LGDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE/P is accepted with a probability 
of 11.6% and is rejected by 88.4%, which indicates that LGDP/P causes LGE/P around 
88.4% of the time in Gupta’s version of Keynesian relation. In the opposite direction, 
the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis of LGE/P does not Granger Cause 
LGDP/P is 0.10% and is rejected by 99.9%, which implies that LGE/P causes LGDP/P 
around 99.9% of the time. 
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Table 8.17: Granger Causality test for Gupta Version with Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE/P 4.3099 0.116 
LGE/P does not Granger Cause LGDP/P 15.331 0.001 
 
8.5.4.2. Granger Causality Test for Keynesian Relation with Real Non-Oil GDP 
 
(i) Granger Causality in Peacock and Wiseman Version of Keynesian Relation 
 
From the findings for Granger Causality Test for the Peacock and Wiseman 
version of Keynesian relation with real non-oil GDP is presented in Table (8.18). The 
reported F-statistics are a standard test for the joint hypothesis that L non-oil GDP does 
not Granger Cause LGE. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the probability for accepting the 
null-hypothesis is only 52.6% while rejecting is 47.4%.  It means that L non-oil GDP 
causes LGE around 47.4% of the time in Peacock and Wiseman’s version of Keynesian 
relation. In Table (8.18), the feedback of causality from LGE to L non-oil GDP is also 
presented where the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis is only 0.20% and 
rejecting it is 99.8% reject the hypothesis.  This means that LGE causes L non-oil GDP 
about 99.8% of the time. 
 
Table 8.18: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version-Non Oil GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
L Non-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause LGE 1.2849 0.526 
LGE does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP 16.198 0.002 
 
 
(ii) Granger Causality in Goffman Version of Keynesian Relation 
 
By looking at the result of the causality test based on probability values from the 
Granger Causality Test presented in Table (8.19), the probability for accepting the null-
hypothesis that L Non- Oil GDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE is 27.7% with the 
72.3% probability of rejecting it. This result indicates that L Non- Oil GDP/P causes 
LGE around 72.3% of the time in Goffman’s version. In the opposite direction, the 
probability for accepting the null-hypothesis that LGE does not Granger Cause L Non- 
Oil GDP/P is only 0.10% and it is rejected by 99.9% and hence it can be concluded that 
LGE causes L Non- Oil GDP/P around 99.9%. The result of causality test indicates the 
existence of strong feedback causality between LGE and L Non- Oil GDP/P in the long 
run as shown in Table (8.19).   
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Table 8.19: Granger Causality test for Goffman Version-Non Oil GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
L Non- Oil GDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE 2.5677 0.277 
LGE does not Granger Cause L Non- Oil GDP/P 14.514 0.001 
 
 
(iii) Granger Causality in Gupta Version of Keynesian Relation 
 
The result of causality test based on probability values from the Granger 
Causality Test presented in Table (8.20). As can be seen, the null-hypothesis that L Non- 
Oil GDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE/P is only 51.4% implying that it is rejected by 
48.6%.  This means that L Non- Oil GDP/P causes LGE/P by around 48.6% of the 
time in Gupta’s Version, which consistent with Keynesian relation suggestion. In the 
oppositional direction, the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis of LGE/P does 
not Granger Cause L Non- Oil GDP/P is 0.60% indicating that LGE/P causes L Non- 
Oil GDP/P around 99.4% of the time. 
 
Table 8.20: Granger Causality test for Gupta Version-Non Oil GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
L Non- Oil GDP/P does not Granger Cause LGE/P 1.3316 0.514 
LGE/P does not Granger Cause L Non- Oil GDP/P 16.711 0.006 
 
 
 
8.5.5. Error Correction Model (ECM) in Keynesian Relation 
In this section, ECM is extended and analysis is presented in the following 
sections with real GDP and non-oil real GDP. 
 
(i) ECM with Real GDP 
The results in Table (8.21) indicate that there is long-run unidirectional causality 
that runs from GDP to GE in Peacock and Wiseman version; from GDP/P to GE in 
Goffman version; from GDP/P to GE/P in Gupta version of Keynesian relation.  This 
is due to the fact that the variables GE and GE/P are statistically significant at the 5% 
level, and the variables GDP and GDP/P are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. 
Thus, three versions of Keynesian Relations are found to hold for GDP in the 
case of Saudi Arabia. 
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Table 8.21: Causality with ECM test with Real GDP 
Versions Variables ECTt-1 T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.002848 -2.61 
L(GDP) -1.10603 -2.56 
Goffman 
L(GE) -0.03125 -3.06 
L(GDP/P) -0.0978 -2.44 
Gupta 
L(GE/P) -0.0282 -2.80 
L(GDP/P) -0.1069 -2.54 
 
(ii) ECM with Real Non-Oil GDP 
 
In the Table (8.22), the results indicate that there is long-run unidirectional 
causality exists which runs from non-Oil-GDP to GE as in Peacock and Wiseman 
version; from non-oil-GDP/P to GE as in Goffman version; from non-oil-GDP/P to 
GE/P as in Gupta version. This conclusion is due to the fact that the variables GE and 
GE/P are statistically significant at the 5% level, and the variables non-oil-GDP and 
non-oil-GDP/P are statistically insignificant at 5% level. Thus, it can be concluded that 
three versions of Keynesian Relations are found to hold for non-oil-GDP in the case of 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 8.22: Causality with ECM test with Real Non-Oil GDP 
Versions Variables 
ECTt-
1 
T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) 
0.3915
4 
3.08 
L(Non-Oil GDP) 
0.0199
5 
2.32 
Goffman 
L(GE) -0.1754 -3.19 
L(Non-Oil GDP/P) 
0.1247
6 
3.68 
Gupta 
L(GE/P) -0.1448 -2.69 
L(Non-Oil GDP/P) -0.1185 -3.56 
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8.6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the relationship between government expenditure and economic 
growth is explored through three versions of Keynesian Relations for Saudi Arabia, using 
time series annual data for the period 1968 to 2010.  
In the analysis, three distinct time series techniques are applied: Initially, the 
regressions analysis utilised for three versions of Keynesian Relations using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) with real GDP and non-oil GDP. In the next step, the Unit Root 
tests through Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationary is applied with real GDP and 
non-oil GDP. In the following step, cointegrating test for real GDP and non-oil GDP. 
Finally, causality tests by using Granger Causality tests are conducted together with 
ECM. 
In overall, the findings in this study suggest that there is a cointegrating 
relationship between the share of government expenditure in national output and per 
capita income. The equilibrium relationship indicates that the major determinant of 
government expenditure in Saudi Arabia, in the long run, is national income. In the case 
of Real GDP and Non-oil GDP, the versions of Peacock & Wiseman, Goffman and 
Gupta show that co-integration relationships is found and the test supported the 
existence of one cointegration.  
Finally, Granger’s causality tests were used to confirm the causality direction 
between the variables by using the ECM. Since there exists an ECM to describe the short 
run adjustment to equilibrium, three versions of the Keynesian Relations are found to 
hold for both (GDP) and (Non-Oil-GDP) in the case of Saudi Arabia.  
The findings in this study verify the importance of Keynesian relation for a late 
developing country such as Saudi Arabia, where the private capital for economic 
development until recently was limited.  The fiscal policy in the form of government 
expenditures has been the engine of economic growth and development in Saudi Arabia.  
The government revenues raised from oil wealth in Saudi Arabia have been the main 
source of economic and social development of the country, which generated 
employment and expansion of the economy as predicated by Keynes.   
The findings of this research, hence, verified the validity of the Keynesian 
Relation in the case of Saudi Arabia, and also indicate the importance of government 
expenditure for economic development in the cases where the private capital is in short 
supply as was in Saudi Arabia.  This does not imply that government’s role for economic 
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growth and development is applauded without any questioning, as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of using government expenditure is a matter of another debate. 
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CHAPTER 9 
  
LOCATING DISPLACEMENT EFFECT IN THE 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to test Peacock and Wiseman‟s (1961) „displacement effect 
hypothesis‟, which originally attempted to explain the proportional increase in time 
government expenditures overtime in the United Kingdom through time by making 
reference to unexpected social and political events. As explained in detail in Chapter 3, 
they found that government expenditure in the United Kingdom did not follow a 
smooth trend, but instead deviated from the observed trends by jumping up at separate 
times to respond to certain socio-political and economic events.  This provided a 
rationale for shift in the level of government expenditures through displacing the 
previous trend. 
The Peacock and Wiseman‟s (1961) „displacement effect hypothesis‟ relates to 
Wagner‟s law by developing a different approach as to why government expenditures 
increase. They contend that under normal conditions of peace and economic stability, 
changes in public expenditure are rather limited unless some major crisis occurs, which 
necessitates an increase in government intervention. In other words, Peacock and 
Wiseman (1961) argue that during social and political upheavals, government 
expenditures move beyond the secular trend it follows by responding to the upheavals 
with increased government expenditures as required. However, they argue that the 
expansion in the government expenditure will not just be temporary.  In other words, 
after such upheaval and crises over, the government expenditures will not go back to the 
pre-crisis level.  Peacock and Wiseman (1961) explain this by referring to the tolerable 
level of taxation imposed on the taxpayers, as taxpayers will be more tolerable for tax 
increases during social and political upheavals, which finances increased government 
expenditures during such periods.  However, they further argue that government 
expenditure will not go back to the previous level after such upheavals as government 
exploit the tolerable taxation level of the taxpayers and keep the government 
expenditures at the new level.  This, thus, implies that the new level of government 
expenditures displaces the previous level. Consequently, the size of the public sector will 
remain able at a higher level until the next shock.  
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This chapter, hence, aims to test the validity of the „displacement effect 
hypothesis‟ in the case of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has recently experienced two 
important political events: Gulf War I and II.  In addition, the impact of oil booms and 
busts should also be considered as sources of shift from the trend in the development of 
public expenditures, which may also result in displacement for certain period of time if 
not in the long-run.  All these can be observed in Figure 9.1, which shows the trends in 
the share of government expenditures in GDP. As can be seen the shift in 1970s, and 
then in 1980s and later the trend between 1990 and 1994 can be considered as deviation 
of the trend due to mainly political reasons, which can be explained by the „displacement 
effect‟, which is the subject matter of this chapter. 
 
Figure 9.1: Share of Government Expenditure in GDP 
 
 
Figure 9.2 also depicts the trends in the absolute level of government 
expenditures with the objective of locating the deviations from the trends.  With the 
increase in oil revenues after the first oil shock in early 1970s, an increasing trend 
continues over the years.  The jump in the trend in 1980 indicates even higher percentage 
increase in the government expenditures and therefore shifts the trends upward.  The 
trend reaches its peak in around 1983 and returns to the original trend in 1988. Thus, the 
shift between 1980 and 1988 could perhaps be explained by displacement effect.  Then 
another deviation from the trend can be seen in 1991 due to the increased defence 
expenditures mainly because of the First Gulf War.  This sudden jump goes back to the 
original trend in 1995, which again indicates observation based evidence for displacement 
hypothesis. Relatively smaller deviations from the trends are also observed in 1997 and 
2000, which is followed by continuous trend since then. 
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Figure 9.2: Trends in the Absolute Level of Government Expenditures in Saudi Arabia 
 
 
This study, therefore, considers that Peacock and Wiseman‟s „displacement 
hypothesis‟ can explain deviations from the trends, and in particular the recent wars and 
other relevant events can be considered potential reasons of deviation in the Saudi 
government expenditures. The data used in this study is the time series annual data for 
the 1968 to 1989 period being the pre- Gulf War II, and 1990 to 2010 period being the 
post-Gulf War II, which have been used to analyse the developments in government 
expenditure (GE) in relation to economic growth by making particular reference to 
„displacement hypothesis‟.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section one, presents some 
empirical results of relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth in relation to „displacement 
effect hypothesis.‟ Following section, presents the Peacock and Wiseman version, and 
the formal explanation of the „displacement effect hypotheses‟. Section three, investigates 
the data and empirical results and analysis by using displacement effect hypotheses‟. 
Section four, presents the results of analysis by using the time series techniques, such as 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Augmented Dickey-Fuller for stationary Unit Root 
Tests, Cointegration Test, Causality Granger Test, and Error Correction Model (ECM), 
that for real GDP and Non-Oil GDP. While section five, concludes the chapter and 
presents the finding. 
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9.2. THE DISPLACEMENT EFFECT HYPOTHESIS 
Peacock and Wiseman‟s (1961) observation on the developments of public 
expenditures lead to the „displacement effect hypotheses in case of the UK.  As explained 
in Chapter 3 and mentioned above, the hypothesis states that due to some social and 
political events and crises government expenditures, as expected, would increase in 
response to the increased public expenditures during such times.  However, according to 
the hypothesis, after such incidences, the government expenditures would stay in the 
new level rather than going back to the pre-crises level and trend, implying a shift and 
displacement. 
The hypothesis, however, indicates two important dimensions as discussed in the 
literature; the structural break from the trend but also the ratchet impact indicating the 
initial jump in the government expenditures due to such events.  These are explained in 
the following sections. 
 
9.2.1.  Structural Break  
As explained Chapter 3, wars and other social and political upheavals are capable 
of displacing this notion of tolerable tax rates and hence displacing the level of 
government expenditures. After such events, government expenditure may fall again, but 
not to their previous levels. Therefore, public expenditure grows in a discontinuous and 
stepwise fashion, the steps occurring at times of major social upheavals (Demirbas, 
1999).  In other words, Peacock and Wiseman investigated that both citizens and 
government hold divergent views about the desirable size of public expenditures and the 
possible level of government taxation. This divergence can be adjusted by social 
disturbances that destroy established conceptions and produce a displacement effect. 
People will accept, in a period of crisis, tax levels and methods of raising revenue that in 
quieter times would have been intolerable, and this acceptance remains when the 
disturbance itself has disappeared.  Thus, the hypothesis indicates that there is the 
structural change aspect in government expenditures in terms of the trend. 
 In explaining the „displacement effect hypothesis‟, Henrekson (1990: 246) states 
that “Peacock and Wiseman (1961), adopt a clearly inductive approach to explaining the 
growth of government expenditure. When Peacock and Wiseman observed that 
expenditures over time appeared to outline a series of plateaus separated by peaks, and 
that these peaks coincided with periods of war and preparation for war they were led to 
expound the „displacement effect‟ hypothesis”.  Such an explanation refers to the 
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structural break nature of the hypothesis.  Diamond (1977), therefore, presented the 
displacement effect as a theory of structural break. He used the Chow test (1960), 
comparing two periods separated by a social upheaval, and he found that, if this shows 
significant structural change and there has been displacement. 
 
9.2.2. A Ratchet Effect  
As mentioned discussed in Chapter 3, the „ratchet effect‟ refers to the restrained 
ability of a processes to be reversed once a specific thing has happened.  The term is 
used within the „displacement effect hypothesis‟ to describe the seemingly irreversible 
expansion of government in times of crisis in his book.  In other words, as explained due 
to the expansionary government expenditures during crises periods, governments then 
have difficulty in reducing government expenditures back to the original level after the 
initial temporary needs due to war, natural or economic crisis.  The government‟s 
exploitation of taxpayers‟ tolerance plays an important role in this process. Thus, the 
main argument of the ratchet effect is that if there is a crisis and government 
expenditures grows as a result, then the public expenditure might decline but not to the 
previous level as there would be resistance against such a move.  
According to Bird (1972), within the displacement effect, this has called „ratchet 
effect‟. This is due to the fact that, for Bird (1972) crises are likely to have short-term 
implications for government expenditure ratio rather than leading to a permanent 
upward displacement for.  Thus, Bird (1972) acknowledges the ratchet effect but rejects 
the displacement effect. In another study, Peacock and Wiseman (1979) argued that in 
the extreme, the ratchet effect interpretation of the displacement effect leads to the 
denial of its very existence. 
 
9.2.3. Empirical Testing of Displacement Effect: Previous Studies  
Gupta (1967) was the first to attempt to subject the displacement effect to 
empirical testing in the case of European countries. He found significant displacement in 
all cases except for Sweden after the Second World War, and also found significant 
displacement caused by the Great Depression in the case of the USA and Canada. 
Legrenzi (2004) argued that the displacement effect for Italy lay within a 
multivariate revenue-expenditure model of government growth. His result for long-run 
analysis shows the effect of GDP on the government‟s growth. Otherwise, he found that 
the short-run analysis shows some evidence for the displacement effect in terms of a 
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lower resistance against tax financing of government expenditure during the Second 
World War.  
Another study by Henry and Olekalns (2000) investigated the Peacock and 
Wiseman‟s „displacement effect‟ to explain the increases in the ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP in the UK. They used a data set extending back to 1836, and found 
instances where displacement may have occurred.  
 
9.3. MODELLING DISPLACEMENT EFFECT IN ECONOMETRIC 
METHODOLOGY 
In an attempt to search for the „displacement effect‟ in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
Peacock-Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law is utilised, which is presented in Table (9.1) 
in real GDP. 
 
Table 9.1: The Original Version of Peacock-Wiseman with Real GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(GDP) Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
 
In addition, the non-oil GDP version of the Peacock and Wiseman‟s Wagner 
Law exposition is depicted in Table (9.2). 
 
Table 9.2: The Version of Peacock-Wiseman with Real Non-Oil Sector of GDP 
No Function Version Year 
1 L(GE) = α + β  L(Non-Oil GDP)  Peacock-Wiseman 1967 
 
In analysing the identified model, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) test is 
employed to determine the parameters in the equations. In terms of diagnosis tests, the 
Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic indicates the absence of serial correlation among the 
residuals; R2 reflects the regression equation‟s ability to determine the dependent 
variable‟s performance in terms of explaining the observed variance in the dependent 
variable. In addition, the coefficients of the logarithm model are considered as elasticises. 
However, it should not be noted that the logarithm transformation is applicable only 
when all the observations in the data set are positive.  
As for the formal explanation of the model, according to Gujarati (1995), the 
normal regression model by taking logs of both sides of the equation: 
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The normal equation of Peacock and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law is:  
 
GE = f (GDP)                                 f‟ > 0 & f‟‟ ≥ 0                           (9.1) 
 
where: GE = Total Government Expenditure level in real terms. 
 GDP= Gross Domestic Product in real terms. 
 
GE = α + β GDP + e      (9.2) 
 
The equation by using logarithm model: 
 
L (GE) = α + β L (GDP) + e     (9.3) 
 
E (Peacock & Wiseman) = 
d(GE )
d(GDP )
/
GE
GDP
    (9.4) 
Where: E denotes elasticity. 
 
In order to capture the impact of political events such as Gulf War 1 and Gulf 
War 2, structural break test is employed. 
For this, the data is split into two groups, then the Chow test is utilised, which is 
like an F- test:  
 
knRSSRSS
kRSSRSSRSS
F c
2/)(
/)(
21
21


                                   (9.5) 
 
The hypotheses for the Chow Test are: 
H0:βi = 0; (There is no structural break )  
H1: β1 ≠ 0; (There is  a structural break )   
 
It should be noted that the impact of various social, political and economic 
upheavals and crises can also be captured through dummy variables.  Therefore, in this 
study, initially dummy variables are used to test the significance of „displacement effect‟ 
in the case of Saudi Arabia.  The following social, political and economic upheavals and 
events are considered by this study as important events causing shift in Saudi 
government expenditures due to their enormity:.  
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D1973: Dummy Variables for year 1973 for the first oil shock resulting in large 
revenues of the Saudi government; 
D1976: Dummy Variables for year 1976 for the second oil shock which resulted in 
even larger revenues for the government;  
D1983: Dummy Variables for year 1983 for the global recession due to the high oil 
prices which resulted in shrinking revenues for Saudi Arabia; 
D1991: Dummy Variables for year 1991 indicating the beginning of the Gulf War 
1; 
D1997: Dummy Variables for year 1997 for the financial crisis affecting certain 
parts of the world; 
D2001: Dummy Variables for year 2001 for the beginning of the Gulf War 2;  
D2006: Dummy Variables for year 2006 for the collapse of the Saudi stock market. 
The Peacock and Wiseman version of the Wagner Law is, then, presented in its modified 
version as follows: 
 
L GE = α + β1L GDP + β2D 1973 + β3D 1976 
+ β4D 1983 + β5D 1991 + β6D 1997 + β3D 2001 
+ β3D 2006 + et                                                                            (9.6) 
 
9.4. FINDINGS FOR DISPLACEMENT EFFECT IN THE CASE OF SAUDI 
ARABIA 
After identifying the model and its particularities, Peacock and Wiseman version of 
the Wagner Law is utilised to examine the validity of „displacement effect‟ in the case of 
Saudi Arabia from 1968-2010.  In doing so results first presented with real-GDP and 
later with non-oil GDP. 
 
9.4.1. Peacock-Wiseman Hypothesis with Real-GDP and Economic and Political 
Dummy Variables, 1968-2010 
In testing the „displacement effect‟, the model is expanded, as mentioned before, 
with the addition of political and economic dummy variables as defined above: 
 
L GE = α + β1L GDP + β2D 1973 + β3D 1976 
+ β4D 1983 + β5D 1991 + β6D 1997 + β3D 2001 
+ β3D 2006 + et                                                                      (9.7) 
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The results from OLS test are presented in Table 9.3. 
Table 9.3: Displacement Effect (Real GDP): 1968-2010 
1968 – 2010 
Variables Coefficient T-Stat Probability 
C 5.006246 5.509902 0.0000 
LNGDP 0.321715 3.603543 0.0010 
D1973 0.778761 3.773290 0.0006 
D1976 1.280299 6.966756 0.0000 
D1983 0.407364 3.659938 0.0009 
D1991 0.080591 0.673151 0.5055 
D1997 0.111410 0.797913 0.4306 
D2001 0.157782 1.072245 0.2914 
D2006 0.470858 3.261902 0.0026 
R-squared 0.979187 Durbin-Watson stat 1.759770 
Adjusted R-squared 0.974142 F-statistic 194.0718 
 
The results, as depicted in Table 9.3, show that all variables are significant except 
for the dummy variables for Gulf War 1 in 1991, for 1997 financial crisis, and for 2001 
Gulf War 2 is not. 
The results indicate that the coefficient value of the GDP as being the main 
independent variable gives the elasticity of government expenditure growth in relation to 
realGDP: E = 0.321715> 0, which means that a 1% unit increase in GDP generates a 
0.321715% unit increase GE. R2 being 97.92% indicates the strength of the model, 
leaving only 2.08% to be explaining by the stochastic disturbance term, e.  
These findings are consistent with Wagner's Law of increasing state activities, 
which states the income elasticity of demand for public goods is greater than unity. In 
addition, the findings in Table 9.3 indicate that the dummy variables, D1973, D1976, 
D1983 and D2006 are statistically significant for the period 1968-2010 for Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the events indicated by the significant dummy variables 
have caused a change in the government expenditures in Saudi Arabia.  
 
9.4.2. Testing Displacement Effect through Chow Test 
In order to test the existence of „displacement effect‟ in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
as mentioned, structural test can be used.  For this, the data are split into two: 1968-1989 
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and 1990-2010.  After establishing the results for the period in question with only the 
relevant dummy variables, the Chow test is applied (Chow, 1960). 
 
9.4.2.1. Testing for Displacement Effect for 1968 to 1989 with Real-GDP  
The estimation for Peacock and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law in relation to 
the „displacement effect‟ is conducted initially for only 1968-1989 period, and the results 
are depicted in table 9.4.  It should be noted that only the relevant variables are included 
in the model, namely D1973, D1976 and D1983, as the data covers only until 1989. The 
formal model is expressed as in equation 9.8. 
 
L GE = α + β1L GDP + β2D 1973 + β3D 1976 
+ β4D 1983 + et                                                                      (9.8) 
 
Where: 
D1973: Dummy Variables for year (1973)  
D1976: Dummy Variables for year (1976)  
D1983: Dummy Variables for year (1983)  
 
Table 9.4: Displacement Effect with Real GDP, 1968-1989 
1968 – 1989 
Variables Coefficient  T-Stat Probability 
C 0.036244 0.035622 0.9720 
LNGDP 0.812822 8.102681 0.0000 
D1973 0.042101 0.225312 0.8244 
D1976 0.683955 4.258447 0.0005 
D1983 0.418495 5.155309 0.0001 
R-squared 0.990514 Durbin-Watson stat 2.773533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.988281 F-statistic 443.7560 
 
In confirming the results in Table (9.4), the findings in Table (9.4) show that 
except for the dummy variable for the 1973 oil shock all the variables are significant.  
The elasticity of the government expenditures in relations to GDP indicates that an 
increase of 1% unit in GDP generates a 0.812822% unit increase GE. The overall 
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explanatory power of the model as explained by the R2 shows that the model is capable 
of explaining 99% of the variation in the dependent variable. 
This finding is consistent with Wagner‟s Law of increasing state activities, which 
states the income elasticity of demand for public goods is greater than unity. In addition, 
having, D1976, and D1983 dummy variables indicates an important result in terms of 
displacement effect, as oil shock in 1976 generated large income for public expenditures 
to expand, and 1983 global recession created fiscal crisis in Saudi Arabia as well.  
Therefore, these two dummy variables help to verify displacement hypothesis in terms of 
divergence of government expenditures from its trend due to economic expansion and 
crisis. However, the insignificance of dummy variable for 1973 oil shock is rather 
unexpected, which can be explained through initial inexperience of the government in 
directing the new economic wealth to economic development through expanding 
government expenditures.  In other words, the social capital in terms of economic 
development perhaps was much lower; and therefore the use of resources for economic 
development was not prioritised. 
 
9.4.2.2. Testing for Displacement Effect for 1990 to 2010 with Real-GDP  
 
As part of the structural test, the second part of the data for 1990-2010 is also 
examined for the presence of displacement effect, as in equation 9.9.  As before, only the 
relevant dummy variables are included in the equation, and the results are presented in 
Table 9.5. 
 
L GE = α + β1L GDP + β2D 1991 + β3D 1997 
+ β4D 2001 + β5D 2006 
+ et                                                                                       (9.9) 
 
where: 
D1991: Dummy Variables for year (1991)  
D1997: Dummy Variables for year (1997)  
D2001: Dummy Variables for year (2001)  
D2006: Dummy Variables for year (2006)  
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Table 9.5: Displacement Effect with Real GDP, 1990-2010 
1990 – 2010 
Variables Coefficient T-Stat Probability 
C 11.73833 13.59206 0.001 
LNGDP 0.232955 0.744838 0.634 
D1991 0.082179 0.615821 0.521 
D1997 0.166333 2.073080 0.056 
D2001 0.263462 3.088118 0.006 
D2006 0.490176 5.929548 0.005 
R-square 0.917577 Durbin-Watson stat 0.001 
Adjusted R-squared 0.888140 F-statistic 0.634 
 
As can be seen in Table 9.5, the GDP and D1991 variables are not significant, 
and the rest of the dummy variables for 1997, 2001 and 2006 are all significant at 5% 
level of significance. Despite being not significant, the coefficient of the GDP being the 
elasticity of government expenditure growth indicates that an increase of 1% unit in 
GDP generates a 0.232955% unit increase Government Expenditure (GE). The R2 value 
is very high indicating the high explanatory power of the model.  
It should be noted that although GDP variable is not significant, this finding is 
still consistent with Wagner‟s Law of increasing state activities, as the income elasticity of 
demand for public goods is greater than unity. The dummy variables D1997, D2001, and 
D2006 are all significant indicating the impact of these variables in creating shift in the 
government expenditures during the period 1968 to 2010. However, it is difficult to 
explain as to why D1991 indicating the impact of 1991 Gulf War 1 on the Saudi 
government expenditures is not significant.  
 
9.4.2.3. Structural Break – Chow Test with Real GDP 
After establishing the results for the split data (1968-1990 and 1990-2010), the 
Chow test for structural break is conducted, which is like an F- test following formula 
(9.10): 
 
knRSSRSS
kRSSRSSRSS
F c
2/)(
/)(
21
21


                           (9.10) 
 
The hypotheses tests are: 
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H0:βi = 0; (There is no structural break )  
H1: β1 ≠ 0;  There is  a structural break   
 
Table 9.6: Residual Sum of Squares with Real GDP 
Source RSSc RSS1 RSS2 Df 
Model 66.1080129 39.3294686 2.35229 1 
Residual 7.21881508 1.91152187 0.215347 40 
 
44.23
)1(242/)35229.23295.39(
1/)35229.23295.39(1080129.66



F  
After establishing the value for Chow-test, it can be concluded that since F-test 
(1, 40) = 23.44 is higher than the critical value from the F-Table (5%) = 4.0847, the null 
hypothesis that there is no structural break is rejected and instead the alternative 
hypothesis stating that there is structural break is accepted.  This implies that structural 
break is a reality in the Saudi Arabian government expenditures at least in terms of 1968-
1989 and 1990-2010 period.   In addition, with the existence of dummy variables and 
their significance, the validity of „displacement effect‟ is verified in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
9.5. FINDINGS FOR DISPLACEMENT EFFECT IN THE CASE OF SAUDI 
ARABIA WITH NON-OIL GDP 
The same procedure in the previous section repeated in this section with non-oil 
GDP to eliminate the impact of oil on the growth of government expenditures. 
Initially, the equation in equation 9.11 is run for the entire period, 1968-2010, 
with the seven variables as defined before. 
L GE = α + β1L Non Oil GDP + β2D 1973 + β3D 1976 
+ β4D 1983 + β5D 1991 + β6D 1997 + β3D 2001 
+ β3D 2006 + et                                                                      (9.11) 
 
The results are depicted in Table 9.7: 
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Table 9.7: Displacement Effect with non-oil real GDP 1968 to 2010 
1968 – 2010 
Variables Coefficient T-Stat Probability 
C -1.663560 0.572393 -2.906324 
LN Non Oil-GDP 1.040415 0.059883 17.37416 
D1973 0.189706 0.084801 2.237078 
D1976 0.095467 0.106051 0.900197 
D1983 -0.057862 0.049004 -1.180754 
D1991 -0.054312 0.045195 -1.201744 
D1997 -0.030112 0.052661 -0.571803 
D2001 0.061700 0.054692 1.128137 
D2006 0.144582 0.057034 2.535015 
R-squared 0.997142 Durbin-Watson stat 1.269720 
Adjusted R-squared 0.996449 F-statistic 1439.122 
 
As the results, in Table 9.7 depicts, none of the variables including the GDP is 
not significant, despite the fact that the coefficients values of each of the variables 
indicate a certain level of impact in addition to the strong coefficient of determination as 
explained by R2.  
  
9.5.1. Testing for Displacement Effect for 1968 to 1989 with Non Oil real GDP  
As part of the structural change test, Chow test, as before, the data split into two 
to capture the impact of potential structural change in the government expenditures in 
Saudi Arabia. 
Table 9.8 shows the results for the period of 1968-1989 with the relevant dummy 
variables. 
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Table 9.8: Displacement Effect with non-oil real GDP 1968 to 1989 
1968 – 1989 
Variables Coefficient  T-Stat Probability 
C -1.797123 -4.369981 
0.0004 
LN_NON_OIL_GDP 1.054415 24.50498 0.0000 
D1973 0.175285 2.918593 0.0096 
D1976 0.074266 0.982622 0.3396 
D1983 -0.070775 -2.018635 0.0596 
R-squared 0.998730 Durbin-Watson stat 2.773533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.998431 F-statistic 3342.748 
 
As the results in Table 9.8 demonstrates, except for D1976 all the variables are 
significant with non-oil GDP having full significance and also high coefficient estimate as 
compared to other variables.  
 
9.5.2. Testing for Displacement Effect for 1990 to 2010 with Non Oil real-GDP  
The same exercise repeated for the second part of the data or 1990-2010 period 
and the results are depicted in Table 9.9. 
 
Table 9.9: Displacement Effect with non-oil real GDP 1990 to 2010 
1990 – 2010 
Variables Coefficient  T-Stat Probability 
C 1.787005 4.008829 0.445767 
LN Non Oil-GDP 0.787996 0.318562 2.473602 
D1990 -0.057546 0.124379 -0.462665 
D1997 0.017427 0.089406 0.194924 
D2001 0.110417 0.092334 1.195845 
D2006 0.228385 0.126219 1.809441 
R-squared 0.942636 Durbin-Watson stat 1.223875 
Adjusted R-squared 0.922149 F-statistic 46.01129 
 
As the results in Table 9.9 indicate, none of the variables show any statistical 
significance.  It can therefore be concluded that oil revenues play an important role in 
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determining the government expenditures, as when comparing the results with the results 
in the previous section the role of oil revenues is rather clear. 
 
9.5.3. Structural Break: Chow Test with Non-Oil real GDP 
After establishing the results for the split data (1968-1990 and 1990-2010), the 
Chow test for structural break is conducted, which is like an F- test following formula 
(9.12): 
 
knRSSRSS
kRSSRSSRSS
F c
2/)(
/)(
21
21


                           (9.12) 
 
The hypotheses tests are: 
H0:βi = 0; (There is no structural break )  
H1: β1 ≠ 0;  There is  a structural break   
 
Table 9.10: Residual Sum of Squares with Non-Oil real GDP 
Source RSSc RSS1 RSS2 Df 
Model 62.3715 32.4621 3.1562 1 
Residual 8.04153 1.28351 0.24721 40 
 
04.30
)1(242/)1562.34621.32(
1/)1562.34621.32(3715.62



F  
After establishing the value for Chow-test, it can be concluded that since F-test 
(1, 40) = 30.04 is higher than the critical value from the F-Table (5%) = 4.0847, the null 
hypothesis that there is no structural break is rejected and instead the alternative 
hypothesis stating that there is structural break is accepted.  This implies that structural 
break is a reality in the Saudi Arabian government expenditures at least in terms of 1968-
1989 and 1990-2010 period.   In addition, with the existence of dummy variables and 
their significance, the validity of „displacement effect‟ is verified in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
 
9.6. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS IN LOCATING THE DISPLACEMENT 
EFFECT 
After conducting the research with OLS in search for displacement effect in the 
case of Saudi Arabia, this section aims to further the analysis by using times-series 
analysis, which includes unit root and cointegration test. 
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9.6.1. Unit Root Test 
The unit root test in this section aims to examine the properties of time series 
annual data for each of the government expenditures (LGE), gross domestic product 
(LGDP), during the period 1968-2010 but it is applied to split data 1968-1989 to 1990-
2010 with the objective of locating the structural breakdown..  
To test the stationary time series model for the study variables, it requires the 
unit root test (Enders: 1995) for which Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used as 
expressed in equation 9.13:  
∆ Yt = a0 + a1t + a2Yt−1 +  ai
k
i=1 Yt−1 + et                         (9.13)          
where: 
∆  = the first difference of the series. 
Yt= is the series under consideration (GDP, government expenditures, or government 
revenues), 
       t = the time trend. 
       k= the number of lag. 
et=is stationary random error (white noise residual). 
The hypotheses tests are: 
H0: Unit root exists in Y , it means that ∶ Y is non − stationary  
H1: Unit root dose not exists in Y , it means that ∶ Y is stationary  
If the null hypothesis is rejected, it implies that the variable is non-stationary, and 
hence there is a unit root process. On the other hand, if the outcome indicates that the 
series are stationary after the first difference, in other words, the series integrated of 
order one I(1), then co-integration test can be performed.  
In this section the unit root test is performed for  Peacock and Wiseman version 
for real GDP and non-oil GDP firstly for 1968 to 2009, and then for the split periods: 
1968 to 1989 and from 1990 to 2009. Table 9.11 presents the calculated t-value from 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller for stationary unit root tests on each variable. 
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Table 9.11: Unit Root Test for Stationary for Real GDP 
Variables 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller for Stationary 
Unit Root Test Statistics 
During  (1968-2010) 
L(GDP) -3.23 
L(GE) -3.88 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -4.12 
Critical Values 5% level -2.937 
During  (1968-1989) 
L(GDP) -3.756 
L(GE) -3.877 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -4.330 
Critical Values 5% level -3.00 
During  (1990-2010) 
L(GDP) -4.105 
L(GE) -5.521 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -4.147 
Critical Values 5% level -3.600 
 
The results in Table 9.12 indicates that each variable used in Peacock and 
Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law in Saudi Arabia indicate that the series are stationary 
after the first difference.  
Based on these test it can be concluded that all variables tested (LGDP, LGE, 
LNON OIL GDP) are contained a unit root significant level of 5% for Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller for stationary unit root tests.  
In the next step, cointegration test is applied to examine the long-run relationship 
between the variables by using OLS test. Applying ADF unit root tests (Table 9.12), 
thus, it is established that each of the variables used in all Peacock and Wiseman version 
of Wagner‟s Law is cointegrated at first order, or I(1), which can be tested for long-run 
relationship between the variables. 
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Table 9.12: Contegration Regressions Results for Real GDP 
Versions 
Dependent 
Variables 
Coefficient T-Stat Probability 𝐑𝟐 DW 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
LGE 
1968 – 2010 
0.467 4.16 0.021 0.651 0.973 
1968 – 1989 
1.101 14.02 0.006 0.882 0.705 
1990 – 2010 
0.511 0.62 0.763 0.532 0.921 
 
 
Table 9.13: Cointegration Regression Results for Real Non Oil-GDP 
Versions 
Dependent 
Variables 
Coefficient T-Stat Probability 𝐑𝟐 DW 
Peacock 
& 
Wiseman 
LGE 
1968 – 2010 
1.024 17.12 0.004 0.932 1.171 
1968 – 1989 
0.987 20.44 0.000 0.929 1.913 
1990 – 2010 
0.663 2.74 0.002 0.961 1.192 
 
The results in Table 9.12 and 9.13 present OLS time series results for the entire 
1968-2010 and also the split periods. The results show that there is a long run 
relationship between the Government Expenditure (GE) and Economic Growth (GDP) 
for non-oil GDP in Saudi Arabia for the entire period as well as for the split periods as 
the independent variable is significant. However, in the case of real-GDP version, the 
next step is to test cointegration by using Johansen cointegrating test. 
 
 
9.6.2. Cointegration Test 
In this section, the cointegration test for Peacock and Wiseman version for real 
GDP and non-oil GDP for the 1968 to 2010 period in Saudi Arabia is conducted; but 
also the split periods (1968 to 1989 and 1990 to 2010) are also examined. 
As mentioned previously, the concept of integration common that if the level 
variables of the form are non-stationary any package of first class, if possible, to generate 
a linear combination of these variables has characterized by a static zero-class integrated I 
(0). In such a case, the integrated real-time variables of the same rank co-integrated, and 
thus it can use the level variables in the regression, nor is the decline in this case a false 
spurious.  
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The null hypothesis is that the variables under investigation are not co-integrated. 
The rejection of the null hypothesis requires that the trace value of the co-integration test 
to be greater than at least one of the different critical values. Therefore, failing to reject 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration leads us to conclude that there is no relationship 
in the long-term equilibrium between government spending and national income.  
Cointegration test in this study is conducted by using the method developed by 
Johansen (1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990). Many studies use the Engle Granger 
two-step, but there are those who used a Johansen and Juselius (1990), for so many 
advantages: such as first, it tests for all of the variables and, secondly, all variables are 
treated as internal variables, so that the choice of the variable is not arbitrary. This 
procedure is the most reliable test for cointegration.  
To determine whether stochastic trends in series have related to each other or 
not, cointegration in Peacock and Wiseman version of the growth of government is 
tested. In addition, after determining the order of integration by Augmented Dickey-
Fuller for stationary Unit Root Tests, co-integration of the series are tested, and if they 
are, the cointegrating long-run equilibrium relationship has to be identified. 
 
9.6.2.1. Cointegration Test with Real GDP 
 
In the case of real GDP for the period 1968-2010, Table 9.14 shows that 
cointegration relationship is found and the test supports the existence of one 
cointegration equation in the relationship between LGE and LGDP. By looking at the 
trace statistic value in Table 9.14, it can be concluded that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration has to be rejected in the Peacock & Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law, as 
the trace statistic values are greater than the critical value of 5%.   
The existence of a co-integration vector is pointed out by a trace test since t-test 
value exceeds critical value of 5% level of significance. This means the cointegration tests 
are statistically significant at five per cent level for determining the long-run relationship 
between LGE and LGDP.  
For the period of 1968-2010 the Johansen Cointegration test includes 43 
observations with exogenous or dummy variables with series D1973, D1976, D1983, 
D1991, D1997, D2001, and D2006 in first differences. Peacock and Wiseman version is 
tested in this section and it is found that the trace test indicates a level of significance at 
5%. At the trace statistic value in Table 9.14, we can reject the null hypothesis of 
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cointegration in Peacock and Wiseman version, because the trace statistic values are 
greater than the critical value of 5%. 
 
Table 9.14: Johansen Cointegration Test results (Real GDP) 1968 to 2010 
Versions 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace    
Statistic (Long Run) 
Critical 
Value 5% 
Prob 
Peacock 
& 
Wiseman 
None 0.29806 22.5771 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.18983 8.4206 3.76 0.0000 
 
In terms of split data, in the case of real GDP for the period of 1968 to 1989, 
Table 9.15 shows that cointegration relationship is found and the test supports the 
existence of no cointegration equation in the relationship between LGE and LGDP. In 
the test, 22 observations included with dummy variables series of D1973, D1976, and 
D1983 in their first differences, and the trace test indicates no co-integrating of 5%. 
 
Table 9.15: Johansen Cointegration Test results (Real GDP) 1968-1989 
Versions 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace    
Statistic (Long Run) 
Critical 
Value 5% 
Prob. 
Peacock 
& 
Wiseman 
None 0.320153 8.233101 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.046326 0.901238 3.76 0.0000 
 
 
On the other hand, in the case of real GDP for the period 1990-2010, Table 9.16 
shows that cointegration relationship were found and the test support the existence of no 
cointegration equation in the relationship between LGE and LGDP. In this test, 21 
observations included with D1991, D1997, D2001, and D2006 in first differences. 
 
 
Table 9.16: Johansen Cointegration Test results (Real GDP) from 1990-2010 
Versions 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistic (Long Run) 
Critical 
Value 5% 
Prob. 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
None 0.287262 10.06590 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.151812 3.293070 3.76 0.0000 
 
 
9.6.2.2. Cointegration Test with Real Non-Oil GDP 
In the case of real non-oil GDP for the entire period of 1968 to 2010, includes 
43 observations with exogenous or dummy variables with series D1973, D1976, D1983, 
D1991, D1997, D2001, and D2006 in first differences, Table 9.17 shows that there is a 
long run equilibrium relationship between non-oil real GDP and government 
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expenditures as found in Peacock & Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law in searching for 
„displacement effect‟ with respect to real non-oil GDP at 5% level of significance. Thus, 
the null hypothesis of cointegration is rejected in all versions of Wagner‟s Law with 
respect to non-oil real GDP, because the trace statistics values are greater than the 
critical value of 5%. Co-integrated relationships exist for Peacock and Wiseman version 
of Wagner‟s Law in searching for „displacement effect‟ with respect to real non-oil GDP 
at 5% level of significance with respect to real non-oil GDP in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
an even stronger result indicating that the real total government expenditure and real 
non-oil GDP are subject to an equilibrium relationship in the long-run. 
 
Table 9.17: Johansen Co-integration Test results (Real Non-Oil GDP) 1968-2010 
Versions 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistic 
Critical Value 
5% 
Prob. 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
None 0.26793 21.0726 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.19341 8.5974 3.76 0.0000 
 
For the first part of the split data, 1968 to 1989, includes 22 observations with 
exogenous or dummy variables with series D1973, D1976, D1983 in first differences, 
Table 9.18 shows that there is long run equilibrium relationship between non-oil real 
GDP and government expenditure at 5% significance level. The result indicates that 
there is one cointegration is rejected in Peacock & Wiseman version with respect to real 
non-oil GDP Table 9.18, because the trace statistic values are greater than the critical 
values of 5%. 
 
Table 9.18: Johansen Cointegration Test (Real Non-Oil GDP) 1968-1989 
Versions 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistic 
Critical Value 
5% 
Prob. 
Peacock 
& 
Wiseman 
None 0.598345 18.71788 15.41 0.0000 
At most 1 0.070389 1.386793 3.76 0.0000 
 
On the other hand, in the case of real non-oil GDP for the 1990-2010, includes 
21 observations with exogenous or dummy variables with series D1991, D1997, D2001, 
and D2006 in first differences, the results in Table 9.19 shows that the trace test indicates 
no cointegration at 5% significance level, as the trace statistic value lesser than the critical 
value of 5%. 
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Table 9.19: Johansen Cointegration Test (Real Non-Oil GDP) 1990-2010 
Versions 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
Eigen 
value 
Trace 
Statistic 
Critical Value 
5% 
Prob 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
None   0.337350 8.642084  15.41  0.0000 
At most 1   0.020385 0.411915  3.76  0.0000 
 
 
 
 
9.6.3. Causality Test 
The econometric analysis so far indicates that there is a long-term equilibrium 
relationship between government expenditures and GDP in the Peacock and Wiseman 
version of the Wagner‟s Law in search for „displacement effect‟. 
According to, Engle and Granger (1987), the variables that integrate towards a 
common equilibrium reflects a long-term relationship, and therefore it should be a 
representation of Error Correction Model (ECM), which provides the opportunity to test 
and assess the relationship in the short and long term between the variables of the form. 
To apply the Error Correction Model (ECM) to Peacock & Wiseman version in Saudi 
Arabia, first Granger-causality has to be explored.  
 
 
9.6.3.1. Granger Causality Test 
In this, the Granger Causality for Peacock and Wiseman version for real GDP 
and non-oil GDP for the entire period and also for the split periods are tested. 
 
(i) Granger Causality Test with Real GDP 
 
Table 9.20 shows the probability values from the Granger Causality Test for 
Peacock and Wiseman Version for the period of 1968-2010 with Real GDP. The 
reported F-statistics are standard test for the joint hypothesis that LGE does not 
Granger Cause LGDP. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the probability for accepting the null-
hypothesis was only 0.36% while 99.64% reject this hypothesis, which means LGE 
causes LGDP around 99.64% of the time in the Peacock and Wiseman‟s Version. In 
Table 9.19, the feedback of causality from LGDP to LGE is presented where the 
probability for accepting the null-hypothesis is only 23.36% while 76.64% reject the 
hypothesis, which means LGDP causes LGE about 76.6% times in the case of Saudi 
Arabia.  It can, therefore, be concluded that there is bi-directional causality between 
government expenditures and GDP in the case of Peacock and Wiseman version of 
Wagner‟s Law in search of „displacement effect‟. 
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Table 9.20: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version for 1968-2010 with 
Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP 6.65097 0.00356 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGE 1.51625 0.23360 
 
 
Table 9.21 shows the probability values from the Granger Causality test for the 
first part of the split data 1968 to 1989 with real GDP. The reported F-statistics are 
standard test for the joint hypothesis that LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP. As can 
be seen, in both cases, the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis is lesser that the 
rejection value, bi-directional causality is established for 1968-1989 period. 
 
 
 
Table 9.21: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version 1968-1989 with Real 
GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP 7.6638 0.022 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGE 4.5697 0.102 
 
The results in Table 9.22 for the period 1990-2010, shows that LGE causes 
LGDP, while the result for LGDP causing LGE is not that string albeit the results show 
that LGDP causes LGE about 50% of the time. 
 
 
Table 9.22: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version from 1990-2010 with 
Real GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGE does not Granger Cause LGDP 18.169 0.001 
LGDP does not Granger Cause LGE 1.3858 0.500 
 
(ii) Granger Causality Test with Real Non-Oil GDP 
 
Table 9.23 shows the probability values from the Granger Causality Test for 
Peacock and Wiseman version for the period of 1968-2010 with real non-oil GDP. The 
reported F-statistics are standard test for the joint hypothesis indicating that LGE does 
not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the probability for 
accepting the null-hypothesis was only 0.48% while 99.52% reject this hypothesis, which 
means LGE causes L-Non-Oil GDP around 99.52% of the time in the Peacock and 
Wiseman‟s version. In table 9.23, the feedback of causality from L-Non-Oil GDP to 
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LGE is presented where the probability for accepting the null-hypothesis is only 32.61% 
while 68.39% reject the hypothesis, which means L Non-Oil GDP causes LGE about 
68.39% times in the case of Saudi Arabia.  It can, therefore, be concluded that there is bi-
directional causality between government expenditures and GDP in the case of Peacock 
and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law in search of „displacement effect‟. 
 
Table 9.23: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version for 1968-2010 with 
Real Non-Oil GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGE does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP 7.85341 0.0048 
L Non-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause LGE 1.72531 0.3261 
 
The probability values from Granger Causality test in Table 9.24 for 1968 to 
1989 with real non-oil GDP, shows that bi-directional causality exists between 
government expenditures and non-oil real GDP. 
 
 
Table 9.24: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version from 1968-1989 with 
Real Non-Oil GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGE does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP 8.288 0.016 
L Non-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause LGE 4.292 0.117 
 
As the results in Table 9.25 depicts, government expenditures causes GDP with a 
strong force.  However, the feedback causality from GDP to government expenditures is 
rather weak, as L Non-Oil GDP causes LGE only about 15.3% of the time. 
 
Table 9.25: Granger Causality test for Peacock and Wiseman Version from 1990-2010 with 
Real Non-Oil GDP 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
LGE does not Granger Cause L Non-Oil GDP 49.41 0.0002 
L Non-Oil GDP does not Granger Cause LGE 0.33105 0.847 
 
 
9.6.4. Error Correction Model (ECM) 
In this section, the Error Correction Model (ECM) for Peacock and Wiseman 
version of Wagner‟s Law for „displacement effect‟ for real GDP and non-oil GDP during 
for the entire period (1968-2010) and also for the split data (1968-1989;  and 1990-2010) 
is tested to identify the adjustment process. 
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(i) ECM with Real GDP 
In the Table 9.26, the results for 1968 to 2010 period indicate that there is long-
run causality that runs from GDP to GE, as the coefficient is statistically significant at 
5% level. Thus, Peacock and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law for „displacement effect‟ 
is found to hold for GDP in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 9.26: Causality with Error Correction Model (ECM) test for 1968-2010 with Real 
GDP 
Versions Variables ECTt-1  T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.22349 -1.08 
L(GDP) 0.67767 1.67 
 
As the results in Table 9.27 for the period of 1968 to 1989 indicate, that there is 
long-run causality that runs from GDP to GE. It can therefore be concluded that 
Peacock and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law for „displacement effect‟ is found to 
hold for GDP in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 9.27: Causality with ECM with Real GDP for 1968-1989  
Versions Variables ECTt-1  T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.52349 -1.54 
L(GDP) 0.86667 1.67 
 
 
The results for 1990 to 2010 period indicate that there is long-run causality that 
runs from GDP to GE, and therefore it can be concluded that Peacock and Wiseman 
version is found to hold for GDP in the case of Saudi Arabia (Table 9.28). 
 
Table 9.28: Causality with ECM with Real GDP for 1990-2010  
Versions Variables ECTt-1  T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.6459957 -3.02 
LGDP 1.377322 0.87 
 
(ii) ECM with Real Non-Oil GDP 
The results in Table 9.29 for the 1968 to 2010 period with real non-oil GDP 
indicates that there is long-run causality that runs from non-oil-GDP to GE. Thus, 
Peacock and Wiseman version is found to hold for non-oil-GDP in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. 
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Table 9.29: Causality with Error Correction Model (ECM) test for 1968-2010 with Non-Oil 
GDP 
Versions Variables ECTt-1  T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.7523 -0.54 
L(Non-Oil GDP) 0.42890 0.78 
 
In the Table 9.30, the results for 1968-1989 indicate that there is long-run 
causality that runs from non-oil real GDP to GE showing that Peacock and Wiseman 
version of Wagner‟s Law is found to hold for non-oil real GDP in the case of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
Table 9.30: Causality with Error Correction Model (ECM) test with Non-Oil GDP 
Versions Variables ECTt-1  T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.80127 -0.99 
L(Non-Oil GDP) 0.460949 0.81 
 
The results in Table 9.31 for the second part of the split data, 1990-2010, In the 
show that there is long-run causality that runs from non-oil real-GDP to GE implying 
that Peacock and Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law for „displacement effect‟ is found to 
hold for non-oil real-GDP in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 9.31: Causality with Error Correction Model (ECM) test with Real Non-Oil GDP 
Versions Variables ECTt-1  T-Stat 
Peacock 
& Wiseman 
L(GE) -0.78442 -5.42 
L(Non-Oil GDP) -0.12992 -1.43 
 
 
 
9.7. CONCLUSION 
 
Gupta (1967) and Diamond (1977) argued that the displacement effect leads to 
the share of national income devoted to government expenditure increasing with GDP 
due to further interventions during social, political and economic upheavals. 
In this chapter, thus, the relationship between the government expenditure and 
economic growth is examined using the Peacock & Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law 
for „displacement effect hypothesis‟ for Saudi Arabia using time series annual data for the 
1968 to 2010 period but also for the split data 1968 to 1989 and 1990 to 2010 with the 
objective of locating the structural change in the development and trend of government 
expenditures.  
Displacement Effect in the Government Expenditures in Saudi Arabia: An Empirical Analysis 
 
220 
 
The results through all the method used and applied to the various levels of data 
indicate that there is a structural break in the trend and development of government 
expenditures in Saudi Arabia. 
First, the regressions for the Peacock and Wiseman of Wagner‟s Law for 
„displacement effect‟ are tested by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) for real GDP and 
non-oil GDP. 
Secondly, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller for stationary Unit Root Test for real 
GDP and non-oil real GDP is applied. In the case, the levels of the series tested, the 
null-hypothesis of non-stationary cannot be rejected for any of the series.  
Third, these results suggest that there is a cointegrating relationship between 
government spending and national income. The equilibrium relationship indicates that 
the major determinant of government expenditure in Saudi Arabia, in the long run, is 
national income. 
Fourthly, Granger causality tests were employed to confirm the causality 
direction between the variables. In the long run, statistically significant evidence is found 
indicating government expenditures Granger causing GDP and also the feedback 
causality in the GDP causing government expenditures. The similar results have been 
establishing by using the ECM.  
 In concluding, as the empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows through 
the analysis of structural break, it can be concluded that government expenditures in 
Saudi Arabia has not only followed a secular growth but also experienced structural 
jumps from one period to another due to certain economic reasons such as the large oil 
revenues due to oil shocks, and also negative impact of world recession and also the 
1997 financial crisis on fiscal policy, but also due to political reasons such as Gulf Wars 
in the recent years.  Further studies can be conducted through other empirical methods 
to locate the beginning and ending periods of the impact of such economic, social and 
political events have had on the trend and development of public expenditures in Saudi 
Arabia, as this study only shows the structural breaks but not the periods of impact. 
Thus, it can be concluded that this study provides initial empirical evidence in favour of 
„displacement effect hypotheses of Peacock and Wiseman through using Peacock and 
Wiseman version of Wagner‟s Law in different forms and through different econometric 
methods. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION  
 
 
10.1 OVERVIEW 
 
Government expenditures are funds spent to actualise the activity and 
performance of the public sector aiming to increase the welfare of society and the 
economy as a whole. However, the expansion of government activities is a political issue 
as well as being an economic issue.  The role of the state in economy is a subject of 
debate for centuries.  Regardless of the political culture of the nations, as indicated in the 
literature, a secular increase has been observed in the size of public expenditures in most 
of the countries in the world for different reason which ranges from welfare oriented 
aims to developmentalist reasons.  In addition to the large literature searching for the 
determinants of increasing size of government, an equivalently large number of studies 
also have looked for the relationship between government expenditures and economic 
growth, as it is perceived that there is a causal relationship between government 
expenditures and GDP.  However, Wagner (1883) suggested that increased government 
spending was because of growth in the GDP and not a cause, unlike Keynes (1933), who 
believed that government expenditure is an independent factor, and a political tool to 
influence growth.  
It is the aim of this study to search for the perceived causal relationship between 
government expenditures and economic growth in the case of Saudi Arabia., which is a 
developmentalist but at the same time is a rentier state.  The Saudi economy mainly 
involves the exporting of oil and gas, and Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves of crude 
oil in the world – an estimated 266.7 billion barrels. This is equivalent to 57% of the 
reserves of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and 29% of the total reserves of 
OPEC, and accounts for 20% of world reserves (www.gulfbase.com, 2011). The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also ranks as the largest producer and exporter of oil in the 
world where it plays a leading role in the OPEC, producing 28% of total OPEC 
production. Average oil production per day in 2009 was 8.055 million barrels and in 2008 
average production was 9.113 million barrels per day. In terms of its contribution to the 
economy, the oil sector accounting for 90% of total export earnings, 80% of government 
revenues and 45% of the gross domestic product. Due to the heavy presence of oil in the 
economy, about 40% of GDP comes from the private sector (Ministry of Economy and 
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Planning, 2010), which at the same time makes Saudi Arabia’s political economy as a 
rentier state. 
Due to the increase in oil prices in recent years but also because of the oil shocks 
in 1970s, Saudi Arabia generated large wealth from oil revenues.  In recent years, the 
country recorded significant economic growth during the period from 2003 to late 2008 
on the back of rising oil production and prices. However, in particular since Saudi Arabia 
became member of WTO in 2005, Increases in foreign direct investment and 
government spending to develop the contribution of non-oil sectors are large and 
influential, which mainly aims to reduce the role of the state and also oil in the economy.  
Thus, economic diversification led by the government has been a recent policy in 
development plans as well. 
It should be noted that due to the increasing oil prices, the real GDP of Saudi 
Arabia rose by 4.6% in 2008 compared to 2007 when the growth rate was 3.5%, but 
decreased to 0.15% in 2009 due to the global crisis. The real growth rate of the economy 
is excepted to be about 3.7% in 2010 and to 4% in 2011 due to an expected global 
economic recovery (www.gulfbase.com, 2011). 
The Saudi economy has seen unusual changes either through mutations or 
through the oil booms in the region for more than four decades (1968-2010). The 
government has decided that during this period of extraordinary gains in revenues and 
general economic surplus, Saudi Arabia will foster developmentalism to assure that the 
future growth of the Kingdom will be through the development of physical 
infrastructure and the development of human resources. However, being a rentier state, 
the state’s economic role is open to question but also importantly the government failure 
is something perhaps should be considered in the case of Saudi Arabia in terms of the 
efficiency of government expenditures.   
This chapter thus aims to provide a summary of the findings so far through the 
empirical chapters but also aims to provide further meaning to the results by reflecting 
on the results. 
 
10.2 SUMMARISING THE FINDINGS 
The aim of this research is to search for the causal relationships between 
government expenditure and GDP, in terms of GDP and Non-oil GDP for the Saudi 
Arabian economy. Hence, in addition to total GDP, non-oil GDP is also considered 
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with the objective of measuring the impact of government expenditures non-oil 
economy. 
The empirical chapters in this research aim to estimate the economic 
relationships represented in Wagner’s law in terms of the causal relationship between 
government expenditures and economic growth.  The empirical research was extended 
by also examining Peacock and & Wiseman and Keynesian Relation as part of the 
macroeconomic models within the field.  It should be noted that each model tested with 
overall GDP but also with non-oil GDP. 
Using aggregate annual time-series data for Saudi Arabia for the period of 1968-
2010, initially the propositions of the six existing versions of Wagner’s law have been 
considered using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS). The following tests were performed: 
Unit Root, Co-integration, Error Correction Model (ECM), and application of Granger-
Causality-testing. The empirical results suggest that testing for the six existing versions of 
Wagner’s law verifies and validates also the relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Table 10.1: Summary of the main Results Theories Explaining the Government 
Expenditure Growth for real GDP and Non Oil Real GDP 
Models Period 
Estimations Methods 
Unit Root Cointegration ECM 
Granger 
Causality 
Wagner's Law 1968 - 2010 
Stationary 
in the  first 
difference I 
(1). 
There is a long-
run relationship 
between 
government 
expenditure 
(GE) and 
economic 
growth (GDP)  
The long-run 
causality runs 
from GDP to 
Government 
Expenditure 
Bi-directional 
Keynesian 
Relation 
1968-2010 Uni-directional 
Displacement 
Effect 
1968-2010 
Bi-directional 1968-1989 
1990-2010 
 
In chapter seven, the empirical results introduced strong evidence in support of 
Wagner’s Law in the case of Saudi Arabia. The results show that the elasticity of 
government expenditure with respect to GDP were greater than unity in the six versions 
of Wagner's law, , which leads to, good evidence of supporting Wagner's predictions. 
The results of the regression analysis – for six versions of Wagner’s Law using 
OLS for real GDP and non-oil real GDP – show that the elasticity coefficient of 
government expenditure, with respect to GDP, was greater than unity in Peacock and 
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Wiseman (1968), Pryor (1969), Goffman (1968),and Gupta (1967). Thus, the findings in 
the case of these four versions are in accordance with Wagner’s expectation. The 
empirical results also indicate that the elasticity coefficient of government expenditure, 
with respect to GDP, is inelastic in the case of Musgrave’s (1969) and Mann’s (1980) 
versions of Wagner’s Law, although their independent variable is still statistically 
significant. Nagarajan and Spreares (1990), furthermore, stated that in order to verify 
Wagner’s Law, the income elasticity needs to be E>1, i.e. greater than unity, and the 
ratio income elasticity needs only be E>0, i.e. greater than zero.  According to this rule, 
Mann’s version of Wagner’s Law does not hold in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
As regards non-oil real GDP – the independent variable in the versions of 
Wagner’s Law – Peacock and Wiseman provide support for Wagner’s Law, whilst 
Pryor’s, Musgrave’s and Mann’s versions do not hold for Saudi Arabia. In addition, since 
elasticity is greater than unity in the results of Goffman’s model, this version of 
Wagner’s Law is consistent for Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Gupta provides evidence for 
Wagner’s Law in the case of Saudi Arabia; the expected elasticity is higher than a unit, 
i.e. E>1. Moreover, since the income elasticity needs to be higher than a unity (E > 1), 
and the ratio income elasticity is expected to be higher than zero (E > 0), Mann's version 
does not provide evidence for Wagner’s Law in Saudi Arabia. 
In extending the analysis, the unit root test in the form of Augmented Dickey-
Fuller is utilised to examine stationary of the time-series of all the variables. The results 
indicate that the levels of all series are non-stationary, and hence all the variables are 
cointegrated at first order [I (1)]. 
The results suggest that there is a co-integrating relationship between 
government expenditure and GDP per capita, and Wagner’s Law holds in the case of 
Saudi Arabia through the cointegration analysis. Therefore, the equilibrium relationship 
indicates that the major determinant of government expenditure in Saudi Arabia, in the 
long run, is national income. 
The econometric analysis further employs the Granger causality test in order to 
verify the causality and its direction between the variables. The results demonstrate 
statistically significant evidence in favour of per capita GDP for the long-run 
relationship. In addition, it is found that Granger-causing the share of government 
expenditure in GDP. This finding is consistent with the expectation of Wagner’s Law. 
Thus, the result of the causality test indicates the existence of strong feedback causality 
for all versions of Wagner’s Law in the long run. 
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Lastly, by using the Error Correction Model (ECM), it is established that all the 
six versions of Wagner’s Law are significant for both real GDP and non-oil-GDP in the 
case of Saudi Arabia. This suggests a short-run adjustment process towards long-run 
equilibrium. 
After establishing that Wagner’s Law in all version valid and can explain the 
nexus between government expenditures and economic growth in Saudi Arabia, Chapter 
Eight focused on testing Keynesian relation by reversing the three versions of Wagner’s, 
Law, using time series annual data for the period 1968 to 2010. 
In the analysis, three distinct time series techniques are applied: Initially, the 
regressions analysis utilised for three versions of Keynesian Relations using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) with real GDP and non-oil GDP. In the next step, the Unit Root 
tests through Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for stationary is applied with real GDP and 
non-oil GDP. In the following step, cointegrating test for real GDP and non-oil GDP. 
Finally, causality tests by using Granger Causality tests are conducted together with 
ECM. 
In overall, the findings in this study suggest that there is a cointegrating 
relationship between the share of government expenditure in national output and per 
capita income. The equilibrium relationship indicates that the major determinant of 
government expenditure in Saudi Arabia, in the long run, is national income. In the case 
of Real GDP and Non-oil GDP, the versions of Peacock & Wiseman, Goffman and 
Gupta show that co-integration relationships is found and the test supported the 
existence of one cointegration.  
Finally, Granger’s causality tests were used to confirm the causality direction 
between the variables by using the ECM. Since there exists an ECM to describe the short 
run adjustment to equilibrium, three versions of the Keynesian Relations are found to 
hold for both (GDP) and (Non-Oil-GDP) in the case of Saudi Arabia.  
The findings in this study verify the importance of Keynesian relation for a late 
developing country such as Saudi Arabia, where the private capital for economic 
development until recently was limited.  The fiscal policy in the form of government 
expenditures has been the engine of economic growth and development in Saudi Arabia.  
The government revenues raised from oil wealth in Saudi Arabia have been the main 
source of economic and social development of the country, which generated 
employment and expansion of the economy as predicated by Keynes.   
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The findings of this research, hence, verified the validity of the Keynesian 
Relation in the case of Saudi Arabia, and also indicate the importance of government 
expenditure for economic development in the cases where the private capital is in short 
supply as was in Saudi Arabia.  This does not imply that government’s role for economic 
growth and development is applauded without any questioning, as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of using government expenditure is a matter of another debate. 
 
After establishing the validity of Keynesian Relation in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
an attempt was also made in Chapter 9 to search for the validity of Peacock & Wiseman’s 
‘displacement effect’.  The model is expanded, as mentioned before, with the addition of 
political and economic dummy variables. 
In this chapter, thus, the relationship between the government expenditure and 
economic growth is examined using the Peacock & Wiseman version of Wagner’s Law 
for ‘displacement effect hypothesis’ for Saudi Arabia using time series annual data for the 
1968 to 2010 period but also for the split data 1968 to 1989 and 1990 to 2010 with the 
objective of locating the structural change in the development and trend of government 
expenditures.  
The results through all the method used and applied to the various levels of data 
indicate that there is a structural break in the trend and development of government 
expenditures in Saudi Arabia. 
First, the regressions for the Peacock and Wiseman of Wagner’s Law for 
‘displacement effect’ are tested by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) for real GDP and 
non-oil GDP. 
Secondly, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller for stationary Unit Root Test for real 
GDP and non-oil real GDP is applied. In the case, the levels of the series tested, the 
null-hypothesis of non-stationary cannot be rejected for any of the series.  
Third, these results suggest that there is a cointegrating relationship between 
government spending and national income. The equilibrium relationship indicates that 
the major determinant of government expenditure in Saudi Arabia, in the long run, is 
national income. 
Fourthly, Granger causality tests were employed to confirm the causality 
direction between the variables. In the long run, statistically significant evidence is found 
indicating government expenditures Granger causing GDP and also the feedback 
causality in the GDP causing government expenditures. The similar results have been 
establishing by using the ECM.  
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In concluding, as the empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows through 
the analysis of structural break, it can be concluded that government expenditures in 
Saudi Arabia has not only followed a secular growth but also experienced structural 
jumps from one period to another due to certain economic reasons such as the large oil 
revenues due to oil shocks, and also negative impact of world recession and also the 
1997 financial crisis on fiscal policy, but also due to political reasons such as Gulf Wars 
in the recent years.  Further studies can be conducted through other empirical methods 
to locate the beginning and ending periods of the impact of such economic, social and 
political events have had on the trend and development of public expenditures in Saudi 
Arabia, as this study only shows the structural breaks but not the periods of impact. 
Thus, it can be concluded that this study provides initial empirical evidence in favour of 
‘displacement effect hypotheses of Peacock and Wiseman through using Peacock and 
Wiseman version of Wagner’s Law in different forms and through different econometric 
methods. 
 
 
10.2.1. Reflecting on the Findings 
In overall, the results presented in this research and summarised in this section 
clearly demonstrates that government expenditures has been an important determinants 
of economic growth in both the measure, namely real GDP and non-oil real GDP.  
However, the results also indicate that the direction of causality worked in both ways; 
while government expenditures resulted in higher economic growth; higher economic 
growth in turn generated the necessary wealth for the growth in public expenditure for 
economic development and welfare of the society.  
While the results validates the presence of Wagner’s Law in the case of Saudi 
Arabia for the period in question, the validity of the Keynesian Relation is also 
established through the rigorous analysis presented in this research.  Importantly, the 
findings also show that Peacock & Wiseman’s ‘displacement effect’ is also verified in the 
case of Saudi Arabia, as the country has gone through breaks in its economic growth and 
public expenditure growth due to economic (oil shocks and global recession) but also 
political events (wars). 
Saudi Arabia, as mentioned, is a developmentalist rentier state, which is heavily 
depended on the wealth generated from oil export.  Due to having traditional modes of 
production based on kinship or tribalism, in modern times this still continues to have 
impact on the political economy of the country in the sense that instead of tribe, the state 
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remains at the heart of developing the economy and society but also provide for the 
welfare need of the society. Thus, the heavy presence of state in economy can perhaps be 
justified through economic rationale by responding to the capital need of the society, it is 
at the same time a cultural, traditional and historical reality and necessity.   
While it is true that Saudi society and its political economy have undergone 
important transformation through being party to international bodies such as WTO but 
also through economic and financial liberalisation, which has resulted in a growing 
bourgeoisie and expanding private sector, the traditional weight of the state is a reality 
continues to exist either as a ‘benevolent administrator’ (dawlah al kareem) or a 
‘leviathan’. For example, in responding to the growing political changes in the region, 
Saudi government committed large public funds to overcome the financial difficulties of 
individual citizens including creating jobs for the unemployed in the public sector. Thus, 
regardless of assessing the economic rationale for such commitments, political necessities 
create pressure for the expansion of the state’s economic involvement. It is therefore not 
a surprise that the youth prefer to work in the public sector despite the expanding private 
sector and the Saudization policies (Al-Shehri, 2009). Thus, the thin line between the 
‘benevolent administrator’ and ‘leviathan’ is becoming rather invisible in the process of 
further expansion of the state’s involvement in the economy. This is particularly 
important in considering the level of economic development in Saudi Arabia and the 
amount of public funds over the years allocated for this purpose. In other words, the 
efficiency of the use of public funds and the effectiveness of the outcome when assessed 
it clearly indicates that more could have been achieved so far.   
The question, as mentioned, comes to the cultural, traditional and historical reality 
of tribal and in modern times state based mode of production; it is a legacy that will 
remain there for the foreseeable future, as the issue is not only a supply oriented 
problem, but the general public is also toxicated with the economic and financial power 
of the state and therefore consider the ‘state the father’ to deliver them with the services 
and financial power they ask for. Thus, rentier economy is supported and popularised by 
rentier mentality of the public, which helps to sustain the growing public expenditures in 
the country despite the economic and financial liberalisation has taken place in the 
country in the recent history. The recent political developments in the Arab countries 
does not help to reduce the size of the state in Saudi Arabia, as further rentier oriented 
spending has been promised to the society to overcome political instability in the 
kingdom. 
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It should, however, be noted that the development of the Saudi society has been 
possible by the heavy state involvement so far. While this fact should remain in mind in 
understanding the Saudi political economy, it is also important to question the efficient 
use of public resources for economic development. Such questioning should also be 
extended to welfare expenditures in terms of their efficiency. As observation states that 
such an academic study would find the inefficiencies in the public spending whether in 
economic or welfare oriented realms. This is an urgent matter requiring direct attention, 
as such a study may prove that the economic development achieved so far would have 
costed lesser and the welfare expenditure are economically and socially much higher than 
its socially optimum level, as they are very much determined politically. 
 
10.3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The policy implications of this finding imply that the fiscal stance of the state 
plays an important role in the macroeconomy of the state and the welfare of the society 
and individuals. 
The growing public expenditures not only due to economic rationale such as 
developmentalist need, but also due to public pressure indicates that stronger position 
should be taken in controlling the public expenditures or at least in moderating its 
expansion. While this study has not attempted the measure the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of public expenditures, the observation from real life indicates that 
government expenditures are inefficient and ineffective in the country, and therefore 
rather than expanding the public sector further an independent private sector must be 
expanded in size but also in its power. In other words, economic diversification is a need 
in Saudi Arabia which should focus on creating an independent private sector, as this will 
help to transform the rentier economy and rentier mentality of the society for a 
productive economy and enabled and functioning individuals. 
Saudi Arabia attempted to liberalise its economy and financial sector and has 
been successful in this process through privatisation and other policies. In addition, 
being a member of the WTO makes its necessary for the country to reduce the public 
sector to prevent the crowding out impact in the economy. Therefore, rather than 
increasing public spending due mainly to political pressures as in recent years, rentier 
mentality has to be replaced with productive individuals in the minds of the citizens.  By 
the same token, the rentier expectations in the economy must be removed in favour of 
independent business class. Proactively pursued economic diversification of the economy 
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away from oil will be an important part of such a policy, which is, thus, essential to 
prevent the state to grow further but also conduct itself with efficiency and effectives. 
 As part of economic and financial liberalisation and reducing the size of the 
government, privatisation has been taken as an important economic policy. However, 
privatisation in Saudi Arabia needs a strategy in support of the business to provide the 
proper role of the private sector, in order to support the economy through the expansion 
of independent private sector to complete its role and meet the requirements 
of overall economic growth.  
 It should, however, be noted that while the role of the state in economic activity 
is undergoing change, the development of the private sector is essential for the robust 
nature of the state. It is expected that the development of the private sector means 
assuming a great role in the future for the provision of social services such as health, 
education, housing and others. It is true that the state intends to move slowly away from 
sectors undertaken by the private sector, and it has taken measures 
to support economic reform of the private sector.  
Saudi Arabia has identified eight strategies with the objective of reducing the 
public sector and expanding the private sector (Ministry of Economic and Planning, 
2010). 
(i) to improve the efficiency of the national economy and enhance competitiveness to 
meet challenges, including with  regional and international competition; 
(ii) to encourage private-sector investment and encourage active participation in the 
national economy, increasing the share of the private sector in the GDP to achieve 
growth within the national economy; 
(iii) to develop the citizens’ participation in productive economic activity rather than 
sustaining rentier mentality; 
(iv) to develop national capital and foreign investment locally; 
(v) to increase employment opportunities, and the optimum operation performance of 
the national labour force; 
(vi) to continue to achieve a fair increase in per capita income through the contribution 
of the private sector; 
(vii) to provide services to citizens, investors in a timely fashion, and in a cost-efficient 
manner, and 
(viii) to rationalise public expenditure and reduce the fiscal tension on the state, and to 
increase government revenues. 
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As part of economic liberalisation, privatisation can help to reduce the size of 
government, hence, but also helps to diversify the wealth generation in the economy.  In 
particular, together with other measures to create a robust private sector, privatisation 
helps to withdraw the state from economic activity and can pave the way for the further 
reduction of the size of the state by withdrawing the state from welfare services. 
  
10.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
   Recent development and economic policies in Saudi Arabia shows that policies, 
incentives and regulatory initiatives have contributed to expand the role of the private 
sector in the national economy and increase its effectiveness, leading to a steady increase 
in economic efficiency of the sector. The total contribution of the private sector to the 
GDP was 6.63%, and non-Oil GDP 89% at the end of the Eighth Development Plan.  
This indicates that the private sector can contribute to the economy through the 
opportunity spaces crated by economic diversification.  Therefore, the following policy 
recommendations suggested by this study: 
(i) The private sectors must engage effectively in the Saudi development plan that 
focuses on long-term goals. The development plan must take into account how to 
form a strong relationship between all sectors and how the function of each 
sector compliments the function(s) of the others. 
(ii) Oil revenues must be used as an effective tool to contribute to the expansion of the 
private sector; 
(iii)  The government should reduce its role and size to enhance and encourage the 
ability of its economy to function effectively, allowing more opportunities for the 
private sector in the economy.  
(iv) The government should adopt creative policies that aim to achieve gradual reduction 
in reliance on oil through a diversification of production within the economy. Those 
policies must be constructed in a way that enables the country to face an expected 
future of depletion of oil reserves. In addition, time constrains for achieving those 
policies of diversifying the production of the economy need to be set.  
(v) The people must understand and recognise that the majority of the existing 
outcomes of ‘development’ in Saudi Arabia are the result of oil revenues and not the 
outcomes of well-organised development plans and policies.  Therefore, individual 
citizens should take up more responsible roles in the economy and society beyond 
the easy life offered by rentier mentality. 
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(vi) SME development should be supported as the backbone of the stronger private 
sector. 
(vii) The institutional framework, which sponsors the development of the private sector 
through legal reform should proactively move away from heavy bureaucracy and 
red-tape and should support the developments in the private sector but also for 
small businesses needs  
(viii) Support for the Saudi stock market is still seen as modest on the largest Arab stock 
markets. Privatisation can also exercise a significant impact on the resettlement of 
capital with the creation of greater opportunities for investment while providing a 
climate to attract foreign investments, primarily in order to obtain technical support, 
technology, and marketing expertise. 
(ix) Allowing the government to reduce its budget deficit. It would also suggest that it 
does not have to continue encouraging shifts in government expenditure towards 
non-oil activities. 
These recommendations, however, are mostly related with the political economy 
of the state, which is determined by the culture, traditional and historical forces of the 
society.  Thus, main changes in the political economy of the country, such as move from 
rentier state, directly indicates the changes in the social formation of the society, which 
may not be an easy task considering the determining forces of the social formation. 
However, the country is in such a juncture that the legacies of culture, tradition and 
history may not be enough to create a competitive economy, which can sustain itself 
against the global forces beyond the position, provided by the oil revenues. The 
economy and society needs to regenerate itself according to the global political economy 
beyond the traditional modes of production and rentierism oriented distributive kinship 
or tribal modes of production. 
 
10.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research aimed at examining the association between government expenditures 
and economic growth in Saudi Arabia. However, there is a large literature on the 
determinants of increasing government expenditures. One of the research areas that can 
be developed on top of this study is hence the determinants of the increasing 
government expenditures in Saudi Arabia. In this, economic, political, social, 
demographic and public choice related factors can be considered. 
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Secondly, an attempt can be made to test the integrated model suggested by Brown 
and Jackson (1990). This can help to see various factors interactively working together 
leading to increase in government expenditures. 
Thirdly, considering that Saudi Arabia is a rentier state, the political economy of the 
Saudi rentierism through supply but also through demand side can be examined. 
An extension of rentier mentality, the impact of population and welfare demand on 
the Saudi public expenditure can also be an exciting study. 
Importantly, however, the models suggested by public choice should be considered 
as important areas of research in Saudi Arabia such as the impact of bureaucracy on the 
growing size of the economy.  Knowing that bureaucracy is an essential part of the state 
apparatus helping to distribute the wealth created by oil, the nature and aims of the 
bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia can constitute an exciting study. This can focus on the 
power of the bureaucracy and their role in the budgetary decision making to locate their 
role in the expansion of public expenditures. 
 
10.6 EPILOGUE 
This study aimed at exploring and examining the causal relationship between the 
government expenditures and economic growth in Saudi Arabia in the period of 1968-
2010. 
The foundational chapters and in particular the empirical chapters testify that the 
aims of this research has been achieved and the objectives of the research have been 
fulfilled. 
The finds of the study clearly shows that there is a clear causal relationship 
between government expenditure and the economic growth and the causality relationship 
between government expenditure and the GDP supports both Wagnerian and Keynesian 
Relation. The study also found that Peacock & Wiseman’s ‘displacement effect’ has been 
effective in certain period of economic booms and busts but also during political turn 
oils such as the case with the Gulf Wars. 
This research, hence, is now considered completed at this stage; however, similar 
to any other research it is a continuous process and will be extended by the relevant 
future research in the field. 
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